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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Should you be interested in this book?
Science is commonly perceived to be the last word in logic and objectivity, where the latter has 
two aspects to it – one of being person-independent and the other of being a true description of 
the workings of Nature. In this little book of mine I will tell you, as best as I can, of the possible 
presence of extra-logical components in the reasoning process of individuals and groups of 
individuals, making special reference to the context of scientific inquiry. And I’ll also indicate 
the possibility of a skewed fit between what science tells us about nature, and Nature itself. In the
process, we will get to understand how all this can constitute a strength rather than a deficiency 
in the way science inquires into nature.
To what extent do people conform to standards of logic and rationality in everyday reasoning 
and in scientific activity? How do the extra-logical components woven into the reasoning process
of individuals lend colour to the way they solve problems relating to workings of nature? To 
what extent does inter-personal and group interactions succeed in effacing the subjective 
component involved in individual and collective reasoning and yield objective knowledge, 
transformed from the belief-laden knowledge of individuals and groups to knowledge gained by 
humankind?
These and related questions have repeatedly been addressed by authors for a long while now. I 
will collect here a few of the basic ideas that have come up in the course of studies into these 
important and interesting issues. In the process, I hope to tell you, in outline, how and to what 
extent scientific inquiry can possibly be conditioned by the mind-set of people.
In recent decades, philosophy has taken a  naturalistic  turn. Briefly stated, naturalism looks at things
and  processes  as  they  actually  are,  without  looking  at  these  from  too  abstract  and  analytical  a
perspective – a tendency so common in philosophy. In this, the naturalist point of view follows the
point  of  view of  science  itself  (see,  for  background,  [Gonzalez1];  [Giere],  chapter  1).  The  issues
relating to mechanisms underlying the inferential processes in men, and to human rationality at large,
are now being addressed from a naturalist point of view. The branch of enquiry dealing with these and
many other related questions on mechanisms of human thinking that has developed over the last fifty
years or so is known as  cognitive science.  In this book, I will have occasion to refer to the naturalist
point of view and to ideas in cognitive science, as someone who has been keenly interested in these in
the context of philosophy of science, someone with a background in physics. 
My job in this book will be to share with my readers a point of view that has a good degree of contact
with current literature on a broad area in cognitive science and philosophy of science. I will explain a
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number of basic concepts to set the tone of this book and then go on to propose a framework that raises
deep questions on the received view of science, based on cognitive aspects of our reasoning process.
In6 the process, I will venture to place before you my own interpretation and speculation of how things
work in individual inferential processes that find expression in scientific exploration by individuals and
by scientific communities at large, again taking care that these do not conflict with the body of opinions
and beliefs shared by experts in the relevant areas of discourse.
I will do my best to build up a picture that hangs together, is not inconsistent with what experts have
found and written on the issues involved, and is, one hopes, relevant and interesting.
Here are a few words on how the text is displayed in this book.
As you can see, this book runs in two courses – one written in larger font that constitutes the main text,
and the other  in smaller  font  that  makes up a  sub-text.  The latter  is  for  the purpose of  additional
explanation and clarification, along with references to literature.  There will not be too many of the
references, and most of those will be to books and monographs. You will find only few references to
journal articles, since I do not want to burden the presentation with technicalities. You can read the text
and the sub-text any way you like.
This said, let us move ahead. I will, in the remainder of this opening chapter, take you to a brief tour of
some of the key ideas that will define the content of this book.
INFERENCE  AND  REASONING:   THE  INTRINSIC  AND  THE  EXTRINSIC
The first basic idea I wish to highlight is that of the role of inductive inference in reasoning in 
general, and in scientific inquiry in particular. Induction and deduction are commonly taken to be
two distinct modes of reasoning where, in either of the two, one starts from one or more 
premises and then draws a conclusion. This act of starting from a set of premises and reaching at 
some conclusion I will call inference. In this act of inference, a person may, depending on 
circumstances, make some use of rules that may have something to do with logic. Now, this may 
seem to be a pretty roundabout and tentative way of putting things but, in this book, you will 
soon get used to such roundabout statements, and qualifications (with or without the use of 
parentheses), because most of the time we will be treading on murky ground. 
Going back to inference and the use of rules, we will say that the act of inference conforms to the
description of reasoning whenever some set of rules of general validity are involved, applied 
sequentially. Now, the concept of rules is a tricky one since there are two distinct contexts in 
which one can talk of rules – a distinction that, at times, goes unnoticed. As a person gets into an 
act of inference, she may be following, in her own way, a set of rules of her own where, to make 
matters complicated (and interesting too!), many of the rules may be unknown even to herself 
because they operate unconsciously. These we will call intrinsic rules for the sake of easy 
reference. On the other hand, somebody, say, a cognitive psychologist, looking at her inferential 
act may try to fathom out what she (the subject) is doing, by trying to relate the relevant premises
and the conclusion by means of a set of extrinsic rules, rules called in use by her, the 
psychologist. How are these two sets of rules related?
In a sense, this is a fundamental question not only in the area of enquiry we are looking at, but in all areas
of human enquiry, being central to the concept of science itself. I, like many others, have always found it
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fascinating. This is a theme we will time and again come back to. As I see it, it is a basic question raised
by naturalism. Think of the following scenario: a sequence of numbers is being taken out from a machine
– never mind how or by whom – and the numbers are being displayed to you. You are trying to fathom
out the ‘rule’ underlying the sequence in which the numbers appear. You make a guess and find that the
guess is working – only up to a point. As more numbers come out, you make a fresh guess and are again
rewarded, but once again you find that the sequence is more inscrutable than what your guess tells you.
The rules you are guessing at and comparing with the sequence at any point of time are the extrinsic ones,
which don’t quite match with the ‘rules’, if any, by which the sequence is made up – the intrinsic ones.
For all we know, the sequence may be of a random nature, with a number of regularities built into it that
make you arrive at guesses and let you be hopeful of eventually arriving at the ‘correct’ intrinsic rues.
Nevertheless,  the intrinsic and the extrinsic remain inexorably distinct.  The business of science is no
different. Here, it is Nature that causes a multiple sequence of events for mankind to guess at the rules
underlying the occurrence of the events. Naturalism firmly distinguishes between the guesses and the
actual workings of nature, and does not entertain  abstract notions of whether and how the former may
approach the latter.     
Cognitive science tries to guess at the intrinsic rules, if any, involved in the inferential reasoning 
process of individuals by comparing it with a set of extrinsic rules, and the starting point in this 
endeavour is provided by what may be called the rules of logic. Here the term ‘logic’ really 
refers to deductive logic, because people also make frequent use of the term inductive logic, 
thereby referring to a distinct type of inferential activity. It makes more sense, however, to speak 
of inductive inference rather than of inductive logic, and to use the terms ‘deductive logic’ and 
‘logic’ interchangeably. 
At a deeper level, the concept of ‘intrinsic rules’ of nature (or, in a different context, of intrinsic rules
operating in inferential processes), taken literally, is somewhat a misplaced one. What we think of as a set
of intrinsic rules may be just a set of interrelations, or  correlations, among things in nature (or among
cognitive factors in the process of making of inferences). Science aims at understanding or ‘reproducing’
(in its models of the world or of the human mind) these correlations, but in its own interpretational terms;
what is ‘intrinsic’ to the world or to a cognitive mind, is sought to be replicated ‘externally’, by means of
‘laws’  and  ‘rules’.  Inherent  to  the  idea  of  laws  and  rules  is  the  supposition  of  some  design  (not
necessarily, though, by some superhuman mind). The correlations in nature, or among cognitive factors in
the human mind, need not be based on any ultimate design that is there for us to decipher.
In more precise terms, one has to distinguish between various classes of logic like, for instance, 
propositional logic, predicate logic, doxastic logic, and deontic logic or, more generally, 
instances of modal logic, some of which may partially overlap with one another in connotation. 
However, all of these are of the nature of deductive logic since they relate to ways of inference 
involving the operation of unequivocally defined rules of inference on premises whose meanings 
in some bigger context are not of direct relevance. As for now, all we need to know is that 
deduction and induction are two types of inferential activity that can, at least provisionally, be 
distinguished from each other. In this scheme of things, reasoning can be described as an 
inferential activity that has some correlation with rule-based inference, where the rules, generally
speaking, are not specific to individuals, and have some degree of universality such as the rules 
of deductive logic. As you see, there is no sharp distinction between reasoning and inference, 
which is only to be expected of the issues in human cognition we will be discussing in this book.
The various instances of modal logic are designed to capture different aspects of thought and reasoning,
as they operate in real life, but from the logical and computational point of view. These find applications
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in a wide variety of disciplines and are,  in particular,  of vital  relevance in  artificial  intelligence. An
overview of modal logic can be found in [Benthem]  
Indeed, as we will see, the distinction between deductive and inductive inferences is also not so 
sharp. Once again, if this sounds confusing, you better get used to it because cognitive 
psychology and some other parts of cognitive science are way apart from physics or chemistry, 
and require a different mindset. Be warned that our job here is, primarily, to get exposed to a 
number of ideas rather than to try to define those too precisely and too prematurely. In this, we 
will be following the spirit of a critique to the conventional image of science itself, an image that
is increasingly being brought into question in recent decades. 
Aspects of the conventional image of science, one that has lingered in philosophical and logical accounts
of science, as also in popular perception, have been collectively termed the ‘legend’ by Philip Kitcher
([Kitcher1], chapter 1).  Kitcher is a notable name in contemporary philosophy of science in his broad,
perceptive, and nuanced approach to issues in science, including those relating to social aspects of science
in today’s world.   
In the remainder of this chapter I will introduce a few other terms that will come up repeatedly in
this book (as these do in our everyday discourse as well) in connection with human mental 
activity, namely, perception, thinking, and cognition, of which, the last term is a bit more 
specialized compared to the other two. And again, I will be no more specific than telling you that
I will use these terms in the sense of common usage. 
PERCEPTION  AND  COGNITION
We perceive something when a set of stimuli act to influence our senses (typically, the sense 
organs) so as to create an impression of the source(s) where the stimuli originate from. 
Frequently, perception involves an internal processing of information whereby our mind comes 
to form an idea of that source of information (such as, the appearance of an external object in the 
case of visual perception) conforming, in some sense, to the nature of the source itself (thus, we 
perceive a table as a table, though there exists serious debate, not all vacuous, as to how much 
our perceived table is the same thing as the table itself). 
There has been protracted debate as to whether our senses give us an unblemished picture of the world.
Each and every act  of  perception is,  in a  very basic sense,  an act  of  interpretation in terms of  past
experience. “No one now seriously believes that the mind is a clean slate upon which the senses inscribe
their record of the world around us: that we take delivery of the evidence of the senses as we take delivery
of the post”, writes Peter Medawar, a pioneer in the field of immunology and in the science of tissue
transplantation, and philosopher of science of great clarity of view [Medawar]. Medawar goes on to quote
Nietzsche: "Everything  that  reaches  consciousness  is  utterly  and  completely  adjusted,  simplified,
schematized,  interpreted,....",  and  Kant  as  well:  "experience  is  itself  a  species  of  knowledge  which
involves understanding,...". 
Here is one more instance of how perception involves complex psychological processing of information
received from the world: “Perceptual processes were at one time believed to be lower-level functioning,
both because they are accomplished without our conscious control and because even animals can do such
things as recognize patterns ....... and learn spatial layouts.... . Perceptual processes were contrasted with
the higher mental processes, such as problem solving, logical thinking, and decision making, which are
8
accomplished consciously, and are much less obvious in animals. There is, however, a basic problem with
labeling perceptual processes as lower-level: The ability to recognize patterns and direct our attention
involves very elaborate cognitive computations, which are heavily influenced by top-down processes that
depend on one’s knowledge and interpretation of situations. Thus, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to
separate lower and higher forms of cognition” ([Weisberg], p181).
The idea that all our perception of nature is, fundamentally, an interpretation, will constitute a recurring
theme in this book.     
Incidentally,  we often use the term ‘perception’ in a deeper and broader sense (my perception of the
current political situation differs from yours). This variation in senses attached to the same term is very
common when we try to say something of our mental world, since the mind is an infinitely complex and
flexible whole, where it is almost impossible (but often necessary!) to meaningfully distinguish between
parts of it or between mental processes of various descriptions.  
When we say that perception involves some processing of information, we are close to the sense 
carried by the term cognition, because cognition is commonly understood to be that mental 
activity where there takes place some processing of thoughts and ideas, tied to some purpose. 
What is important and interesting in this context is that some (or most) of the processing may be 
of an unconscious nature, which we ourselves may not be aware of. Cognition, in other words, 
refers to a broad class of mental activity that includes inference making and reasoning in which, 
generally speaking, there is a conscious component. In this, inference making and reasoning are 
special types of cognitive activity where there is a relatively greater role of a ‘purpose’ or a 
‘goal’ guiding the course of the cognitive activity though, again, the purpose or goal may be, to a
large extent, hidden from our own conscious awareness.
While perception and cognition are broader in scope than inference making and reasoning, 
thinking is, again, a broad and all-inclusive term with unconscious and conscious processes 
involved in it. Of, course, like everything else, the term ‘thinking’ is used in senses often widely 
differing from one another (what were you doing?, - oh, just thinking; or, I am thinking hard how
best to entertain our guests); but, well, what can one do? 
CONCEPT:  THE BASIC  ENTITY  OF  THOUGHT
One other term will be especially relevant for our purpose in this book: concept. What is a 
concept? As I see it, a concept is some kind of organized thought about some object or set of 
objects (or about some other concept(s)) that tells us something about the object and that is made
use of in any context involving that object. For instance, my concept of a table is involved when 
I ask somebody to move our dining table to some other place in the room (the concept tells me 
that the table is something that can be moved, by the application of some particular kind of 
effort, without getting altered in any appreciable way) or when I am engaged in a philosophical 
debate, claiming that the table is not entirely what it seems to be (the concept tells me that there 
are aspects to the table not perceived by me). The term concept holds a huge significance since it
is by means of concepts that we understand and organize the world around us and, what is more, 
act in (and upon) it. Concept, in brief, is the thought entity by means of which we make sense of 
our world and of our life. A concept commonly involves a central entity (the table) associated 
with numerous other entities stored in the mind, all these woven into a single whole. Concepts, in
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turn, are associated with one another at various levels so as to make up more complex structures 
like ideas, beliefs, and items of knowledge. I emphasize the term association here: association 
between thought elements in the formation of concepts, and association between concepts in the 
formation of more complex forms of thought. 
In summary, I have introduced to you the terms ‘reasoning’ and ‘inference’, ‘deductive’ and 
‘inductive’ types of inference, and ‘logic’. I have also mentioned terms that will hover in the 
background throughout the discourse presented in this book – ‘thinking’ (or ‘thought’), 
‘cognition’, and ‘perception’. And I have told you what the term ‘concept’ will be meant to stand
for. This will constitute the starting point to the next phase of our journey where we will dwell 
upon these ideas at greater length, and upon many other related concepts and ideas.
THE  SUBSTRATUM  OF  COGNITION
 Let me go back to the point where I digressed from, namely, inductive inference. While the 
basic idea of inductive inference will be one constituent of the central theme that will define this 
book, the other constituent ideas of dominating relevance will relate to the substratum of mental 
activities that determine and guide the process of inductive inference – activities that belong to a 
substratum in the sense that these have traditionally been ignored in the understanding and 
analysis of human cognition, and also in the sense that it involves a multitude of mental 
processes that the individual (or the group of individuals) engaged in making the inference is 
often not aware of. I refer to the substratum of the cognitive unconscious.
This idea of a substratum is of relevance in every sphere and at every level  of human enquiry.  It  is
relevant, in the sense indicated above, in the context of the way we perceive the process of cognition.
More generally, it is relevant in the way science inquires about nature. Any such enquiry is, by the very
nature of things, limited to some specific domain or other, and there is a substratum that is either ignored
as  being  not  of  relevance  or  whose  existence  is  not  known or  suspected.  But,  unknown to  us,  the
substratum holds the key to many things. For instance, in the domain of electricity and magnetism, the
substratum, at one stage of discourse (before the introduction of unifying ideas by Faraday and Maxwell),
was constituted by the wave nature of electrical and magnetic disturbances, which held the key to a vast
range of phenomena involving the joint variation of electrical and magnetic field strengths. Again, within
the context of the classical electromagnetic theory, the substratum relates to the quantum nature of the
electrical  and magnetic fields. This is another theme that will be repeatedly encountered in this book:
every  enquiry  is  limited  to  some  specific  context or  other  that  may  or  may  not  be  explicitly
acknowledged, underneath which lurks a substratum – one that is either not known to us or about which
we are not aware. The entire perspective of the enquiry changes as the substratum is recognized and taken
into account, whereby a new context is set.
LOGICAL LEAPS IN INFERENCE
Continuing with the question of inductive inference, I will, in this book, devote quite a few 
words to induction and deduction, broadly distinguishing between the two (I will outline to you 
the sense in which these two are distinct and also the one in which they overlap), emphasizing 
time and again that inductive inference is a process involving logical leaps, i.e., gaps in the 
sequential application of rules of a more or less general validity – ones of well-defined nature. 
This is an all-important and pervasive feature of human thinking that begins at the level of the 
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most trivial mental activity of the child and of the grown-up (and, of course, the trivial is only 
seemingly so) and ending at the level of the most intricate scientific reasoning of the individual 
and the scientific community. The logical gaps entail, inevitably, the necessary role of choice 
between alternatives, where a choice is a selection that is not dictated by rules independent of the
specific context in which the choice is made. This will again require that we address the question 
as to what the choice really and precisely is and how it is actually exercised, and will again make
us confront the question of conscious and unconscious factors in determining the course of 
human inferential activity. Incidentally, whenever we exercise a choice, we actually make a 
decision. The exercise of choice and the making of decisions, these are ubiquitous at all levels of 
human activity though we are not always aware of these. The surgeon makes a choice and saves 
the patient’s life; or, the general exercises a choice and makes a strategic retreat – it is only such 
momentous events that engage our attention. But, unknown to us, choices and decisions continue
to be made incessantly, and this is what makes our very existence possible.
WHAT SCIENCE AIMS AT
Science is done by the individual scientist on the one hand, and by the scientific community on 
the other. I will not try to define who the individual scientist is, or what differentiates her from 
her fellow men. And the scientific community will remain similarly undefined, like so many 
other things in this book, because explicit definition does not always add to understanding. 
In quite a considerable number of issues addressed in this book, I will rely on what I think is the common
ground between me and you, and will not try too hard to make things ‘evident’ – all I want to do is to
share, and not to impart. Sharing begins on common ground and ends up expanding it.
The scientific thinking of the individual is generated and processed in the labyrinthine innards of 
the human mind and, as such, is conditioned by and stamped with individual idiosyncrasies. At 
the same time, the initiation of the thought process and the final product of it have to relate, at 
least in some sense, to what the scientific community thinks and does. It is the community that 
ultimately decides whether and when the intellectual product offered by the individual scientist 
gets to be integrated into mankind’s storehouse of knowledge. Here we will have to confront the 
question as to how far the socialization of individual thought leads to an objective view of nature,
as it is commonly supposed to.  
And this will open up another vital issue: what is science for? Is science a means to solve, and to 
keep on solving, problems faced by men and groups of men as they move along in the business 
of their life, a means to continually ensure and improve upon their survival and existence? In 
short, is science a means and a strategy to solve problems faced by men and women in this 
world? Problems relating to disease, hunger, and the innumerable other aspects of living? Or, is 
science a strategy to probe into the workings of nature, into the hidden secrets and mysteries that 
make nature what it is? How much of a practical necessity is science and how much of an 
aspiration to Truth? Can it be that the two are so intimately related that it is futile to seek an 
answer to this question either way? Or, can it be that by recognizing the distinctive natures of 
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these two aspects to science we can achieve clarity in addressing and answering some other 
questions of concern to us? I don’t really know, but we will see ..... .   
Whatever be the purpose that the individual or the scientific community may want fulfilled by 
doing and practising science, the effort to do science involves immensely complex motivations, 
aspirations, tensions, and intellectual resources. Some of these are within the individual, and 
some within the community, but the two merge unto each other in unfathomable ways. In this 
book, my attention will be focused once onto the individual and once onto the community, but 
always with the implied admission that the individual is a microcosm of the community and the 
community carries all the contrariness of the individual. Science begins in the mind of the 
individual and ends up in the knowledge, belief, and practice of the community. And again, it 
begins in the concerns of the community, and ends up blossoming in the mind of the individual.
By the term ‘community’ I will  primarily mean the scientific community within which the individual
scientist works; at times it will implicitly stand for smaller groups of workers in the immediate periphery
of the working scientist with whom she collaborates and shares her thoughts; and at others it will mean the
social environment at large that nourishes and nurtures her and, at the same time, makes her a part of a
complex process. 
THE  LOGICAL  AND  THE EXTRA-LOGICAL:  INFERENCES  AND  BELIEFS
And now I feel I have set the tone of this book: Within the broader question of what we want 
science to do for us – how much we do science with a view to understanding the mysteries of 
nature and how much to acting upon nature to achieve certain ends – this book will take up the 
question of how science is done by the individual situated within a broader context – the context 
provided by the scientific community on the one hand, and by the broader social and cultural 
environment on the other. In the pursuit of both these questions, we will examine the role that 
logic plays in the scientific activity of the individual and the scientific community, and in 
shaping our concept of nature, and we will look at the nature and extent of extra-logical aspects 
in the inferential processes involved in everyday activity and in science. These extra-logical 
aspects relate to the logical leaps and the choices that are forced upon us in facing and 
confronting the world around us, in confronting Nature if you wish, where both conscious and 
unconscious factors contribute to the process of taking a leap and making a choice. 
In  this  book,  I  will  adopt  the  view  that  doing  science  is  continuous  with  our  everyday,  mundane
inferential activity, while being an exceptionally special and focused instance of the latter.
In this, the two recurrent themes that will be thrust upon your attention will be: inductive 
inference, and belief. Belief is commonly, and quite justifiably, held to be the harbinger of 
superstition, pseudo-science, and bigotry. At the same time, belief is also commonly held to be 
the antithesis of logical inquiry. But here I will try to present a different perception of the role of 
belief. 
BELIEF- EMOTION- FEELING:  THE  UNACKNOWLEDGED  TRINITY 
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Belief is that vast marshy ground that supports both superstition and bigotry on the one hand, and
the most astounding inferential feat on the other. And it is exquisitely difficult to disentangle 
these two aspects of belief from each other. Part of the difficulty lies in the fact that there has not
been much relevant work specifically on belief in cognitive psychology, while not an 
inconsiderable part also relates to the nature of belief itself. Belief is not knowledge, but it 
provides that substratum on which knowledge rests and unto which knowledge merges 
continuously, quite seamlessley and with little differentiating shade. In inductive inference, 
belief provides the springboard for logical leaps, the compass needle that, rightly or wrongly, lets
us select, choose, and decide among alternatives for which pure logic supplies no clue. And in 
this, belief is aided and abetted by emotion and feeling. Belief, emotion, and feeling, these make 
up the triumvirate, operating mostly in the unconscious world of men, that I believe to have a 
great but subtle role in guiding and shaping their scientific quest, a quest commonly perceived to 
be the pinnacle of conscious, logical inquiry on the part of humankind. In this book I will tell you
if there is ground for this belief of mine.
THE   RECEIVED  VIEW  –  AND  BEYOND
Indeed, this book will, in its own way, pose a critique to the commonly held image or, in other 
words, the ‘received view’, of science. As I have stated above, recent decades have witnessed a 
questioning, from various different quarters, of the traditional image of science and, as a matter 
of course, of science itself – of what science has been doing to our world. I will draw from some 
of these other critiques. I will, in particular, look into the question of how objective a view of 
nature science provides us with and examine how fragile that view is. This, along with a number 
of other similarly important issues, will constitute an implied re-examination of the commonly 
held perception of science, if not of science itself.
The origin of the ‘received view’ is diffuse, since this view resulted from diverse accounts of science and
the scientific method given by scientists and philosophers, and other men of eminence, mostly belonging
to the western intellectual tradition. Roger Bacon and Francis bacon are considered as initiators in the
building up of the perception of what should count as the method of science. The British empiricists
contributed greatly to the further consolidation of the view, to which a logical foundation was added by
the logical positivists and logical empiricists of the last century. Many of these trends within the broad
umbrella of the received view were, of course, remarkably acute and prolific, and were sharp enough to
lay the foundation of a critical examination of the received view itself. Karl Popper, while an outspoken
critic of logical positivism, was among the last great architects of the received view, and attempted the
formulation of a sharp criterion for the  demarcation between what is  scientific and what is  not.  The
demarcation  problem subsequently  lost  its  initial  promise  of  providing  a  precise  definition  of  what
science is supposed to be. Ironically, the Marxist trend in social movements contributed to the perception
of science as a disembodied intellectual process, realizing the immutable laws of dialectics. It added to the
received view the tenet of social determination (but not social construction) of the course of science that
eventually turned out to be a simplistic and suffocating point of view while, at the same time, retaining
the potential to pose a substantial critique to science in the present day world. 
The counter-current to the received view began with a naturalistic turn to the philosophy of science whose
origins were, however, yet more diffuse. Results of the naturalist turn in the philosophy of science were
augmented by trends in cognitive psychology that emerged as the behaviourist approach in psychology
lost momentum. Naturalism, moreover, is itself not a sharply defined point of view, and various naturalist
trends are often devoid of a common and strong family resemblance. Michael Polanyi was among the
early critics of the logical positivist and logical empiricist view of science as the repository of impersonal,
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logical,  and  objective  knowledge,  progressing  cumulatively  to  a  true  picture  of  nature  and  its  inner
mechanisms.  N.  R.  Hanson,  the  “Flying  Professor”,  raised  doubts  against  the idea  of  an  ‘objective’
confirmation of scientific theories by observed data, pointing out that observation itself was theory-laden
and, drawing upon the pragmatist tradition in the philosophy of science, contributed in no small measure
to the inauguration of the cognitive-naturalist era. And then came the final onslaught by ideas unleashed
by Thomas Kuhn ([Kuhn1]), aided quite considerably by a criticism of the received view of science by
Paul Feyerabend [Feyerabend]. 
Philip Kitcher [Kitcher1] has drawn a distinction between ‘legend bashers’ and ‘science bashers’. Among
the former are those critics of the received view of science who aim at transcending the limiting horizon
of the received view and arriving at some position beyond that horizon. Kitcher is himself a critic who,
nevertheless, aspires to identify a ‘legacy’ to the legend that has been built around the received view. 
Science bashers, on the other hand, will not be referred to in this book beyond making the remark that
science bashing is the necessary obverse of science fetishism which completely ignores deep questions
relating to the idea, seemingly ingrained in science, of taking control over Nature. Science, indeed, is in
trouble in today’s world since it has become, to all intents and purpose, synonymous with  control  and
power. 
These few remarks are, of course, too sweeping to be taken seriously. I include these as being indicative
of the spirit in which this book would like to view the commonly held perception of science. Precisely
because of the sweeping and personal nature of the appraisal presented in these remarks, I do not include
a great many references to substantiate what I say. However, I consider  [Kitcher1]  and  [Kitcher2]  as
general references that you may find useful, and illuminating too. 
The themes raised in this chapter will run through the course of this book.
I will move on from here.
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CHAPTER 2 
OBJECTIVITY
How  truthful  is  science?
Or
Does  science  REALLY  describe  the  workings  of  Nature? 
This chapter will be concerned, principally, with scientific realism.
 
I will examine, to the best of my understanding, how objective our conception of Nature, gained 
through Science, is. Now, the term ‘objective’ may have different connotations in different 
contexts. One possible connotation is: person-independence. We would prefer the findings of 
science to be independent of the idiosyncrasies and the mind-sets of individuals, as also of those, 
if any, of specific communities and cultures. In short, we would prefer science to be a product of 
the whole of mankind. At this point, I will not question as to how far this ideal aspiration is 
achievable, either in practice or in principle. I will provisionally assume that, somehow, science 
appears as a product of mankind without any birthmark resulting from its origins in individuals 
and particular scientific communities. In that case, the second connotation of the word 
‘objective’ will demand attention and examination: how accurately does Science tell us what 
Nature actually is, and what its inner workings are?  
The question of impersonality of science will be addressed in subsequent chapters (mostly in chapters 3,
5, and 6), where we will get to face the contrariness inherent in the process of science: science purports to
be knowledge possessed by mankind, but it develops in the minds of individuals – minds deeply riddled
with beliefs of a personal nature alongside of ones less personal and more objective.
This, in brief, is the question that scientific realism addresses.
There exists quite a vast literature on scientific realism and critical appraisals of scientific 
realism from various different points of view. This is a subject of hard core philosophy which it 
is way beyond me even to think of outlining or summarizing, let alone attempting an in-depth 
review on. Scientific realism as a point of view, or as a philosophical position, has had its 
beginnings in antiquity, and continues till date to spawn heavily polemical literature of various 
shades at a rate that shows no signs of abetting. The polemics proliferates into ever-expanding 
areas, in pace with scientific theories themselves.
My aim in this chapter is, as a matter of fact, quite modest, one which neither the realist nor the 
antirealist will, perhaps, consider worthy of objection in any strong measure. In the end, 
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however, I will likely be judged closer to the realist position, and the antirealist may not be 
happy. The realist also may not feel comfortable in my company, but I will not worry too much 
on questions of who thinks what, and will now get down to what I want to say to you on how and
to what extent science describes nature and explains its workings.
Recall that I want this book  to make you aware, if you are already not so, that the conception of nature
that science builds up, is rather riddled with logical  gaps or, in other words, science is not as logical a
business as it is commonly made out to be, being in the nature of an interpretation of the world. It is the
existence of the irreducible gap between the interpretation and that which is interpreted, that, on the face
of it, speaks against realism. At the same time, this book does not want to give you the impression that
science is not much more than a convenient and clever  exercise,  with little engagement  with reality,
where it is incapable of making authentic statements about nature, which is where it will differ from the
antirealist point of view as well: if science constitutes an interpretation of the world, then the world has
necessarily to be supposed to exist independently of the interpretation.
THE  IRREDUCIBLE  GAP
The very first thing that, I think, is needed, is to stick to the basic fact that our conception of 
nature, as built up in scientific theories, is distinct from nature itself. I will not adopt the position
of stating that it is meaningless to talk of ‘nature itself’, which is the stance sometimes adopted in
critiques of realism where one underlines the fact that the most that we can say in the matter is to
the effect that we have innumerable ‘sense data’- various sensations on the basis of which we 
build up all our concepts and theories. 
When we press our palm against a table-top, we feel some specific sensation which, when we 
come to think of it, is all that we have in this particular instance of our conception of a table. To 
be sure, we can also see the table standing in front of us, but there again, all we can be ‘certain’ 
of is our sensation of vision. Even summing up all our sensations about the table, we can never 
be sure of the existence of the table itself. 
How, for instance, can we rule out the possibility of an omnipotent malicious demon creating in 
us the illusion of all these sensations of a table, which is how Descartes argued his case for 
radical scepticism? (Likewise, Descartes argued, you cannot rule out being in a state of perpetual
dream.) This is the position of idealism that Bishop Berkeley espoused. It may seem to be a 
strange position to adopt for a mind as remarkably penetrating as Berkeley’s. Berkeley’s 
arguments were indeed of great cogency, so much so that if one cares to follow those arguments 
closely, one will be left with little option but to reach the position to which he leads ([Ladyman], 
chapter 5).
Rene Descartes (1596-1650) is acknowledged as one of the founders of modern western philosophy. His
approach  was  a  foundationalist  one  in  that  he  looked for  irreducible  foundations  of  knowledge.  He
adopted an attitude of fundamental scepticism towards things empirical and accepted the workings of the
mind (that part of it of which we are aware) as the one facet of reality we can be certain of, being the
fountainhead of rationality. The other facet of reality the mind works on is a God-given one, distinct from
the reality our senses tend to lead us to. In this, Descartes’  position was antithetical  to the one later
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adopted by the empiricists who accepted the empirical as the ultimate authentic source of knowledge, and
were sceptical towards the authenticity of what the mind infers. 
George Berkeley (1685-1753) accepted the reality of the sense impressions but did not accept these as
being caused indubitably by an independently existing world. Reality, in other words, consisted only of
sense impressions or ideas, and the mind that perceives those ideas. Our conception of an independently
existing real world is possibly some kind of a trick that the ideas play on us.
This is one instance of a general problem that we will encounter again and again in our 
discourse. It is indeed not possible to come up with a purely logical argument taking us from our 
sensations to the world ‘out there’, since there does exist an irreducible gap between the two.  
The realist’s argument that our sensations must be sensations of something, and that that 
something is simply the world out there, may appear to be quite ‘natural’, but that still does not 
make it incontrovertible from the point of view of logic, because one may conjure up alternative, 
though apparently weird, explanations of our sensations like the one invoking the malicious 
demon (or a modernized version of it, namely, the so-called ‘brain-in-the-vat’; there exist entire 
semi-religious philosophies saying that the world is nothing but one great illusion). Arguments 
between realists and people going by these theories of mind-dependent reality – a reality that is a
construct of the mind making use of the sense impressions – can be endless as also pointless 
since the worlds of the two protagonists never meet. 
The ‘brain-in-a-vat’ (see, for instance, [Poundstone]) is a certain type of  thought experiment supporting
the  position of  universal  scepticism (akin  to  Cartesian  doubt)  towards  an  empirically  sensed  reality.
Assuming that all our sensations and ideas originate in patterns of neuronal excitation in our brains, it is
not necessary to enquire further as to where those excitations come from. A disembodied brain, with its
neurons excited in various appropriate patterns can be made to produce exactly the series of sensations
that an individual goes through in her life. Once again, there is no sure-shot way of countering such an
argument because it is meant to be impervious to any such attempt.
The world, indeed, transcends our senses and our concepts (or, to put it differently, our concepts 
transcend the world), and to reach from the latter to the former is a fundamental and irreducible 
act of induction that the realist cannot deny, and the more sensibly he comes to terms with this 
basic fact the wiser he will prove himself to be. It is precisely the gap between nature-in-itself 
and our conception of nature that implies the possibility of alternative routes in the explanation 
of our sense data, such as the evil demon, the brain in the vat, or even the world as a big dream 
or illusion. 
The  ‘irreducible  gap’  between  Nature  and  our  conception  of  it  is,  however,  only  a  matter  of  our
perception as cognitive agents. More of this later.
It is all very well to accept the realist explanation, of the existence of a real and structured world 
causing our sense impressions, as ‘natural’, and to dismiss these other explanations as ‘weird’ 
and contrived, but quite another to use pure logic alone in the act of dismissal because, in the 
end, all these labels like ‘natural’ or ‘weird’ are extra-logical qualifications that we impose on 
concepts and theories. Later in this book we will have occasion to look into the matter of the 
relevance of such qualifications in making inferences in our daily life and in doing science (the 
general theory of relativity is a BEAUTIFUL one; the many-worlds interpretation of quantum theory
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looks WEIRD to me; he has the knack of coming up with SIMPLE  and ELEGANT ideas. All we have to 
take note of now is that these qualifications do not necessarily make an explanation either 
compelling or worthless from the point of view of pure logic. The way we interpret the relation 
between our sensations and the world around us is a choice that we have to make – one that 
cannot be done sitting back and looking at formulas in logic. All our life we have to go on 
applying our mind, look at possible alternatives, and risk making choices – the responsibility for 
the making of those choices lies with us, and us alone. The choice of accepting the position that 
all our senses are caused by an independent and structured reality (the senses are also part of that 
reality) is a huge act of induction that every child goes through without ever being aware of it. 
And, as she grows up, she renews her commitment to the choice, this time consciously, and 
continues to get along with it unless, of course, she gets weary of accepting the responsibility of 
making choices and decisions in a real, uncertain, and troubled world, and swaps position so as 
to believe now that the world is one big illusion.  
THE  OBSERVABLE  AND  THE  UNOBSERVABLE
Of course, the acceptance of a real world independent of our minds is not the end but rather just 
the beginning of scientific realism. While scientific realism has got to say much more than this, it
is not, however, one single, neatly defined package. Protagonists differ from one another in what 
they accept as the defining description of scientific realism. However, pretty much everybody 
committed to realism has to address the question of a supposed distinction between ‘observable’ 
and ‘unobservable’ entities making up the world. The table in front of me is one instance of an 
observable entity while the electron, of whose existence we become aware only indirectly, by 
certain effects created by it, such as by a voltage pulse in an ionization chamber, is an 
unobservable entity. There is a philosophical position that tells us that the claims made in 
scientific theories about the unobservable entities are only convenient means of describing and 
systematizing various observations, and the entities themselves cannot be assumed to ‘exist’ in 
any real sense.
Most realists, however, agree that the electron is as ‘real’ as the table in the dining room, though 
the means of registering the existence of the two differ from one another. I will stick by my 
earlier disclaimer that I will not enter into a detailed analysis of all the various philosophical 
points of view. In this book, I will state my position on a number of philosophical issues without 
any appreciable engagement with philosophical literature.
While the statements that I make are not inconsistent with what has been said by specialists in the various
issues involved, these will, however, not always be consistent with the position adopted by any particular
philosophical  camp. In  philosophy,  issues  are  discussed  and  analyzed  through debate  and  discourse,
rather than by reference to any independent ‘objective’ determinant of the validity of this or that position.
In looking into what the philosophers say on any particular question or issue, one often finds them to be
clustered  into  groups  around  leading  personalities  whose  theses  serve  as  nuclei  for  contending
viewpoints. However, I will, at times, cut across the various contending viewpoints and put together the
content of this book in what may appear to be a synthetic approach. Broadly speaking, I will be close to
the realist point of view, but here again, I will move across various different positions within the realist
camp. Indeed, I will be adopting a naturalist orientation while remaining committed to a broadly realist
point of view. Rather than burden you with an account of where my philosophical loyalties lie (I do not
have strong loyalties to speak of), my aim will be to tell you as clearly as I can, and to the best of my
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understanding, how and to what extent scientific theories describe nature and where, in this, these bear the
stamp of extra-logical inferential leaps.
OBSERVATION INVOLVES INTERPRETATION
 To come back to the issue of the table and the electron, I will adopt the position that there is no 
big difference between the two from the point of view of scientific inquiry. The table top causes 
our visual sensory organ to be excited in a more or less direct manner while the causal link from 
the state of the electron to our sensory perception is much more indirect, mediated through a 
number of intermediate stages. My perception of the table, while apparently a simple and direct 
act, involves a complex process nevertheless, starting from the excitation of the visual organ, and
proceeding through a large number of transformations and associations in my mind, partly 
conscious and mostly unconscious. The result of these transformations can, in a sense, be 
compared with a theory, because a theory is likewise a complex thing even when it appears to be 
a simple one and because a theory is, like my visual perception, an interpretation of what our 
sense data, directly or indirectly received, communicate to us. My perception involves, much like
a scientific theory, a large number of associations and chains of reasoning, some explicit and 
some defined only implicitly. An electron causes transformations in the states of systems used 
for ‘observing’ it, and the actual act of observation is an inference based on some kind of a 
theory, this time mostly an explicit one, as to how and why such transformations occur. For 
instance, consider the statement that the voltage pulse in an ionization chamber is caused the by 
ionization of gas molecules by means of electromagnetic interactions. This, of course, is part of a
theory, a theory of what electromagnetic interactions are, a theory of how and when such 
interactions cause the ionization of a gas, and so on. All these remain implied when a scientist 
says that she has ‘observed an electron’. 
That  every  observation  is,  in  some  sense,  an  interpretation  in  terms  of  some  theory  lurking  in  the
background, has been the focus of protracted discussion in the philosophy of science. Norwood Russell
Hanson,  the  prolific  and  colourful  “Flying  Professor”  of  philosophy,  drew  attention  to  the  theory-
ladenness of observations [Hanson1], while Kuhn lent a great deal of weight to this view, within his own
terms of discourse, by underlining how the perception of a scientist depends on the world of beliefs and
theories she resides in ([Kuhn1], chapter 10). It is now commonly accepted that observations are indeed
conditioned  by  conceptions  of  a  theoretical  nature  ([Churchland],  [Medawar]) acquired  in  past
experience, and that there is no great distinction between the observable and unobservable parts of reality.
However,  the  theory-laden  nature  of  all  observations  has  lent  itself  to  other  interpretations  as  well,
notably  an  interpretation  espoused  by  anti-realism  in  general,  and  relativism [Brewer-Lambert] in
particular. If observation is theory-laden, then there is no independent determinant of reality since it is
through observations that we are supposed to come to our understanding of reality. In particular, various
alternative conceptions of reality are possible,  depending on the theoretical  framework we choose to
employ which, in essence, is the point of view of relativism. Of course, almost everything can be given an
interpretation  in  accordance  with  our  chosen  point  of  view,  and  the  idea  of  theory-ladenness  is  no
exception. For instance, one can say that our conception of reality is constituted by a complex interplay of
facts of observation, originating in an independently existing reality, and the framework of prior beliefs
and conceptions that we constantly make use of in interpreting the observations, which would be closer to
how I should like to express things. 
And,  as  for  relativism,  I  should  not  be  disturbed  by  the  fact  that  there  can  be  various  different
interpretations of any given part of reality, corresponding to various different ways we make sense of
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facts  of  observation  in  terms  of  our  prior  beliefs  and  concepts,  so  long  as  we  recognize  that  these
interpretations are  all  oriented  towards  the  same  reality  – the latter  continues to exist  and to  evolve
without regard to how we interpret it. Moreover, the framework of beliefs and concepts that we use in
interpreting facts of observation cannot be just anything, constructed extempore at the bidding of our
whim, because any such framework is built in a protracted course of experience involving innumerable
acts of inference and interpretation in the past, ones moreover, that have been tested against earlier facts
of  observation.  It  may  very  well  be  that  there  are  more  than  one  such  frameworks,  depending  on
culturally acquired differences in modes of thought, but that still does not make these arbitrary, with little
commitment to explain an independently existing reality and, in particular,  to explain further facts of
observation as  these are  found in the course of  time.  It  is  here  that  the various different  theoretical
frameworks will have to face a reality check when some of these will prove ineffective, some less so and,
perchance, one among these alternative theories will get transformed into a broader and more powerful
theory to take on the continuing challenge of reality.                                       
But we should not digress too much. We adopt the position that, in a certain sense at least, the 
table and the electron are equally real and, on the other hand, our perception of either is akin to a 
theory. But, what does this actually mean? Does this make them amenable to unambiguous 
description by our theories? Here lies an open terrain that is not so easy to map. Because here, 
precisely, lies that gap between reality and our conception of reality. There must be something 
out there that is causally linked to my perception of the table or my conception of the electron. 
But that something is – I am rather tempted to say – quite fathomless. It gets only very partially 
and incompletely registered or mapped into my perception or conception or theory, whatever you
will. Consider, for instance, the table first. Is it that solid object made of wood that has four legs 
and a plane top that stands before me? Or, is it that collection of atoms or molecules that do not 
have precisely defined positions and are incessantly in vibrational motion around their mean 
positions, held together by invisible bonds and separated by vacuous spaces? Or is it a still more 
nebulous thing comprised of protons, neutrons and electrons, with all these corpuscles engaged 
in a crazy whirlwind of a dancing exercise? Or, even focusing on a single electron, what can one 
make of this astounding speck of reality? Is it a particle with a certain absurdly small mass, a 
certain quantum of charge, a certain ‘spin’ (in the jargon of physics), and so on? Or, is it, once 
again, something completely different, like, say, a certain state of a wave field? 
OBSERVATIONS  ARE  PARTIAL:  MULTIPLE  LAYERS  OF  DESCRIPTION
Whatever reality is out there, it seems to be really pretty inscrutable! Every single bit of reality 
has multiple levels of description. And each of these multiple levels invokes a picture of that bit 
of reality utterly different from the one evoked by another level. You will find realists (many of 
them scientists, really) who refuse to be intimidated by these multiple layers of reality and rather 
take it in their stride without making much mystery about it, telling you that this is the most 
natural thing to be expected of science which goes ever deeper into the description and 
explanation of the real world, discovering ever more fundamental modes of description. Indeed, 
probing nature at greater and greater depths is the specific business of the scientists (we are 
principally talking of physics and physicists here, but our discourse, generally speaking, will be 
inclusive of other disciplines as well), which is why they are quite so nonchalant about these 
multiple levels of description. 
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Here, though, is a question that requires serious thought. Our conception of the world goes on 
changing like, for instance, from the conception of the table as a single object to the table as a 
collection of atoms and molecules, to the same table as a collection of protons, neutrons, and 
electrons, and so on. Evidently, none of these conceptual changes was accompanied with a 
corresponding change in the world itself, which means that the thing out there that we refer to as 
the table remains its old self, whatever that self is. While the world does not change, our 
conception of it changes, and changes rather radically. This, of course, testifies to the existence 
of the gap between the world and our conception of it. But, granted that the gap is there, what 
can one say of the successive stages that our conception of the world passes through?
Even as I have depicted the successive stages of our conception of the table as differing drastically from
one another,  the  actual  process  of  change  in  our  conceptual  world  is,  in  most  cases,  more  gradual.
Conceptions don’t change overnight. There was a more or less  prolonged stage when people did not
know of electrons and protons, but had a fairly good idea that matter is made up of atoms and molecules.
The concept of electrons, protons and neutrons, and their role in the structure of atoms and molecules
took a long time developing and maturing. But at the end, people did arrive at a theory of structure of
matter  that  looked radically  different  from the theory  based on atoms and molecules  as  the ultimate
building blocks. 
This, indeed, is a tricky question. Science is supposed to give a true picture of the world. Which 
of the successive conceptual stages I mentioned above, are true, in the sense of being a correct 
representation of the object out there we have been referring to as ‘the table’? Evidently, not all 
of these conceptual representations can be true at the same time. Okay, so can we say that none 
of these is true by itself in any absolute sense, but that these are more and more accurate 
representations of ‘the’ truth? This is the view that most realists, and most scientists, appear to 
subscribe to. 
We will have more to say on this later in chapter 9, where we will see how complex the concept of truth 
about nature is. Briefly stated, truth has two aspects to it, one relating to the mental process of arriving at 
truth – a process that results in an interpretation of some part of nature, and not in an exact description of 
it, and the other relating to nature itself, to which the truth pertains. The first of these two aspects can, in a
sense, be said to belong to the domain of epistemology, and the second to that of ontology. 
I have referred to the irreducible gap between nature and our conception of it. It is precisely because of 
that gap that our scientific theories, however successful and accurate these are, are interpretations, and not
exact descriptions of nature. The gap relates to the fact that there is no mechanism by which nature as a 
whole imprints an exact copy of itself on our minds. Instead, numerous signals originating in the world 
out there, transmitted through various channels of observation, stimulate our senses and these stimulations
then interact with conceptions stored in our minds that have been produced in a long series of past 
experiences. It is due to this specific manner of processing of incoming information in the light of past 
experience, where the incoming information is filtered in a selective manner, depending on current goals 
and our cognitive and perceptual capabilities, that all our inferences and theories assume the nature of 
interpretations. The contrary and complex nature of truth resides precisely in the fact that the vehicle of 
truth is an interpretation rather than an exact description.  It is this that lies underneath all the clashes, 
conflicts, and turmoil in everyday life, where men have to exercise their judgment to approach truth, but 
have no magic wand of judgment at their disposal.
In scientific investigations, however, that magic wand is, in a sense, provided by nature itself because 
here a standard of judgement emerges through repeated processes of experimentation, observation, and 
confirmation. While none of these processes elevates a scientific theory from the status of an 
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interpretation to that of objective truth in any absolute and logical sense, we will assume that the scientific
process, to all intents and purposes, is capable of interpreting parts of nature within given domains of 
investigation in an impersonal  way, i.e., in a manner independent of the process of interpretation 
occurring in the minds of individuals and groups of individuals. However, so far as an understanding of 
nature as a whole is concerned, a scientific theory, in spite of the elaborate process of justification that 
elevates it to the status of an impersonal interpretation, remains an interpretation nevertheless, since it 
captures only some limited aspect of nature, and is contextual, where the idea of context is again a 
complex one, involving ‘internal’ and ‘external’ aspects, as we will see below. As a consequence, the 
evolution of scientific theories is not a smooth one since there occurs a dramatic restructuring of a theory 
as the external context of observation and interaction with nature gets changed, and also as the internal 
context, made up of the existing framework of our ideas, evolves with time. In other words, the way a 
succession of scientific theories captures the truth about some part of nature cannot, generally speaking, 
be described in simple terms as a cumulative approach where some ultimate truth is approximated more 
and more closely.
THE  EXISTENCE  OF  OBJECTS,  AND  THEIR  RELATEDNESS  TO  ONE  ANOTHER
 
In speaking of the ontological aspect of truth, it is really not enough to speak just of the existence
of the world, along with all its parts that we observe either directly or indirectly. Mere existence 
does not tell us anything. What is of vital importance is the relatedness of objects in the world to 
one another, because it is the relatedness that tells us how objects behave, what rules, if any, they
conform to, and how we can act back on parts of the world. It is the relatedness of an object with
other objects that tells us of its qualities or properties, and the properties are precisely the aspects
of an object that give it distinction and identity. The properties of the table identify it distinctly 
from the chairs arranged around it or from the floor on which it stands. So, the correct 
ontological statement would be that the table, the chairs, the floor, and all such things exist and 
are related to one another in a manner independent of our mind and of how our mind attempts to 
know of their existence and relatedness. 
However, the existence of objects and their relatedness to one another, make up a single whole.  It is only
provisionally that one can distinguish between the aspect of existence of natural objects and that of their
manifold  correlations,  appearing  as  their  properties  and  mutual  interactions,  of  potentially  infinite
complexity. The distinction between the existence of things and their properties and mutual interactions
arises from our experience of nature, and is also routinely accepted in scientific practice where an entity
with some definite properties is first postulated to exist, which is then assumed to interact  with other
entities similarly postulated. However, the properties postulated to characterize an object are themselves
indicative of some of its previously acknowledged characteristics – ones that have already been learnt
about it.
THEORIES  AS  DESCRIPTIONS  OF  INTER-RELATIONS
All our inferences and theories are actually designed to tell us how the things in the world are 
related to one another. In the context of our attempt to know of this world, it is the relatedness 
that is of primary importance. Another way of saying this would be that we come to know of the 
existence of objects in terms of their qualities and properties. And, in order to learn what the 
properties are, how an object is related to other objects, we ourselves interact with it, either 
directly through our senses, or by examining it by means of other objects, by examining its 
relatedness to these other objects. In any case, the properties revealed to us this way depend on 
how we set up the interaction with it, the context in which the interaction is set up.
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To those of you who have an acquaintance with  quantum theory, the above paragraph might look like a
reference  to  the  notorious  measurement  problem,  because  the  measurement  problem  is  crucially
dependent  on the  context defining the measuring process.  However,  I  do  not specifically  refer  to the
quantum measurement problem in our discourse. The type of contextuality I refer to is relevant to the
observation of objects in general, where the objects are found to reveal aspects of nature in a manner that
depends  on  the  context  of  observation.  The  context-dependence  of  observations  in  quantum
measurements  constitutes  a  very  distinctive  instance  where  microscopic  systems  are  found  to  differ
radically from large scale (macroscopic) ones. It seems to me to be a plausible position to adopt that
quantum contextuality (I use the term ‘contextuality’ to denote ‘context-dependence’) is something that is
continuous with, and at the same time constitutes a very special case of, the contextuality inherent in the
observation  of  natural  objects  and  processes  in  general.  But  we  will  not  confine  ourselves  to  stray
remarks,  and  will  initiate  our  discourse  on  contextuality  in  the  next  section,  postponing  further
discussions to later occasions.
   
ALL  OBSERVATIONS  AND  THEORIES  ARE  CONTEXTUAL
What I mean by contextuality in the observation of natural objects and processes can be 
explained with the help of a number of examples. The context in the observation of an electron in
an ionization chamber when the electron possesses a relatively low energy differs from the 
context where the observation is made in the setting of a scattering experiment or in some other 
similar setting where the particles involved in the experiment possess a sufficiently high energy. 
One then comes to conclude that the electron is not even a well-defined particle (or a particle-
wave in the quantum mechanical sense), but is a certain state of a field. Low energy and high 
energy contexts are seen here to reveal radically different aspects of nature. It does not really 
matter that this example relates to the quantum world because it makes us aware of the general 
fact that any observation of an object or an entity gives us a conception of just a cross-section or 
a tiny piece of nature, a cross-section determined by the context of the observation. What is 
objective is the cross-section in question, and the concepts and theories built up for the purpose 
of representing that cross-section can be faithful and accurate, to whatever degree possible, only 
within the context – the ‘external’ aspect of it.
On the other hand, at any given stage of development of scientific theories, there exists a vast
web of ideas and concepts related to one another, where these concepts are clustered into more or
less coherent wholes – the theories, that give us a picture of nature, a map to tell us what things
there are and how they behave. However, this vast and complex web is a dynamic one. Concepts
and theories – resources that constitute the ‘internal’ context of observation and theory building –
get transformed depending on the way science looks at nature. In other words, there occurs an
evolution  of  the  external  and internal  contexts  caused  by  a  broadening  of  the  scope  of
observation of natural things and their behaviour, as also by a restructuring of the conceptual
web.  New  aspects –  or  ‘dimensions’  –  of  nature  are  thereby  captured  in  the  concepts  and
theories, amounting to a radical transformation in the picture of nature that the sciences build up
for us. 
A good way to illustrate the idea of the context is to refer to the practice of  engineering drawing 
where engineers and architects prepare plans, elevations, and sections to represent aspects of a 
complex three dimensional object, say, a grand architectural structure, on a two dimensional 
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drawing sheet. These appear as distinct drawings on the sheet, where each of these drawings 
represents (possibly with quite exquisite faithfulness and accuracy), some aspect of the structure 
in some context of representation. Thus, there can be several elevations for observations from 
several different sides (each, therefore, constituting some particular context of observation), 
while a top view (a different context altogether) gives the plan. And, additionally, numerous 
sections may be necessary for a detailed description of what the interior looks like and what the 
internal structure of each interior object is (like, for instance, whether a pillar is hollow or a solid 
one). When done by architectural experts on the basis of detailed survey, each of the drawings 
correspond to some aspect of the structure to be described faithfully and accurately (hence, 
objectively, though with some unavoidable error which we need not take cognizance of for the 
present), but none is a representation of the object itself. The object itself, which is most 
definitely ‘out there’, appears in our concept only as fractional representations which we 
continually attempt to synthesize in our mind, and the real question that then comes up is, in what
relation does the synthesized concept stand to the ‘reality’ since, in a very definite sense, the 
former is an interpretation of the latter. 
While the program of science is similar to the architect’s attempts at drawing up plans, elevations, and
sections, it  differs in one fundamental and profound respect:  an architectural  structure is an object of
which the description by means of plans and elevations can, in a sense, approach more and closely the
‘object itself’ (though, even this is arguable: but we will not be too insistent on finer issues) since the
structure has (again, arguably) only a finite number of distinct aspects, or ‘dimensions’, to it. In contrast,
nature is inexhaustible in its aspects (‘dimensions’) and presents an unending succession of facets for
scientific theories to capture and to  describe. 
I will now pause to draw a few significant conclusions from the example of the electron and of 
the architectural marvel. The architecture is out there for all to see and to wonder at, while the 
electron (or whatever it is that we call an electron) is hidden from our bare senses, but there are 
common aspects to our conception of the two. First of all, the architecture is not really for all to 
see and visualize since there are hidden aspects in it too – and I don’t refer here to the fact that it 
is made up of electrons and protons or of quarks or whatever, but to the more mundane fact that 
some of the pillars may be internally hollow while some others are solid, some of the stones are 
impregnated with gems and the surfaces of some of the domes are serrated, and so on. Every 
time some new aspects of the structure are revealed to us in some new context of observation, a 
new synthesis is made in our mind that alters and replaces the conception that was previously 
there. What is important to note is that this alteration is a qualitative one, and not just an 
improvement in accuracy and faithfulness and, in this sense, is a replacement. Contrast this with 
the other type of improvement of representation that an engineer or architect often effects, 
namely, an improvement in the accuracy of a drawing within any given context like, say, altering
slightly some particular angle in a plan or elevation drawing, which also constitutes a 
replacement, but of a relatively simple nature, namely, a quantitative one.
Another illuminating analogy (or, an instance, if you will) as to how our conception of nature gets 
conditioned by the context, is obtained by referring to the way we appraise the personality structure of an 
individual. Our ‘reading’ of her depends on the various different circumstances in which we observe her 
response to environmental inputs and, additionally, what our current theory of mind is – in particular, 
what our current appraisal of her is, because it is the current appraisal that acts as a conditioning factor to 
how we set up our interaction with her. There are infinitely many aspects to her personality that even a 
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lifetime of probing and interaction will not bring out to the full. Indeed, the very concept of a personality 
to discover and describe, is not a substantive one. We discover a person bit by bit, but it never amounts to 
discovering the person as such, whatever the ‘person’ stands for. A routinely known aspect of her 
response to her environment may undergo a spectacular change as some components of that environment 
get changed. What is more, our conception of the person also undergoes sea changes as we get to know 
her across a spectrum of circumstances.  
Thus, the epistemological question of our conception of the existence of things is related in a 
complex manner to the ontological question of their existence in reality. My conception of the 
existence of the table or of the electron is dependent on the context of my observation and 
experimentation, where the context reveals only a slice of the reality I am looking at, made up of 
only a few of the infinite number of aspects or ‘dimensions’ of the latter. And that conception 
gets altered quite spectacularly in successive stages as the context gets broadened more and 
more, with an ever increasing number of ‘dimensions’ or ‘layers’ of the entities brought under 
the scanner. Finally, this external aspect of the context is supplemented by and interacts with the 
internal aspect I mentioned earlier, the two together making up the overall context in which we 
make observations and build theories in our engagement with nature. 
THEORETICAL  CONCEPTS:  GREATER  AND  GREATER  DEPTHS  IN  A  LAYERED  DESCRIPTION
What is more, the gap between the reality out there and our conception of that reality gets even 
more intriguing when one considers objects and entities, not only in their aspect of existence, but
of their quality, correlation, and interaction, of the mechanisms underlying their multifarious 
interactions. As I have mentioned, the question of the existence of a table or of an electron is 
inextricably woven into the question of how it relates to the rest of reality, what the properties of 
the table or of the electron are, what the mechanisms of its interactions with other entities are. 
The world exists as a whole and it is only in our minds that we perceive, first, objects in 
individual existence and, then, the behaviour of objects in interaction and evolution, manifest in 
their innumerable qualities.
For instance, consider a pair of particles A and B. Now, the mere existence of A and B is a rather
trivial matter to worry about. One has to look at how these two are related between themselves, 
how they interact, how they influence one another, and it is this that makes our conception of 
their individual existence really meaningful. And it is here that our concepts take a spectacular 
dive into depths that may in the end prove to be fathomless. Because, now we are concerned not 
just about the existence of the two particles, but about how best to describe their relatedness. 
And, just as the existence question is no less conceptual than observational, the relatedness 
question is equally, if not more, so.
Continuing to refer to the two particles A and B, each of the two can be said to move through a 
succession of positions depending on their initial positions and velocities, and on their mutual 
interaction. Physicists describe the latter in terms of a certain interaction potential, which 
determine the trajectory of each of the two, a curve in three dimensional space. Now, these are 
concepts at a different level compared to just the concept of either particle existing by itself or 
even to the concept of the joint existence of the two particles – concepts of interaction and 
trajectory may be, in this sense, said to be derived ones. And conceptual complexities continue to
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crop up at every small step that one takes in describing the behaviour of the two particles in their 
aspect of relatedness, where concepts derived in successive stages make their appearance. Thus, 
for instance, it is not enough to speak of the trajectory as a succession of positions occupied by 
either particle at successive instants of time because, of equal importance is the sequence of 
velocities, or their momenta, at the successive positions. One thereby gets to the idea of a 
trajectory or a curve, not in our familiar three dimensional space, but in a six dimensional one 
(the so-called phase space) for either particle. The dizzying journey does not stop here, for, one 
has to refer to a twelve dimensional phase space so as to properly describe, in general terms, the 
joint motion of the two particles under their mutual interaction. But, hold on. Perhaps we are 
getting carried away in our newfound enthusiasm with ideas. Why should one go over to a six 
dimensional or a twelve dimensional space, and why should it not be possible to keep things 
concrete and describe the motion of two or, if we like, any number of particles, in our good old 
world of three dimensions? 
It is certainly possible to describe the motion of any number of particles by referring to just the 
three dimensional space and a set of mathematical functions. Indeed, the higher dimensional 
spaces are convenient geometrical constructs for describing features of the functions that one 
needs in the three dimensional description, but before dismissing these in favour of the 
mathematical functions in the three dimensional setting, one has to recognize that the 
mathematical functions themselves are constructs of a similar nature. However, the higher 
dimensional spaces force themselves more and more into our reckoning as we go on to describe 
more and more complex aspects of the mutual influence of the two particles on the motion of 
each other, or to consider the interactions of a larger number of particles with one another. In 
attempting to describe the motion of a system of particles, there arise questions of greater and 
greater depth – ones of greater and greater intrinsic complexity – questions that are virtually 
impossible to settle in the setting of the familiar three dimensional space.  Phase spaces of 
arbitrary numbers of dimensions then become a necessity, and instead of the interaction 
potential, one then more conveniently makes use of the Hamiltonian function of the system of 
particles under consideration.
THR  BIG  QUESTION:  HOW  DO  THEORIES  CORRESPOND  TO  REALITY?
It will not do to go on here with examples of how abstract and labyrinthine our theories of the 
mutual interactions of objects and entities can be and how much of a success those theories can 
prove to be. What is of importance to note here is that, the vast and intricate web of interrelations
between objects and entities in nature is necessarily described in terms of theories of a more or 
less complex nature, theories involving concepts and constructs that appear to be remote from 
the things existing out there. It is, of course, meaningless to ask whether a Hamiltonian function 
exists in nature. And equally meaningless to ask if there exist twelve dimensional phase spaces or
ones of even higher dimensions. Our description and explanation of interrelations among objects 
is utterly and incorrigibly conceptual and theoretical, involving theoretical constructs. Granted 
that such constructs turn out to be immensely successful in answering subtle questions and 
explaining deep and complex phenomena, are these constructs anything more than mere 
instruments that help us set up explanations, without having something in them that can be 
identified as truth ? Do the theoretical constructs correspond to some mechanisms intrinsic to 
nature? Do the sciences converge in ever greater measure to these intrinsic mechanisms that are 
‘out there’ for us to discover?
I am not sure if anybody can produce a definitive answer to this. Evidently, the theoretical 
constructs are not mere instruments assembled fortuitously, helping us with explanations of 
phenomena so that we can, by making use of these constructs, identify and predict regularities 
and correlations with uncanny success. That would be miracle indeed. Like many other realists, I
don’t opt for miracles. But then, what is there in the hidden mechanisms of nature that these 
complex theoretical constructs represent, or correspond to? A theory, along with its constructs, 
must in some way hit upon ‘correctly’ some mechanism inherent in nature so as to be 
overwhelmingly successful in some area of scientific enquiry. As I see it, this is the central 
question that scientific realism has to figure out with some clarity before one can adequately 
demarcate between the points of view of realism and antirealism.
The viewpoint of scientific realism has many facets, of which this question relates to an important one. In
the end, however aligning oneself with realism or antirealism is not a matter of hard logic, but one of
choosing a position on the basis of shared perceptions and insights. In real life, we often adopt decisions
that  cannot  be  proved to  be  correct  on  logical  grounds  (this,  indeed,  is  the  hallmark  of  inductive
inference),  but we can still try to  evaluate those by referring to various circumstantial and contextual
factors. Deliberations and judgments are no less important in this world than logical proofs.
The  No-Miracle  Argument was  made  famous  by  the  American  mathematician-philosopher   Hilary
Putnam who presented it in favour of the point of view of scientific realism in a paper on the philosophy
of mathematics ([Putnam], a collection of essays). Bas van Fraassen, who has countered the point of view
of scientific realism (or, more precisely, of the point of view that recognizes successful scientific theories
as  being  endowed  with  truth)  with  his  own  constructive  empiricism,  has  dubbed it  as  the  ‘ultimate
argument’ for realism [van Fraassen], perhaps implying that, tragically, there is no better argument than
this in support of realism which, strictly speaking, is no argument at all. Fraassen has advanced his own
explanation of the success of scientific theories – one where success is not much more than the outcome
of a process of ‘survival’ by competition: a theory survives the competition from other theories because it
happens to have “latched on to actual regularities in nature”. Notably, he accepts here the position of
metaphysical realism, which speaks of a reality to which all our theories are addressed 
I should mention here that we are now referring principally to mathematical  and, in a broader sense,
theoretical constructs in science, that are mostly encountered in theories in the physical sciences. The
uncanny effectiveness of these constructs of exquisite mathematical depth is indeed a matter of genuine
puzzlement  when one pauses to think over these.  The Nobel winning mathematical  physicist  Eugene
Wigner  [Wigner1] famously expressed  this  in  an article  entitled “The Unreasonable  Effectiveness  of
Mathematics in the Natural Sciences”, and several other leading mathematical physicists have expressed a
similar sense of wonder and mystery in the fact that mathematical structures, predominantly in the nature
of mental constructs, are found to be relevant in the explanation of mind-independent natural phenomena.
However, the issue is of general relevance in the philosophy of science where theoretical constructs are
effectively made use of in explaining observed aspects of reality in all the scientific disciplines.
What is more important than proclaiming oneself as belonging to this or that camp in philosophy is to try
to gain genuine understanding, even without the benefit of logical proof, of how things operate in this
world of ours. And the question of how the deeply theoretical constructs of science correspond to, or
represent, the mechanisms of nature, stands out as one of paramount importance.  
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It is not enough to say that the theoretical constructs are ‘true’ in the sense of corresponding with
features and relations existing in nature because, to me at least, this sounds much like a statement
of faith. One has to understand with some clarity what this correspondence actually consists of. 
Can one say, for instance, that there is a correspondence between relations among elements of a 
theory and the web of relations existing between natural entities? While this is also vague and 
unsatisfactory, I will use this as the base camp from where one can have a view of the really 
intriguing questions concerning the world and our existence in it.
A metaphorical  description of  how mathematical  constructs  turn out to be relevant  in explaining the
mechanisms inherent  to a mind-independent  reality is  that the mind, taking in cues from an external
reality, spins out webs of its own, based on rules of logic and mathematics, and some of these webs latch
on to aspects of reality. Of course, the webs spun out with threads of logic and mathematics, all  hang
together, and so do all the various parts of reality and all the mechanisms inherent in these.    
Inferences and theories are  produced in a psychological process in which beliefs of various degrees of
generality play a significant role, as we will see later in this book, but as they acquire a finished form,
they pass through a process of justification, both in the mind of the individual and in the collective mind
of the scientific community, though ‘justification’ and ‘discovery’ are often inextricably mixed with each
other (in this context, see [Feyerabend], chapter 15). An aspect of justification of overriding importance is
consistency – the quality that makes our theories and concepts hang together. Our beliefs, however need
not be consistent – some beliefs resist justification and consistency check. Remarkably, the belief system
of an individual or of a community  still hangs together. This is because beliefs are tied together with
emotions (this we will have a look at in chapter 6 below).
SUMMARY:  THE  ISSUES  OF  RELEVANCE
Before I go on, I will summarize for you what we have had so far – the position I want to adopt 
as also the issues that it leads up to. For the sake of easy reference, I will make up a list.
1. There exists a mind-independent reality: this is a matter of inference from our experience,
and not one of logical certainty; there exist alternative points of view, any of which one 
may adopt, depending on how one summarizes and interprets one’s experience in life and
the experience gained by mankind in the course of history.
Our existence in a real world entails innumerable problems and conflicts that we have to cope with
and move through; the responsibility lies on us to understand and explain the multitude of events
into which we are thrust, including social interactions with people around us. For this, we make
use of  our  naturally  evolved  inquisitiveness  and  capacities  of  inference.  We interact  with the
reality around us and form hypotheses and theories in order to explain why things happen. This is
vital for our continued existence, and continued autonomy and authenticity in that existence.
2. In explaining the inner mechanisms of nature by means of scientific theories, we arrive at
concepts that involve entities that are not directly observable – ones whose existence we 
infer by indirect observations and reasoning. However, the existence of the unobservable 
entities is not to be doubted solely because of this. In the course of development of 
scientific theories, the inferences about these entities are made more and more reliable, 
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and little doubt now remains regarding entities, about the existence of which strong 
doubts were entertained in the past.
At the same time, inferences may be fallible, and it cannot be ruled out with absolute certainty that 
some of the unobservable entities assumed to exist in our current scientific theories will have to be 
defined in a new light in days to come. Indeed, the existence of a certain entity, such as the 
electron, is quite distinct from our description of it, and the latter can and does change radically 
from time to time.
3. While any object of nature exists and interacts with other objects independently of our 
conception of it, that conception keeps on changing dramatically, as the context in which 
we interact with and observe nature gains in depth and breadth, and as our conceptual 
framework itself gets enriched. Our description of things and processes in nature, and our
explanations of phenomena, is effected by means of theories, where the latter are 
generated in a cognitive process. Broadly speaking, that process originates with signals 
and stimuli from objects in interaction, and then proceeds through a number of complex 
stages: the signals and stimuli generate internal responses (neuropsychological, 
emotional, somatic) and these responses initiate further processing where our past 
experience in the form of beliefs and concepts assume relevance. The consequence of all 
this is that our theories describe parts of nature in a selective manner, in the form of 
interpretations.
4. All observations of facts of the world are fundamentally cognitive in nature, and the 
cognitive processing of one and the same fact of the world may result in various different 
interpretations of it. Scientific theories are not determined solely by facts of nature – the 
latter only act as the causal origin of the former. The theories are formed in a cognitive 
process in the form of a selective and purposive interpretation, being conditioned by past 
experience, and by past beliefs, conceptions, and theories. Observations are theory-laden.
5. Scientific theories constitute a continuation of inferences we make in the course of our 
daily life, where these inferences provide the basis for our decisions and actions. In the 
making of these inferences, we interpret the world around us by making use of our 
cognitive abilities and, at the same time, keep on enriching and transforming that 
interpretation as the context of our interaction with the world changes and, at the same 
time, as our overall conceptual framework gets enriched. What is special in the case of 
scientific investigations is the great emphasis on repeated cross-verification against facts 
of observation, on rigorous consistency checks against a vast web of currently existing 
concepts, and on discourse among members of a community of fellow scientists where 
rules of inference agreed upon by the entire community are made use of. This tends to 
make scientific theories free, to all intents and purposes, of relativism, in contrast to 
inferences of a non-scientific nature, where interpretations often vary from person to 
person, and from one group of persons to another.
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This aspect of enhanced reality check notwithstanding, scientific theories continue to be 
in the nature of interpretations of reality, since these capture only certain aspects of 
nature through a cognitive process as outlined above.
Even though impersonal to a large extent, scientific theories bear the stamp of their origin in the
cognitive processes of men and of groups of men. The course of development of the theories is
conditioned  by  modes of  thought  of  communities  and  by  cultural traits  and  latent  beliefs  of
societies.
6. Scientific theories aim at providing us with effective descriptions of entities and 
mechanisms constituting reality, an effectiveness that is supposed to imply truth. 
However, the concept of truth is a complex one since, on the one hand, it relates to a 
mind-independent reality and, on the other, resides in inferences and theories that act as 
vehicles of it, the latter being produced by cognitive processes in the minds of men. This 
contrariness results in a fundamental tension that cannot be reconciled by logical 
discourse alone. However, that is how everything in life turns out to be – no concept is 
ever pure and free of contrary aspects, least of all the concept of truth. 
This, however, does not make invalid the concept itself. Truth is not delivered to us ready and tied
in a neat package. Mankind has to struggle for it, and struggle with all intensity and commitment
to achieve authenticity, as it has had to do in the past.  
There is no denying the irreducible gap between Nature and its workings, and the model world 
that science assembles for us in the form of the great web of concepts and theories, that makes 
realism a matter of a stand or a viewpoint that we adopt in our own life process – a viewpoint 
arrived at in experience, and not as a logically compelling conclusion. At the same time, the gap 
relates solely to the fact that our perception of reality is cognitive in nature. Nature does not 
know of any such gap. Signals originating in the world interact with our cognitive apparatus, and 
we as cognitive agents, on reflecting upon our cognitive process, become aware of what we 
describe as a gap. Looked at from outside the cognitive process (in so far as such a thing is 
possible), the whole affair is nothing but an interaction between parts of the world and our 
cognitive apparatus (with all its ‘software’ of concepts and theories) – just another instance of 
the vast web of interactions going on between parts of nature. The mysteries of epistemology 
arise only as we make an abstraction, for our own benefit, of questions of epistemology from 
ontology.  
What is more, the cognitive process itself knows of no great distinction between the pre-
scientific and the scientific. Our web of scientific theories has parts of it built up through 
experiences gained in non-scientific and pre-scientific practice, and the rest is assembled by 
scientific exploration, where inter-personal differences in interpretation are sought to be 
minimized. This lends a new complexion to scientific theories that can be likened to an edifice 
built upon a substratum of loose ground, not as coherent as the edifice itself. But that is precisely 
how all edifices are built.
“Science does not rest upon solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, above a 
swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but 
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not down to any natural or "given" base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have 
reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles are firm enough to carry the 
structure, at least for the time being.” (Karl R. Popper, in The Logic of Scientific Discovery, quoted in       
[ Magnani1]).
We will now have a look at all these issues relating to the scientific process and its relation to 
cognitive activities of men, but there is one other thing to take note of before we can proceed.
The questions that are coming up are not as much in the domain of science as such, as in that of 
philosophy of science. If the theories of science constitute a distilled essence of our experience 
with reality, then philosophy of science, in turn, constitutes the distilled essence of those very 
theories. If the scientific concepts and theories are arrived at by acts of inductive inference, then 
the points of view one adopts in philosophy of science are, in turn, arrived at by induction of a 
higher order.
Philosophies are produced not by the passive application of universally accepted  rules but by a choice
from among alternatives, where a choice cannot be right or wrong but can only be more plausible or less
so. The alternatives are, fundamentally speaking, not many, because philosophical ideas are made up of
only few building blocks when compared with the vast and awe-inspiring array of concepts the scientist
works with. But the scientist has an arbiter standing in front of her to whom she and her fellow travellers
defer in judging the worth of their theories – Nature herself. To the philosopher, on the other hand, Nature
does not proffer any yardstick for judging right or wrong – she only smiles enigmatically (however, even
for the scientist, the yardstick does not come ready-made; but more of that later). Science creates a new
world for itself every time the horizon of mankind’s interaction with nature expands; philosophy only
recreates the world – a world built in contemplation.
What makes philosophy a really challenging exercise is the innumerable nuances that the few basic ideas
are combined with. Where the scientist works with a great variety of building blocks, erecting structures
of awe-inspiring complexity, the philosopher works with clay – only a few colours of it – to which she
gives innumerable  shapes.  The philosopher of today works with the same old clay and the same old
colours that the philosophers of antiquity worked with, but the shapes made up by the two differ much,
because the edifice that science assembles goes on being built and built. While the edifice of scientific
theories is built in successive episodes upon the existing edifice and takes on ever-expanding fantastic
forms, philosophies are  re-built. There appear  cycles in philosophy, where old ideas are worked anew,
worked in new contexts, because the philosophy of science works on scientific theories – theories that
keep evolving in fantastic ways. And, precisely because of this, philosophical practice is forever filled up
with polemic, with exchanges between rival camps. In contrast, scientific practice involves polemic only
during the phase of emergence of a new theory, or at a time the existing theory proves sterile in solving
new problems while no definitive shape of a successor has emerged. Once a new theory proves its worth,
polemic is replaced with feverish, predominantly co-operative - perhaps competitive as well - work in the
journey forward. In philosophy, you can say nothing really new, you can only adopt a different way of
looking at things. And, it is precisely because of this that there cannot be sharp and lasting demarcation
lines between the various camps that philosophical thought is divided into. Old demarcation lines dissolve
and new ones appear. Contrasting ideas appear to be irreconcilable and mutually exclusive only when
these are allowed to be bled of life by being defined with empty words – words that don’t really apply to
the context at hand. 
While one is to choose between realism and antirealism, it is by no means a matter of a simple 
dichotomous choice between two mutually exclusive clusters of ideas. There do exist mutually 
exclusive cores to these two positions in philosophy, but the cores do not exhaust the entire 
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philosophical terrain and it really makes no sense to carve up the entire terrain into mutually 
exclusive clusters of ideas. On the contrary, it may be immensely fruitful to think of novel 
combinations of elements of ideas that have so long been assumed to belong to one or the other 
of these mutually exclusive clusters. Indeed such novel blending of ideas picked out from what 
previously appeared to belong to irreconcilable camps, may be more in consonance with the 
developments eternally taking place in the sciences where, again, old frontiers dissolve and new 
areas of exploration emerge at an astounding pace. Indeed, explorations for a workable position 
in the philosophy of science are to be conducted in close affinity to developments in the sciences,
taking care that such explorations are constrained by these developments, by the successes and 
failures of scientific theories. This, broadly speaking, is the naturalist position in the philosophy 
of science.
This has been the way Philip Kitcher’s position in the philosophy of science appears to have evolved over
the years. For instance, [Diéguez] indicates how Kitcher’s realism has undergone a process of moderation
as his views have broadened during the years between the writings of [Kitcher1] and [Kitcher2]. Even at
the time of [Kitcher1], Kitcher speaks of a “vast middle ground” between extremes in issues relating to
scientific realism. 
I will, then, close this chapter on the note that we will, with these few strands of ideas introduced
here, again face the question we started with: in what sense does science describe the workings 
of nature ? As I understand, there is no clear-cut answer to the question, which is to be 
approached, not head-on, but only from the standpoint of our own cognitive processes, of how 
we perceive the world. In the end, however, all these make sense only when looked in relation to 
the question as to how we perceive ourselves. This is the question of values, of our goals and 
purposes: the ultimate testing ground of mankind.
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CHAPTER 3  
THE EMERGENCE OF THEORIES: HOW ARE THEORIES CONSTRUCTED AND 
ACCEPTED ? 
The explorers in science: individuals and scientific communities
It seems reasonable to describe this fusion of the
 personal and the objective as Personal Knowledge.
Michael Polanyi
This book aims at addressing two complementary aspects of science from two distinct, though 
related, perspectives. The first of the two starts by considering science to be a product of 
humankind without overt concern as to how the product came to be. In reality, science is done by
human beings in their individual capacity and as members of groups of people – each as a 
member of her own immediate group or community of fellow scientists, as a member of a bigger 
scientific community, and as one belonging to groups of fellow human beings sharing various 
different identities and cultural components; and this constitutes the second of the two aspects of 
science mentioned above. The first of the two perspectives was adopted in the last chapter. We 
will adopt the second perspective now. However, we will see by and by that the two perspectives
are inextricably woven into each other.
THE  ESSENTIAL  TENSION:  THE  OBJECTIVE  AND  THE  SUBJECTIVE
Theories in science are constructs relating to aspects of reality. And herein lies the great tension 
in the world of science: on the one hand, theories have a causal link to slices of reality, 
depending on the context of our confrontation with these, and, on the other, these are constructs 
– constructs produced in the minds of individuals and groups. On the one hand, science is to be 
loyal to nature while, on the other, it is an interpretation of nature produced by people whose 
world of concepts is separated by an irreducible gap from the ‘real world out there’. I have 
raised, in the last chapter, the question as to how and in what sense science can be said to be 
loyal to nature. This chapter will deal with the other aspect – that of the way the scientific 
theories are generated in the conceptual world of individuals and groups or communities. We 
will then proceed to a more complete and meaningful discourse where these two aspects are 
merged with each other, making possible a composite picture of science as an evolving map of 
nature, as revealed in the minds of people.
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Science is supposed to be ‘objective’ not only in the sense of being loyal to nature but in that of 
being loyal to nature alone, being free of the vagaries of the minds of individuals and of 
communities of individuals. However, like the first of these two suppositions, the second too is 
burdened with big question marks hanging over it. This is what we will have a look at now.
But even before we proceed with an examination of how science is dependent on the conceptual edifice
already there in the minds of people, I must caution you not to read too much into any one of the two
perspectives I have mentioned above to the exclusion of the other. In philosophy, as in everyday life, we
do have a tendency of reading too much into a single idea and losing foothold. This, for instance, is what I
refer to by speaking of the big divide between realism and antirealism. Realists speak of science being, in
some sense or other, true to Nature, and are sceptical of allusions to the mind-dependence (and culture-
dependence  too,  but  culture-dependence  can  be  looked  at  within  the  broader  perspective  of  mind-
dependence)  of  science,  while  antirealists  have  the  opposite  tendency  of  emphasizing  the  mind-
dependence at the cost of the allegiance of science to nature. In reality, however, the two are blended into
a single whole that we call science. It is only for the sake of convenience of discourse that we can effect a
separation  between  the  two,  where  we allow ourselves  to  forget  the  essential  fusion of  and  tension
between these.
SCIENCE ON A PEDESTAL
The first three quarters of the twentieth century saw great and dizzying advances in science 
where remarkable theories were built and, in a concomitant development, a certain mind-set was 
developed, whereby Science was placed on a pedestal. Science was seen as something 
transcending human fallibility, as a tightly knit body of knowledge, based on and regulated by 
the inexorable laws of logic, where the individual human being had no place simply because the 
individual human mind was not fully ‘objective’, nor were the judgments and propensities of 
communities of individuals. There were individuals steeped in superstitions; there were tribes 
engaged in ritualistic dances and mystical magical practices; there were communities engaged in 
blind and cut-throat politics; and there were nations at war. Then, there were music, poetry, 
literature, and the arts oriented toward the innards of the human mind. And, among all this blind 
passion and subjective explorations, here was Science, the only endeavour truly seeking to reach 
out to Nature by transcending human subjectivity.
Paralleling all this lofty status granted to science, there were trends in the philosophy of science 
as well, trends that stressed, on the one hand, the great role of logic in science that made it free of
the vagaries of human psychology and, on the other, the epic of Science unravelling the 
mysteries of nature, of science engaging with reality. To be sure, there were conflicts between 
dictates of logic and claims of science discovering the real workings of nature because logic, 
after all, works in the world of concepts and cannot, by itself, bridge the great divide between 
that world and the real world, the World of nature. But then, it was hoped, science could make 
our conception of nature converge more and more to nature itself.
LOGIC  AND  REALITY
Philosophy of science in the first three quarters of the twentieth century was dominated by 
Logical Positivism and Scientific Realism. The logical approach applied the proverbial Occam’s 
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Razor, with logic ideally playing the role of that razor and, to be consistent in its dissections with
the razor, could not, in principle, accede without reservations to the reality of what goes by the 
name of reality, especially that part of it which is remote from our senses. Instead, science was 
seen as attempting to identify regularities of what is sensed and experienced. Scientific realism, 
in its turn, in acknowledging a mind-independent world, had to grapple with the question of how 
the mind can arrive at truths about that world – that central question of epistemology. In other 
words, Logic and Reality resided in distant worlds, and the two could not be united in a 
consistent manner – consistency being supposed to be what science was all about.
But questions of philosophy are abstruse ones. The general perception of science, in both the 
common man and the working scientist was that science was utterly logical and that it revealed 
for mankind the real mechanisms underlying the workings of nature. The two together made up 
the picture of objectivity of science. 
In philosophy as in popular perception, science was seen as something rational because (a) it was logical
and thus free of the common fallibilities of the human mind, (b) it was aimed at the truth about nature,
and (c) it tended to approach that truth more and more closely.
Logical  positivism  was  viewed  variously  even  by  the  proponents  of  the  philosophical  movement
themselves. It was based on the analytic-synthetic distinction originally introduced by Immanuel Kant,
where propositions in logic and mathematics were of the analytic type, while statements with an empirical
content were of the synthetic type, which called for a principle of  verifiability  of such statements. The
question of verifiability brings up the issue of confirmation of scientific hypotheses and theories, but no
logically  compelling  method of  confirmation  could  be  found.  During  the  later  half  of  the  twentieth
century, logical positivism gave way to logical  empiricism in which the failings of the logical positivist
project gradually gained acceptance. At the same time, the overall philosophical framework was sought to
be retained, though without any strong unifying thread. Logical empiricism was thus, in a sense, the self-
examination of logical positivism. It was this self-examination that made room for the development of the
pragmatist and naturalist trends in the philosophy of science, within a broadly realist framework.
An account of the logical positivist and logical empiricist movements in the philosophy of science can be
found in [GodfreySmith].
Logical positivism was no longer the dominant current in the philosophy of science by the fourth
quarter of the twentieth century, while it was precisely this period when naive realism as a trend 
was put to question as well. In a sense, the trouble with both approaches relates to that great gulf 
separating the conceptual world of men from the real world out there, where the two worlds 
could never be bridged seamlessly. Logical positivism harboured within it the sceptical 
viewpoint that questioned everything outside the realm of sense data and could not come up with
a solution to the question as to how the truth of scientific theories be established by logic, for 
which it tried to develop a foolproof theory of induction. If a logic of induction could be 
developed, then that would justify the confirmation of theories by means of empirical 
observations. But no such logically sound foundation of induction was forthcoming, and the state
of affairs remained pretty much the same as where David Hume had left off, with induction 
continuing to remain as the ‘scandal of philosophy’ [Broad].
35
Realism, on the other hand, grappled vainly with the question of the truth of scientific theories, 
which it could not resolve in a logically sound way. As in the case of logical positivism, realism 
got trapped within the cage of consistency – how could the truth of scientific theories, being 
objects in the conceptual world, be ever proved to be true of the natural world since the two 
worlds are fundamentally remote from each other? The last three decades of the twentieth 
century saw a gradual withering of the lofty status of realism in the philosophy of science.
MICHAEL  POLANYI:  ROOTS  OF  PERSONAL  KNOWLEDGE
The first major current against the impersonal objectivity of science had been initiated by 
Michael Polanyi, a scientist of great repute who turned to the field of philosophy and put forth 
ideas of astounding originality, only to be set aside by the philosophical community with what 
amounted effectively to a condescending dismissal meted out to the amateur. 
Michael Polanyi (1891-1976) was a physical chemist of great stature, and turned to philosophy in his later
years. The relevance of his contributions to the philosophy of science will, perhaps, take many more years
to be fully realized and appreciated. A biography of Polanyi, including his scientific contributions and his
economic, political, and philosophical thoughts, written by his long-standing friend Eugene P. Wigner,
who was also a collaborator, is to be found in [Wigner2] (Wigner’s account of the scientific contributions
of Polanyi is to be complemented by the mention of his path-breaking work on crystal dislocations that
opened  up  the  enormously  important  field  of  plastic  deformations).  Wigner  and Polanyi  had  a  long
correspondence and dialog on questions relating to tacit knowledge, quantum physics, and the mind-body
problem, for which, see [Jha].
Polanyi’s major work of great relevance in the philosophy of science was put together from a 
collection of lectures and essays, and was named Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical 
Philosophy [Polanyi1], a major concern of which related to the acquisition of knowledge as the 
act of individuals and, in particular, to the building of scientific concepts and theories as a 
personal endeavour, where the major thrust of Polanyi’s was against the all-consuming critical 
stance of the logical positivist who was sceptical of whatever did not conform to the canons of 
logic. He was one of the early philosophers of science to grasp the significance and relevance of 
cognitive processes taking place below our level of awareness (“we can know more than we can 
tell” [Polanyi2]), or what can be termed pre-conscious and pre-logical stages of cognition. He 
analyzed the process of formation of conjectures, hypotheses, and scientific theories as these 
actually arise in the minds of people, in which he can be identified as perhaps the first major 
naturalist in the modern era. Polanyi, after Freud, was one who delved into the human 
unconscious as the substratum of conscious activity, though, to be sure, his thrust differed from 
Freud’s in that his major concern was to look for the roots of human cognition, where the latter 
has a noticeable conscious component as well.
In looking at what he termed tacit knowledge (or what I feel should more appropriately be 
termed tacit cognition) Polanyi underlined the role of beliefs entrenched in the human mind 
where these beliefs endow the cognitive endeavour of the individual with deeply personal 
explorations and commitments leading to the birth of new concepts, hypotheses, and theories. 
But this concern of Polanyi’s with unconscious personal cognitive processes did not make him 
an anti-realist in the sense of identifying scientific theories as solely mind-dependent constructs 
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having no connection with reality. In fact, Polanyi was a realist even as he underlined the deeply 
personal aspects of theory building in science. His view of the process of emergence of scientific
hypotheses was that it was anchored in reality, though not directly so. Instead, the ‘external’ 
reality was seen as causing the generation of a huge store of unconscious bits of clues, the 
constituents of tacit knowledge. This vast and ever-growing store of tacit clues was seen as 
providing the real context in which concepts and theories were produced.
“To say that the discovery of objective truth in science consists in the apprehension of a rationality which 
commands our respect and arouses our contemplative admiration; that such discovery, while using the 
experience of our senses as clues, transcends this experience by embracing the vision of a reality beyond 
the impressions of our senses, a vision which speaks for itself in guiding us to an ever deeper under-
standing of reality—such an account of scientific procedure would be generally shrugged aside as out-
dated Platonism: a piece of mystery-mongering unworthy of an enlightened age. Yet it is precisely on this
conception of objectivity that I wish to insist ....... ” ([Polanyi1], chapter 1).
Thus, it was essentially the supreme naturalist in Polanyi that enabled him to mount a major two-
pronged development in the philosophy of science, a development that, on the one hand, was 
directed against the scepticism of the logical positivist denying everything outside the realm of 
logic, thereby bringing the personal aspects of scientific theory-building to the fore, and on the 
other, sought to establish a causal link between the reality of nature and the subjective world of 
the individual in the form of clues in an unconsciously held storehouse of knowledge. It is 
essentially a link of the same nature as that involved in the perception of forms and shapes of 
objects in our everyday observations, such as the recognition of a face or as the identification of a
white, oval object as an egg. Our mental recognition of either the face or the egg is actually a 
construction in our mind produced by sensory inputs working in the context of stored clues. In 
arriving at such a recognition our mind correctly latches on to some aspects of reality (as van 
Fraassen would say), much like a key fitting a lock – it would, metaphorically speaking, not fit to
just any lock, but only to the one whose inner structure fits its own (the key’s) construction – a 
construction that was dictated by clues supplied by the lock itself (the key was constructed by an 
independent hand from these clues, but it would succeed in opening the lock nevertheless).
In stressing the aspect of hypotheses and theories being constructed in the minds of individuals, 
Polanyi highlighted that these are, truly speaking, guesses –  guesses that were not determined 
uniquely by known data, being generated in flights of imagination, and ones that left open the 
possibility of alternative hypotheses. At the same time, the hypotheses are not pure fancies of the
mind since these are constrained from two sides – on the one hand, the concepts, hypotheses, 
and theories are constrained by the sense data, the inputs generated by our experience in the real 
world, and on the other, these are constrained by the context of our already acquired cognitive 
products, the vast storehouse of knowledge, memories, and clues – partly conscious and 
overwhelmingly tacit. The treasury of tacit knowledge and cognitive clues, in turn, is a product 
of past acquisitions from experience where clues were received of the workings of the world out 
there, and it is thus within a complex and stratified web of existing concepts, clues, hypotheses, 
and theories – all invisibly linked to reality – that new hypotheses and theories are generated. 
This is the two-fold nature of newly generated hypotheses and theories – being products of 
imaginative guesswork constrained by present and past experiences of nature, where clues 
received from nature are made use of. Imagination and reality – these are the two contrary things 
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that encapsulate the essential tension inherent in the entire endeavour of science, the tension 
resulting from the fathomless gap between the world of nature and our conceptual world.
“We see here [in scientific discovery, akin to guessing the presence of a burglar in the house at night] a
consistent effort at guessing – and guessing right. The process starts with the very moment when, certain
impressions being felt  to  be  unusual  and suggestive,  a  ‘problem’ is  presenting itself  to  the  mind;  it
continues  with the  collection  of  clues  with  an  eye  to  a  definite  line  of  solving the  problem; and  it
culminates in the guess of a definite solution.”, ([Polanyi3], p 9-10). 
But that gap between our mental world and the real world is not something that we need to read 
too much into because, simply speaking, it is something that we, as limited cognitive agents, 
perceive as a divide between ourselves and Nature – everything that excludes ourselves. It is only
in philosophy that all this smoke is produced where one tries to ‘understand’ this fundamental 
divide, because all forms of life including human beings happily continue and thrive without 
being burdened with  this awe-inspiring ‘responsibility’ of ‘bridging’ the gap. In the course of 
existence, an individual living being engages in various life processes on the basis of myriads of 
clues received from the external reality as also of clues generated internally. The mental activity 
of man is one instance of this ongoing life process – one of a very special nature though. It is 
only when the mind focuses on its own activity vis-a-vis the external world that the conundrum 
of an irreducible gap between the ‘knower’ and the ‘known’ is raised. At the same time, it is this 
gap – the distinction between the real world and our conceptual world – that irrevocably 
constrains the way we perceive the mind-independent reality that we are immersed in.
And Polanyi – the naturalist that he was – did not take it upon himself to resolve the conundrum, 
instead choosing to address the question as to how scientific thought is actually generated in the 
minds of men. In this, Polanyi analyzed in great details a number of aspects of the process of 
formation of new concepts, hypotheses, and theories, much in the manner of an introspective 
study and analysis, and came out with interesting and important clues to this process. The first 
‘clue’, of course, was that the process occurred, in the main, within the matrix of tacit knowledge
and was essentially in the nature of a guess-work, though one that made use of clues acquired 
from the reality that the hypothesis or the theory sought to describe and explain. And the clues 
were immersed within the belief system of the scientist, imparting the process with features of a 
deeply personal nature. A second interesting observation of Polanyi’s was that the process was 
initiated and sustained by a commitment on the part of the scientist, triggered by a puzzle, a 
problem, or an anomaly that the existing theoretical framework failed to solve or explain. 
A third observation was that the clues were half-baked ideas or hints that were tacitly available to
the scientist, having been produced in a long process of experience and prior attempts – failed as 
well as successful ones – to  solve problems of a similar kind. Polanyi highlighted the idea of 
heuristics – hunches and rules of thumb – enunciated by George Polya in the context of problem 
solving in mathematics and thereby anticipated, along with Polya, a broad and major trend to 
take shape in subsequent decades in artificial intelligence and, more generally, in the field of 
understanding and explaining inductive inference in the context of human inferential processes. 
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Yet another feature to emerge in the course of Polanyi’s analysis of the process of the formation 
of hypotheses and theories was that it was not a process aimed at grasping the whole of nature, of
nature in its entirety, but one focusing on some aspect of nature, one that relates to the immediate
problem or anomaly at hand (“...an aspect of nature seeking realization in our minds”, 
[Polanyi3], p 21 ) while, at the same time, picking up and pointing at clues to hidden aspects. A 
hypothesis or a theory proves itself superior to an earlier one and supersedes the latter in this 
ability of providing a glimpse to hitherto unrecognized aspects of nature, thereby finding its 
place in an unending succession of hypotheses reaching out to an inexhaustible landscape of 
nature, awaiting exploration. In this optimistic outlook on theories reaching out to nature with its 
infinite hidden dimensions, Polanyi once again proved himself to be an early exponent of the 
naturalist trend in the philosophy of science in the recent era, refusing to address lofty 
philosophical questions relating to the ‘mind attempting to comprehend nature’ – questions that 
were formal and contemplative ones that required endless reflection, with little possibility of an 
acceptable solution. And the naturalist in him gave a new and fresh view of realism too in 
speaking of the infinitude of nature that remains ever unexplored.
“A true physical theory is, therefore, no mere functional relation between observed facts, but represents
an aspect of reality, which may yet manifest inexhaustibly in the future.”, ([Polanyi4],p 191).
Finally, Polanyi came out with the remarkable observation that a creative act of hypothesis 
formation on the part of the individual scientist involved a critical stage in which apparently 
uncorrelated bits of half-formed concepts undergo a spontaneous coalescence into a new 
coherent form, where the coherence is once again to be interpreted with reference to the 
previously existing storehouse of tacitly held cognitive elements and to inputs from the external 
reality.
“We may follow up our parallel between discovery and Gestalt perception by regarding the process of
discovery  as  a  spontaneous  coalescence  of  the  elements  which  must  combine  to  its  achievement.”,
([Polanyi3],  p 19).      
All these aspects of the formation of new concepts and theories in the minds of individuals will 
be discussed at greater length in subsequent sections in this book. I mention these here in order to
indicate how concepts corresponding to aspects of reality can be formed in the minds of men 
where, as Polanyi pointed out, the process is at once constructive and exploratory – one of 
invention and discovery. It is this interweaving of apparently contrary aspects that gives rise to 
philosophical conundrum. I say ‘apparently’ here, because the contrariness is a matter of our 
perception – Nature  does not have any innate design of baffling us with this hugely tough puzzle
of ‘mind versus reality’. We, as thinking agents, are parts of nature and we are ‘forced’ into 
making maps of aspects of nature in our minds where these maps are representative of those 
aspects of reality and, at the same time, are fundamentally skewed ones. The ‘forcing’ is, of 
course, part compulsion and part adventure – adventure into uncharted realms of reality where 
the spirit of adventure is, in all likelihood, acquired in an evolutionary process.
It is the personal and constructive aspects of scientific theories that we will be discussing further 
in the pages of this book, acknowledging at the same time that these aspects are not necessarily 
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antithetical to the other aspect of these theories, namely their allegiance to aspects of an external 
reality. In this, scientific theories are, to some extent, comparable to a portrait of an individual 
created by an artist – the individual is sitting out there as the live model whom the artist 
represents in his portrait, but what the artist finally produces is not an exact likeness of the 
external appearance of the model, so much so that the model herself feels anguished at seeing the
finished portrait, complaining that she cannot recognize herself in it. While the artist most 
definitely anchors his work in the presence of the model ‘out there’, yet the portrait turns out to 
be the artist’s perception of her, including ‘dimensions’ of hers perhaps unknown to herself, 
dimensions relating to her personality, her psyche, and her immediate mood. Clues to these other
‘dimensions’ are received by the artist in ways perhaps he himself cannot define, and the 
greatness of the artist lies in how his tacit and unconscious self makes use of these clues, and 
combines these with previously stored perceptions in his mind so as to make a coherent whole 
that, while being a great work of art, is still a skewed representation of the subject sitting 
expectantly in front of him.
THOMAS   KUHN:  THE   PARADIGM   SHIFT
The remarkable insights of Michael Polanyi, however, remained largely unnoticed in the world 
of philosophy of science. While constituting a telling criticism of the received image of science 
(and of human thought in general) these did not raise much of a tremor in that world. But Polanyi
was followed by Thomas Kuhn who did cause a great tremor that extended from the terrain of 
philosophy of science out towards remote cultural terrains, to merge into broader cultural 
movements of the last quarter of the twentieth century. Kuhn’s thoughts had quite a significant 
kinship with Polanyi’s in that both had a naturalist trend and both focused on the constructive 
aspect of scientific theories, at the risk of appearing to undermine the received view of the 
objectivity of science. 
 
Kuhn’s naturalism was expressed in his paramount interest in the history and sociology of 
science, where he refused to engage with abstract philosophical problems, instead looking at how
scientific theories were actually constructed in the historical unfolding of ideas in the context of 
specific challenges of a social and epistemological nature, and at how scientific concepts and 
theories are actually handled by communities of scientists in the course of their professional 
work. He, like Polanyi, was one of the early representatives of the naturalist trend of recent 
decades without overtly contending or appearing to be so, both primarily engaged in settling a 
number of issues in the philosophy of science (issues as perceived by them) without burdening 
themselves with abstract questions of epistemology, ontology, and metaphysics. 
However,  one  cannot  glibly  dismiss  centuries  of  seemingly  abstract  philosophical  discourse  since
philosophical abstraction is by nature akin to scientific abstraction. Questions abstracted away from the
endless  contrariness  of  real  life  lead  to  fruitful  analysis  but  only  if the  results  of  that  analysis  are
continually referred back to the muddied grounds of reality. In a sense, the analytical philosophy of the
first half of the twentieth century was the necessary precursor to the naturalist-cognitive turn that came
about at around the nineteen sixties and seventies. The great merit of the analytical philosophy was that it
never desisted from acute self-analysis.
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In his first acclaimed work, The Copernican Revolution [Kuhn2], Kuhn presented a study of how
a major transformation in the world view of science was brought about under the influence of 
factors only partly of an epistemic nature, where major social-cultural components exert an 
equally important influence in the complex of pulls and pushes resulting in the transformation. In
particular, he identified stages in the process where conceptual changes occurred without regard 
to evidential support, or, in other words, without overt concern for convergence with observation
data (Polanyi also drew heavily from an appraisal of the Copernican revolution with his 
inimitable philosophical insight ([Polanyi1],  [Polanyi4])). And then he came out with his major 
and celebrated work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions [Kuhn1] , where he cogently set 
forth a number of theses relating to the scientific process that put a question mark to the logical-
analytic-philosophical view of an impersonal and objective science undertaking the promethean 
task of bridging the chasm that separates mind from matter and cumulatively unravelling hidden 
mysteries of nature.
Kuhn’s name has now become synonymous with phrases like ‘scientific revolution’, ‘paradigm’, 
‘normal science’ and ‘incommensurability’. However, while his work generated a great stir in 
professional circles of philosophers of science, scientists, and sociologists, and gradually came to
create a remarkable impression in the minds of people much beyond the limits of the 
professional circles – quite in contrast to Polanyi’s work – his bold ideas were not received by 
professionals with open-armed acceptance. What Kuhn had done was to counterpose a point of 
view to another, entrenched, one, in a breathtaking sweep, which is precisely why his work 
received a general acclaim, far beyond the confines of its avowed subject area. But it did not 
quite match the scalpel of the professional who took to dissecting his views much like the 
zealous surgeon who dissects in vain to discover where life lies hidden in the patient on his 
dissection table. To be sure, there were professionals who found Kuhn stimulating but still, they 
could not quite accommodate Kuhn within a rigorously justified framework that they were 
accustomed to. But, despite their demands of precision and rigour, their own field would never 
remain the same when Kuhn was done addressing from the mountain-top. He was speaking, not 
so much on this or that specific problem in the field of philosophy of science, but against the 
mind-set of his time – the same dead-weight that was felt implicitly by an entire generation. 
While a work of such sweeping spirit does not appeal to professionals, it does stir up the minds 
of people who, at least for the time being, are prepared to leave aside their professional armour. 
Kuhn, of course, was not alone in addressing the mind-set of his time since there were others 
who gave vent to the gathering tremor in the world of ideas and viewpoints –  those in the likes 
of Polanyi, Hanson, and Feyerabend, each of whom was to leave a lasting impression in the field 
of philosophy of science; but none of these others caught the imagination of their generation, and
of generations to succeed, quite as much as Kuhn did. Polanyi, in particular, raised issues of a 
stupendous magnitude in significance and implication, but was never noticed much within and 
outside the circle of philosophy of science, because he did not connect with people, was felt to be
idiosyncratic, and expressed concerns too much at variance with those of his time.
The  question  as  to  why  Kuhn’s  work  drew  more  attention  than  Polanyi’s  has  been  addressed  in
[Timmins].  
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ON  THE   IRRATIONALITY  OF  THE  SUBSTRATUM
What I want to highlight as the seminal contribution of Polanyi and Kuhn in the context of the 
issue of the objectivity of science is that both underlined the constructive aspect of scientific 
theories – one in the minds of individuals and the other in the perceptions of scientific 
communities. And in this, they rose to new heights by refusing to relinquish the connection of 
the theories to an external reality, the reality of nature – one acknowledging this connection quite
openly and other by implication. What is more, they both treaded what appeared to many as the 
path of irrationalism but what in reality was the path of identifying and looking into the 
substratum of the logical-rational mode of thought in science. In this, Polanyi explored an area 
distinct from Kuhn’s – in the mind of the individual as distinct from the pre-logical perception of
the scientific community that was given the name of ‘paradigm’ by Kuhn. It is the substratum 
that is apparently at variance with the super-stratum of logical-rational and deliberative mode of 
thought and it is the discrepancy between the two modes of thought that is commonly perceived 
as irrationality intruding into the world of science.
The process of formation and initial acceptance of new concepts and theories is rooted in the 
substratum, where the concepts and theories are constructed, but this process of construction is 
constrained by the external reality and is ultimately aimed at it, the logical-rational super-stratum
being, in a manner of speaking, the mediator between the two, i.e., between the substratum and 
the external reality. This, in brief, is the scheme of things that Polanyi and Kuhn outlined in their 
work. The distinctive features of the areas of discourse chosen by the two determined, in some
measure, the roles that these two were to play in subsequent decades. Polanyi, after his time, 
gained great acceptance in the fields of cognitive science and psychology because he, more than 
anybody else, re-opened the door to the human unconscious after the latter was banished from 
respectable science by the ostracization of psychoanalysis and by the rise of behaviourism. And 
Kuhn, by contrast, brought in a new wind in the fields of historiography and sociology of science
that ultimately impacted on the philosophy of science and, then, merged with emerging trends in 
broader cultural areas. 
With this, I am done with laying the groundwork for the remainder of this book. In addressing 
the issue of objectivity in science I will repeatedly come back to issues raised in the last chapter 
and the present, but by then you will have known the setting in which one can meet with the 
ideas I want to share with you – explicit and implicit ones to be found in the literature put 
together by researchers.
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CHAPTER 4
INDUCTIVE INFERENCE
Induction: the guessing game of life
Life is an endless process of guessing, and survival and progress means guessing right. Guessing
essentially means drawing a conclusion without adequate support of reason, and often requires 
one to choose from possible alternatives or even, at times, to generate a possible choice where, 
apparently, there is none.
Guessing is so commonplace an occurrence in our everyday activities and our developmental 
process right from birth, continuing up to the terminal stages of life, that we are mostly unaware 
of its ubiquity and all-pervading importance. We keep on drawing conclusions based on guesses 
so continuously that most of the time it does not seem to involve effort. By contrast, deducing by 
following the path of regimented logic requires a great deal of effort, and engages our 
admiration. The great relevance of guessing goes unacknowledged in our everyday activity, and 
more so in science, that highly specialised form of inquiry and inference.
Your three month old baby has become irritable and is throwing tantrums. The baby’s father 
insists that she is hungry and is feeling neglected, and, on the face of it, he may not be wrong. 
But you assert that the baby is having sore throat and call in the physician. Both of you have your
‘reasons’ for your respective assertions, but none is conclusive in itself.
A football coach, on looking at the medical report of a player in his team suffering from an ankle
injury for the last two months, selects him for the next important match. On being criticized for 
the selection he maintains that he has had a hunch that the player would make a magical 
contribution in the upcoming match.  
A child, barely four years of age, was shown the drawings of two circles, one large and one
small, and also of two squares and two triangles of different sizes. On then being presented with
the drawing of an oval-like figure and a three-sided figure with curved sides, she identified the
former as a circle, and the latter as a triangle. 
All these are instances of inductive inference – a form of inferential activity whose instances 
span a stupendous spectrum from the most commonplace to the most creative and sublime. 
“Philosophers since Hume have struggled with the logical problem of induction, but children solve an
even  more  difficult  task  –  the  practical  problem  of  induction.  Children  somehow  manage  to  learn
concepts, categories, and word meanings, and all on the basis of a set of examples that seems hopelessly
43
inadequate. The practical problem of induction does not disappear with adolescence: adults face it every
day  whenever  they  make  any  attempt  to  predict  an  uncertain  outcome.  Inductive  inference  is  a
fundamental  part  of everyday life,  and for cognitive scientists, a fundamental  phenomenon of human
learning and reasoning in need of computational explanation.” ([Tenenbaum et al])
 Inductive inference will be of central relevance in this book, which is why I will start by briefly 
explaining a number of basic ideas relating to induction. First, the business of defining induction.
What, specifically, are the characteristic features that define induction? Here I cannot give you a 
universally accepted definition since people distinguish between different types of induction and 
adopt different points of view in characterizing induction. A commonly adopted approach is to 
counterpose it against deduction. In other words, one classifies all inferential activities into two 
major classes, namely, induction and deduction, and then makes further divisions within the class
of inductive inferences. However, neat and clear-cut classifications are not always possible, and 
one quickly finds that things get mixed up to no small degree. In particular, one finds that the 
way deduction and induction appear to be related to each other depends on whether one adopts 
the problem view or the process view ([Heit]).
THE  PROBLEM  VIEW  AND  THE  PROCESS  VIEW
The problem view distinguishes between deductive and inductive arguments on the basis of 
form, without overt reference to content. Consider, for instance, the following:
when I put on my brown coat I look like a joker /  I have put on the brown coat today /  I must be
looking like a joker,
which is a deductive argument since its form guarantees that if  the premises are true, then the 
conclusion will necessarily be true. It doesn’t really matter whether the premises are actually 
true (the first proposition is definitely not true, I assure you – I don’t have a brown coat).
Consider, on the other hand, the following:
I  feel like an errant child whenever my Aunt Agatha is around /  I am feeling like an errant child
now /  Aunt Agatha  must be around somewhere,
where the form of the argument does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion even when the 
premises happen to be true (my maths tutor of bygone days happens to have a similar sinister 
influence over me). In this particular example, the argument happens to be an instance of 
abduction – the formation of a hypothesis on the basis of evidence which, according to some, 
constitutes a type of inference that is, to some extent, distinct from induction proper, the latter 
being an argument that constitutes a generalization. Thus, consider,
 all dogs have tails –  dogs are mammals – all mammals have tails;     
which, manifestly, is a generalization (indeed, one too much so) and qualifies as an instance of 
induction.  Both of the last two arguments have one thing in common – there could be 
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alternative conclusions compatible with the truth of the premises (other great personalities such 
as  my maths tutor that make me feel like an errant child, and, some mammals not having tails). 
This is what will, in this book, be taken to be the distinctive feature of induction. To be sure, an 
inductive inference does have other features too that turn out to be relevant in various other 
contexts. But an inference in which the conclusion is not a necessary one, and other similarly 
contingent conclusions are also possible, defines a class that is of overwhelming prevalence and 
relevance.
If the problem view identifies inductive inference in what can be termed an objective manner, 
distinguishing it clearly from deductive inference, the process view is a subjective one, and 
refers to the psychological processes that generate induction. And, in this process view, the 
distinction between deduction and induction is not so clear. But, it is the process view that is of 
greater relevance when we ask the question as to how people actually perform inferential acts of 
an inductive nature. However, there is no single accepted account of the psychological processes 
underlying deduction and induction. It is possible that both types of inference are based on the 
same kind of processing while, in contrast, a two-process account is also of considerable 
explanatory power.   
“According to one-process accounts, the same kind of processing underlies both induction and deduction.
Another way to describe this idea is that there is essentially one kind of reasoning, which may be applied
to a variety of problems that could be considered either inductive or deductive in nature ... . In contrast,
according to two-process accounts, there are two distinct kinds of reasoning. It is possible that these two
kinds of reasoning directly correspond to induction and deduction. Alternately, the two kinds of reasoning
might correspond to some other distinction, such as intuitive reasoning versus deliberative reasoning that
could be related to the distinction between induction and deduction.” ([Heit]). We will, in this book, be
specifically interested in the processes underlying inference making in general and inductive inference in
particular.
Processes of an inductive nature are commonly found to occur in organisms ranging from 
animals to human beings, and are now performed, in various manners and up to various degrees 
of complexity, by computer programs as well, where all these taken together are at times referred
to as cognitive systems. However, in speaking of cognitive systems, I will mostly have human 
inferential activity in mind while cognitive systems of other descriptions will be, at times, also 
referred to.
Imagine that a cognitive system receives certain inputs from the external world and becomes 
activated so as to attain a certain goal. Or, it may even be the case that the ‘input’ is generated 
mostly internally (a child suddenly feeling that she has not seen her mother for some stretch of 
time), thereby setting the desired goal (mother has to be located) or, to put it differently, setting a
‘problem’ to be solved (a husband receiving a divorce notice and frantically thinking as to how 
to revive his marriage). It may quite conceivably be the case that the inputs are not ones that 
have routinely been received in the past and that the goal is also not one routinely faced by the 
cognitive system, because in the case of routine inputs and routine goals, the system may make 
use of certain rules that have been learned in the past in solving the relevant problems, where 
these rules are ‘objective’ in the sense that other cognitive systems, similarly endowed, would 
also have made use of similar rules.
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Inferential activities are set in action when inputs (generated internally or externally, or, in parts, 
both internally and externally) make it necessary that a problem (in a general sense) be solved or 
some goal be attained. If the inferential process is based on rules learned in the past that are not 
specific to the cognitive system under consideration and that, when applied appropriately, are 
guaranteed, more or less, to generate a correct solution to the problem at hand, then one has a 
case of deductive inference. On the other hand, if the inputs and the goal have novel elements in 
them (mother absent for a long time and everything too quiet all around) then one has to 
generate a solution all by oneself, and for this one looks for clues, again, in part from within 
(from past experience stored in memory) and in part from the external world (clues, additional 
information, overall context). One then generates, implicitly or explicitly, a hypothesis that 
points a way to the attainment of the goal (crying out loudly, and crawling out through the door 
toward the kitchen where mother was found on a previous occasion), a hypothesis that would 
differ to a greater or lesser extent from one cognitive system to another and one that may even 
lead to a wrong solution to the problem at hand (mother not in the kitchen).
Evidently, no idealized description is possible in respect of such an inferential process, which 
makes a clear distinction between deductive and inductive inference not an easy thing to achieve.
We do have very definite instances of deduction, though, namely, mathematical reasoning, 
based, in the ultimate analysis, on the rules of logic (and, in addition, on the postulates and rules 
of set theory). A child is taught the rules of adding numbers, and she makes use of these rules 
whenever asked to work on an addition problem. A friend of hers also makes use of the same 
rules, and both arrive at the correct solution to the addition problem. But then, mathematical 
reasoning tasks can be stupendously complex and difficult as well, where it is not simply the 
matter of a sequential application of known rules and arriving at the correct answer. Quite 
frequently, one does not know which rules to apply in what sequence so as to arrive at the 
solution of a mathematical problem, and one has to decide on a course as to which route to 
follow in order that the correct solution be found, which needs inspired guessing – an essential 
component of inductive inference. 
“It is most unlikely that more than a tiny minority of mathematical theorems were ever in fact arrived at,
"discovered," merely by the exercise of deductive reasoning. Most of them entered the mind by processes
of the kind vaguely called "intuitive"; deduction or logical derivation came later, to justify or falsify what
was in the first place an "inspiration" or an intuitive belief.”, ([Medawar], p 26).
“Many researchers in the field of philosophy, logic, and cognitive science have sustained that deductive
reasoning also consists in the employment of logical rules in a heuristic manner, even maintaining the
truth preserving character: the application of the rules is organized in a way that is able to recommend a
particular course of actions instead of another one.”, ([Magnani1], p 48).
George  Polya  made  remarkable  contributions  to  the  analysis  and  understanding  of  mathematical
reasoning, and stressed upon the role of inductive inference in all kinds of creative mathematical thought
(recall, from chapter 3, how Polanyi acknowledged Polya’s work on the role of heuristics in mathematical
explorations; heuristics have a great role to play in inductive inference, as we will see later in this chapter,
and in chapter  6).  Polya underlined the non-deductive character  of creative mathematical  thought by
making use of the phrase ‘plausible reasoning’ [Polya], contrasting it with ‘demonstrative reasoning’, the
latter  serving  essentially  the  purpose  of  justifying  the  inferences  arrived  at  by  plausible  reasoning.
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Plausible  reasoning  is  another  name  of  informed  and  inspired  guessing.  It  constitutes  a  principal
component of the psychological process of discovering mathematical truth. Commonly, a mathematical
proposition is first guessed at and subsequently proved with considerable effort. At times, the proposition
resists  all  attempts  at  proof  and,  at  the same time,  cannot  be dismissed as  being  false,  a  celebrated
example of such a proposition being Goldbach’s conjecture.
However, it is always the way that mathematicians and scientists make use of well defined rules 
of logic that captures our imagination as the quintessential feature of reasoning and inference. It 
is the set of these rules (along with the postulates and rules of set theory, forming the secure 
basis of much of mathematics) that has, in common perception as also in the perception of 
philosophers, set the standard or norm of objective reasoning and inference. The logical school 
of philosophy of science sets great value to the logical structure of scientific theories but, in real 
life, theories are seldom constructed in a logically tight structure (Robert Klee, in [Klee], chapter 
2, gives an instance of how a theory might look when formulated in such a fashion). Instead, 
scientists take great pains to ensure that the theories are not inconsistent with known concepts, 
results, and evidence of proven worth. In practice, the ideal of objective reasoning following the 
rules of logic constitutes just one extreme end of an enormously wide spectrum of inferential 
processes, and only the instances belonging to this extreme endpoint truly deserve the name of 
deductive reasoning. In principle, anything within this wide spectrum, not coinciding with the 
endpoint of rigorous deductive reasoning falls within the ambit of inductive inference, which is 
why an overwhelmingly large fraction of all real life inferential activity has to be identified as 
being inductive in nature.
The enormous importance of deductive reasoning in everyday experience and in scientific explorations
cannot, of course, be underestimated. What has to be scaled up is our level of acknowledgement of the
relevance of inductive inference. Deductive inference is always carried out in the reasoning process of
individuals  and  groups  for  justifying  hypotheses  and  inferences  arrived  at  in  an  inductive  manner.
However,  inductive inference  and its  justification mostly proceed  hand in hand,  and the two can  be
distinguished only notionally. Speaking in relative terms, pure deduction is rare indeed. 
That the problem view and the process view distinguishing between deductive and inductive 
inferential activity by cognitive systems do not correspond to each other is demonstrated by 
means of psychological experiments where, typically, a psychologist poses a problem to the 
subject that, on paper, appears to be one of deductive nature. In other words, the subject is 
required to perform an act of deductive reasoning according to the problem view – one that can 
be executed by appropriately following and making use of the rules of logic known to him (the 
subject). What is commonly observed in such experiments is something else – the subject works 
out a ‘solution’ that does not routinely agree with what the rules of logic would decree, i.e., in 
other words, the subject follows a process that does not necessarily correspond to the problem 
view.
In summary, inductive inference belongs to a wide spectrum of processes, of which only one 
extreme corresponds to truly deductive reasoning which is rule-based, the rules being 
independent of the particular cognitive system doing the reasoning, and guaranteeing to produce 
the correct solution to the problem at hand. The ideal prototype of deductive reasoning is 
provided by the rules of logic which, when applied sequentially along with a number of basic 
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rules of mathematics (those of set theory, to be precise) do lead the cognitive system to the 
correct solution. 
Deductive reasoning is essentially formal in that, given a set of premises, the rules operate on 
these without regard to their content or meaning. In other words, deduction is syntactic rather 
than semantic. The latter involves the meaning and relevance of concepts and propositions in 
some larger context.
INDUCTIVE   INFERENCE:  CONTEXTUAL,   AMBIGUOUS,   AND   NON-DEDUCTIVE 
Inductive inference is, in contrast to deductive reasoning, context-dependent where the meaning 
or the content of a set of initial premises or inputs is evaluated within a given context and then a 
process is initiated that is more or less specific to the cognitive system doing the inferential act 
(for instance, the subject of a psychological experiment) and where the factors – of whatever 
nature – driving the process are not laid out with any degree of clarity  to be described and 
interpreted by external cognitive systems (the psychologist). Inductive inference is fallible and 
uncertain – where the inductive process results in a conclusion which is chosen from among 
possible alternatives within the relevant context. The ‘choice’ is once again context dependent 
and may, in fact, turn out to be an erroneous one when viewed against the goal set out to be 
arrived at.
Put differently, inductive inference includes a wide spectrum that can be referred to as non-
deductive, where pure deduction corresponds to an extreme end of the spectrum and is in the 
nature of an exception. Non-deductive inference is, mostly, of a mixed type where context-
independent rules have some role to play but where, at the same time, complex context-
dependent processes assume relevance (processes, moreover, specifically dependent on the 
particular cognitive system under consideration – our ‘system’ of interest being an individual 
person). The meaning of the term ‘context’ will emerge in the course of the remainder of this 
book.
   
We will, in this book, try to have a look into the type of ‘processes’ that are involved in the 
inductive inference of an individual, thereby connecting with the personal aspect of knowledge 
that Michael Polanyi spoke of. What is important to take note of here is that a non-deductive 
inference, not being rule-driven like a deductive inference, involves gaps that are not bridged by 
the application of rules akin to logical ones. The individual making the inductive inference 
performs, in a manner of speaking, logical leaps in crossing these gaps, and it is precisely the 
necessity of these leaps that results in what is specific to the individual person making inference, 
and that engenders the possibility of alternative inferences in the process – some other individual
would perform the leaps in some different manner arriving, possibly, at some other conclusion 
consistent with the inputs she started from (two experienced physicians, separately examining a 
patient meticulously and thoroughly, and then arriving at different diagnoses based on the 
clinical symptoms) or, in some case may even fail to effect a crucial leap or two.
Before we proceed, I want to repeat that when we speak of a non-deductive inference in this 
book, we will refer, in a general way, to an inductive inference (the apparent circularity in 
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nomenclature notwithstanding). For me, the crucial feature of inductive inference is the 
possibility of alternative conclusions consistent with the inputs initiating the process of inference
and the consequent necessity of making one or more choices that result in some particular 
conclusion to the exclusion of other possible ones, these choices not being dictated 
unambiguously by strict logic. At times, the term induction is used in the more specific sense of 
an inference that produces a generalization such as the following:
the two items that I was served with in this restaurant were delicious / all the items available in 
this restaurant must be delicious.
There are, however, other types of non-deductive inference that differ from inductive 
generalization, while being intimately related to it.
In the remaining part of this chapter, I will first come back to the question of a workable 
definition of induction, along with a brief survey of the taxonomy of induction – what various 
different types of inductive process there are. The latter will serve the purpose of definition by 
enumeration, and will make for a more focused characterization of induction, highlighting the 
overwhelming importance of induction in human cognition and behaviour. I will, in this context, 
briefly explain the idea of abduction, the formation of explanatory hypotheses – an inferential 
process of great relevance in science. While abduction is considered by some as a special type of 
induction, with induction defined in a general sense, others are in favour of looking at abduction 
and induction as two distinct, though closely related, cognitive processes (refer to [Magnani1], 
[Flach-Kakas], and to chapter 8 of this book for a detailed examination of the process of 
abduction). I will then present a brief introduction to various factors of relevance in explaining 
the process of induction, which will subsequently help us address the issue of human rationality. 
Finally, I will close this chapter by, emphasizing on the role of intrinsic factors in the inductive 
process, and their context-dependence.
INDUCTION:  DEFINITION,   FEATURES,   TAXONOMY
Holland et al ([Holland et al], p 1) define induction as a process that “expands knowledge in the 
face of uncertainty”. Here ‘knowledge’ means things learnt in the past or, more generally – and a
bit more vaguely – things believed to be true from past experience. And ‘uncertainty’ refers to 
the fact that the input data, i.e., the facts of current experience that set the act of inference in 
motion, are not sufficient to uniquely lead to a conclusion – the latter being the premise(s) 
constituting the ‘solution’ to the problem at hand. 
Consider once again the imagined experiment with the child who was shown drawings of 
geometrical figures of various shapes and sizes and was told as to which ones were circles, 
which ones triangles, and which ones squares. These instructions get stored in her memory as 
‘knowledge’ gained from past experience. But note that she was given only certain examples, 
and not precise definitions of the various geometrical shapes, since the terms of the definitions 
would not be meaningful to her. On then being presented with an oval-like figure and a triangle-
like shape with curved boundaries and corners (Fig.1), she is found to identify these as a circle 
and a triangle respectively. 
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Fig.1: Similarities between geometrical figures; when a child was asked to identify similarities
between geometrical figures presented to her, she identified the oval-like figure (bottom left) as a circle
(top left), and the figure with three curved sides and rounded corners (bottom right) as a triangle (top
right).
Neither of these identifications is, in the literal sense, correct, and she could very well offer a 
confused response, which would be quite in keeping with the nature of the problem presented to 
her. Yet she did respond (with a charmingly majestic confidence) in each case, and the response 
did her credit too since she did identify some features that were common to the drawings 
previously shown to her and the ones she was asked to identify. A figure with three curved 
boundaries and curved corners (bottom right) could conceivably be identified as circle-like, and 
the oval-like figure (bottom left) could conceivably be identified as triangle-like.  But the child 
did come out with identifications in the face of uncertainty and, on being told that her 
identifications were on the right track, the entire process did expand her knowledge of ‘circle-
like’ and ‘triangle-like’ figures. This ‘knowledge’, which is admittedly not precise, or ‘correct’ in
the literal sense, would later provide the context in which she would learn and make sense of 
precise definitions of a circle and a triangle, but the ideas of ‘circle-like’ and ‘triangle-like’ 
would continue to stand for valid ones for her, along with many more instances that she would 
doubtless come across in course of time.
The noted psychologist, Philip Johnson-Laird has had the following revealing comment to make 
on induction ([JohnsonLaird], p 169):
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“In  fact,  much  of  our  reasoning  is  inductive  and  outside  the  scope  of  logic.  Our
conclusions may be true, but even with true premises no guarantee can exist for their
truth, because induction is fallible. I mentioned .... that textbooks often define induction
as reasoning from the particular to the general. But ... the definition isn’t quite right. We
can make inductions that make particular conclusions. And so I defended this working
definition: inductions go beyond the information given, and rule out more possibilities
than their premises do. That is their hallmark.”
In this paragraph, Johnson-laird refuses to define induction simply as an inferential process 
resulting in a generalization since inductive inference, at times, my involve the identification of a
particular member as belonging to a certain class (identifying a face on having been given a 
number of characteristic features such as blue eyes, thick lips, and a sharp nose), or processes of 
other descriptions as well. On the contrary, what he sees as the hallmark of induction is that it 
leads to conclusions (or actions based on conclusions generated internally, as in decision 
making) that do not necessarily follow from the premises, conclusions consistent with the 
premises, but those arrived at after ruling out some possible alternatives. This, in other words, 
involves a choice, where the choice is not determined by the premises alone, but is arrived at by 
means of a ‘leap’ across a void left open by the fact that the premises do not provide any key as 
they do in a deductive inference where the subject moves through a succession of intermediate 
stages by following a set of well defined rules (recall those uneasy days when your maths tutor 
tried to drive home to you the derivation of those abominable theorems of Euclid’s). We will 
return later to the question of how the choice is made, what the process of making an inductive 
inference consists of. What is of relevance now is to have a feel of what is involved in induction 
– an idea, even if a vague one, of the ‘hallmark’ of induction, as Johnson-Laird puts it.
Another way to highlight the basic features of induction is to say that induction increases the 
semantic information in the premises, where the term ‘semantic’ refers to the meaning residing 
in the premises within the context in which the inferential activity takes place, and ‘information’ 
to the extent to which possible alternatives are ruled out in making that meaning more concrete, 
i.e., in seeking out to add something to the meaning. For instance, when we are given clues for 
identifying a face (blue eyes, thick lips, sharp nose) and we do identify a particular face on the 
basis of those clues, the terms like ‘thick lips’ and ‘sharp nose’ receive an added texture of 
meaning (in virtue of the specific identification), and information is gained in that other similar 
faces are ruled out in making the choice (thick lips all right, but eyes not so blue, and nose a bit 
bent). Here is another instance of how information is gained by the ruling out of alternatives: if 
there are five students in a class then the knowledge that a drawing has been done by one 
particular student carries some information; but if there are ten students, then the same piece of 
knowledge carries more information because it eliminates nine possibilities while in the former 
case the name eliminates only four possibilities. Here the gain in semantic information (carried 
by the name of one particular student among all the students in the class – one who did the 
drawing) increases as more possibilities are ruled out.
Based on these ideas relating to the basic features of inductive inference, the following may be 
identified as a few of the more conspicuous types of induction that we routinely undertake in our 
everyday activities as also in higher cognitive activities such as reading and interpreting a highly 
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contentious essay on the international political situation, getting to the bottom of a sublime piece 
of poetry, or working through the steps of a complex experiment in the chemistry lab.
1. Generalization. This is the most common type of inductive inference mentioned in texts. 
Suppose you have come across a number of objects of a certain type, all sharing a 
common characteristic. You then infer that all objects of that type share that same 
characteristic. For instance, on examining a number of items in a vegetable shop newly 
set up in your locality, you find those to be not of good quality. You then warn your 
friend that the shop is not to be patronized since it sells vegetables of inferior quality.
2. Category formation. A child is shown a particular car for the first time in her life and is 
told that the object is a car. On then looking at another car she immediately shouts in joy 
that she has seen another car. In this case, the child has picked out on certain features of 
the object that was identified as a car to her – features that appeared to be salient to her 
senses (for instance, the wheels), and ignored other features that did not appear to be as 
remarkable. On next looking at an object that possesses those salient features, she blurts 
out that it is a car, thereby arriving at the suggestion of a category – that of cars, even 
though there are, in fact, a thousand and one differences in particular features of the two 
cars that she has seen. A related activity is that of identifying subdivisions within a  
known category. For instance, on being told of certain characteristic features of two 
breeds of dogs, and then seeing a dog across the street, a child correctly identifies its 
breed. Here she focuses on the distinguishing features of the dog in question from the 
features of the other breed as told to her, and ignores the similarities, perhaps less salient 
to her (in the context of identifying the breed), with the latter.  
3. Analogical reasoning. A nineteenth century scientist, on experimenting with the signals 
emitted by a radio transmitter, has a sudden feeling that the signals have certain 
similarities with light rays. Subsequently, optical signals and radio signals are identified 
as two types of electromagnetic waves, belonging to two different ranges of wavelength. 
Identifying analogies across apparently unrelated categories is an inferential act of 
remarkable relevance in everyday activities as also in scientific discovery, engendering 
the possibility of a supremely creative act.
4. Making judgements and decisions. As an examiner in an essay competition, you are at a 
loss while judging the relative merits of two particular students. While one of the two is 
endowed with a decidedly better literary flair, the depth of understanding of the other one
is really remarkable. Which of the two would you judge to be the more deserving 
candidate to receive the first prize in the competition? You are at a loss because the two 
qualities – one of literary flair and other of depth of understanding – are disparate ones. 
The judgement that you finally make is crucially dependent on values specific to you and 
not determined solely by features or qualities of the two essays in question. Some other 
examiner could very well have made a different judgement, in which case the prize 
would go to the other candidate.
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Decision making is another type of inductive activity closely related to making a 
judgement. 
“In order to decide, judge; in order to judge, reason; in order to reason, decide (what to reason
about)” [JohnsonLaird-Shafir].
While teaching a class of teen-agers, you have a feeling that one particular student has a 
behavioural problem. You observe her keenly for as long as one month, comparing her 
traits with those of her class-mates, and find yourself in two minds as to what course to 
adopt regarding the child. Finally, you call up her parents and suggest that they consult 
expert counsel, even as you have the nagging doubt that the child may, after all, be 
having no problem at all, being just different from the rest. Your decision rests on your 
judgment that the child is not simply different from the rest, but is having some kind of a 
problem in her social interactions.
5. Abduction. Abduction is the inferential process of making hypotheses that have an 
explanatory power and is of great relevance in, among other things, scientific thinking. 
Science seeks to explain, to build new concepts and theories that expand existing 
theoretical frameworks, when the latter fail to explain facts of observation or to make a 
coherent whole of facts of observation and individual concepts making up the framework.
At times, auxiliary concepts and theories are postulated as adjuncts to an existing 
theoretical framework so as to consistently accommodate known facts and available 
concepts within the framework, without substantial alteration of the latter. Once in a 
while, an entirely novel hypothesis is put forward that subsequently transforms an entire 
conceptual framework. In all this, the scientist makes a conjecture, in the nature of a 
logical leap that subsequently passes through a process of appraisal, partly in the 
unconscious mind of the scientist herself, partly in a deliberate experimental and logical 
process of appraisal undertaken by her and then, in the remaining part, through the 
experimental and theoretical scrutiny of her peers in the scientific community.
Charles Sanders Peirce, the American philosopher, is credited with a substantial analysis 
of the abductional process of inference. Peirce’s ideas on abduction were formulated in 
stages, where, in the early stages Peirce was mainly concerned with the syllogistic theory 
of abduction – a theory of looking for one or more ‘missing premises’ in a logical 
argument where the conclusions are known in part or in whole in the form of puzzling 
statements or observations that the current body of knowledge (again, in the form of a 
number of premises) fails to lead to. Abduction, in this view, is ‘reasoning in reverse’, 
which implies that the premises arrived at by abduction are of uncertain validity since the
relation of logical implication is not a reversible or reflective one (‘A implies B’ does not 
imply ‘B implies A’). Related to this view is the subsequent idea of Peirce’s where he 
advanced the inferential theory of abduction, in which “abduction represents the 
hypothesis generation part of explanatory reasoning”, ([Flach-Kakas], p5).
Peirce distinguished between induction and abduction while, at the same time, leaving the
door open for subsuming both under a broader description of non-deductive reasoning. 
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Lorenzo Magnani points out that a pervasive view in philosophy, of the process of 
hypothesis generation, looks at it as one that is “paradoxical, either illusory or obscure, 
implicit, and not analyzable” ([Magnani1], p 1; see also p 21, 27 where the term 
‘retroduction’ has been introduced, in the same sense as ‘abduction’). It may be noted, 
however, that certain instances of induction and abduction have been generated in 
artificial cognitive systems (see [Flach-Kakas], [Magnani1]).
The process of abduction will be taken up at greater length in chapter 8.
6. Providing support and confirmation, in a limited sense, to generalizations and hypotheses
from observed facts. This brand of induction has evidently a considerable overlap with 
induction as the inferential process of generalization, but is possessed of a distinct aspect 
as well, where facts of observation are made use of in inferring the validity of hypotheses
and theories. Indeed, induction has been looked at in the philosophy of science as 
providing the logic of confirmation of scientific hypotheses and theories, which, in a 
sense, is antithetical to the view that induction is an inferential process of an essentially 
non-logical and fallible nature. I will have more to say on this by way of explanation in 
paragraphs below, where it will be seen that the programme, in the philosophy of science,
of looking at induction as a logic of confirmation did not quite meet with success, and 
induction was instead accepted as an inferential process that can provide support, in a 
limited sense, to hypotheses and theories. This role, however, is distinct from abduction, 
which is the process of generation of hypotheses.   
Now that we have some idea as to the defining features of induction as non-deductive inference, 
and to a number of types of induction, where the latter includes the process of abduction – an 
inferential process of great relevance in science – I will raise a number of issues that will set the 
stage for subsequent chapters of this book. However, before I do that I must mention that 
induction, as outlined above, covers almost the entire range of mental activities in human 
cognition, where cognition, broadly speaking, refers to the aspect of information processing in 
the human mind, such processing being, in general, in the nature of a sequential activity that may
or may not be a well defined or explicit one. Cognition, in other words, may involve a sporadic 
succession of steps rather than a clearly defined sequence based on definite rules, where the steps
may be interlaced with tangled heaps of branches, possibly having unconscious moorings. While 
‘cognition’ is a term having a broad coverage, ‘induction’ is one with a slightly more specific 
connotation – that of being an inferential activity in relation to a goal or purpose, set in motion 
by inputs from without or within. Induction, indeed, draws upon almost all mental processes 
associated with cognition and, conversely, is involved in some form or other in almost all such 
processes.
Before I proceed, I briefly deal, in the next section, with the question of whether and to what 
extent induction can provide us with a logic of confirmation, because this issue has been the 
cause of a vast body of work and polemics in the philosophy of science. Summarily stated, the 
very fallibility inherent in the inductive process goes against the possibility of induction 
providing a secure foundation for the confirmation of scientific hypotheses.  
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CAN   INDUCTION   CONSTITUTE  A  LOGIC  OF  CONFIRMATION?
At the outset, I have to tell you that the terms ‘induction’, ‘inductive logic’, and ‘inductivism’ are
used in two different contexts that, paradoxically, are of contrary significance, at least on the face
of it. As I have indicated above, a number of philosophers of science have used these terms to 
look for and to describe a logic of confirmation of explanatory hypotheses, hoping that induction 
may thus be given a place analogous to deductive logic, especially in scientific exploration. In 
scientific inquiry, people continually make hypotheses to explain numerous facts of observation 
where the psychological process of arriving at these hypotheses is obscure, to say the least. 
However, taking for granted one or more such hypotheses in the context of a set of observed 
facts, can one find a logic whereby one particular hypothesis, which may be made up of a 
number of concepts, and which may assume the form of a theory, is confirmed by these facts in 
preference to other possible, alternative hypotheses? If so, then this logic of confirmation of 
hypotheses from an analysis, scrutiny, and collation of facts of observation can be given the 
name of ‘inductive logic’, which will then constitute the standard or norm for testing and 
comparing scientific hypotheses and theories in an objective and impersonal manner.
It is important to note that such a purported norm has to be objective, or rational, in the dual 
sense of being impersonal, i.e., free of the vagaries of the psychology of individuals, and of 
being capable of pointing out the true significance of observed facts relating to actual properties 
or qualities of natural objects.
As opposed to such a logic of confirmation, the term ‘inductive inference’ will be used in this 
book to stand for the inferential process of arriving at generalizations, hypotheses, and fallible 
conclusions that do not, in general, conform to desired norms of objectivity and rationality. On 
the one hand, these are in the nature of interpretations of qualities, properties, and correlations 
existing in natural objects while, on the other, the process of generation of these interpretations 
may have deeply entrenched roots in the minds of individuals.
Ladyman ([Ladyman], sections 1.3, 1.4)  refers to two senses in which the term induction can be 
used when he speaks of the ‘new tool’ (Novum Organum) of induction proposed by Francis 
Bacon on the eve of the scientific revolution in the western world: “Induction in the broadest 
sense is just any form of reasoning that is not deductive, but in the narrower sense that Bacon 
uses it, it is the form of reasoning where we generalise from a whole collection of particular 
instances to a general conclusion”. Here the ‘narrower’ of the two senses points to the approach 
of looking at induction as providing a possible logic of confirmation of theories from facts of 
observation. However, as I have mentioned above, the support that induction can provide to a 
hypothesis or a theory can at best be a limited one because of the inherent fallibility of inductive 
generalization which is essentially an interpretation of observed facts rather than a logical 
confirmation of a hypothesis on the basis of those facts. On the one hand, philosophers would 
like to see induction as providing a rational norm for effecting an expansion of knowledge in an 
inferential process where one reaches beyond the premises that one starts from while, on the 
other, a psychological examination of the process of inductive inference fails to identify such 
normative and rational hallmarks in induction. 
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The proposed use of the term ‘induction’ in the sense a logic of confirmation did not quite find a 
secure ground for itself, even when its intended meaning is broadened to include probabilistic 
confirmation, where a set of observed facts is made use of to infer whether the validity of some 
particular hypothesis or theory is more probable than that of others (refer to [Ladyman], chapter 
2; [GodfreySmith], chapter 2, chapter 14 ). David Hume, for one, successfully propounded the 
view that there is ground for profound scepticism to induction as the logic of confirmation, and 
that inductive inference really has no ‘logic’ of the same standing as deductive logic. In other 
words, induction, properly speaking, is a non-deductive mode of inference that does not conform
to standards of objectivity.
There are, however, subtleties here. Once one accepts that there is no justification in using 
induction as a logic of confirmation ([Ladyman], chapter 2) endowed with the credentials of 
objectivity, one is led to looking at induction as non-deductive inference in a broad sense, as 
pointed out by Ladyman. And, as I have indicated above, within this broad connotation, there 
exists room for the view that induction, in a narrower sense, does have a role to play in the 
acceptance, if not in the confirmation, of hypotheses and theories. Suppose we have a theory A 
that is consistent with a set of observed facts and with proposition(s) deriving from some other 
hypotheses that have been justified on more or less secure grounds (there is, of course, no 
absolute justification for anything). One then does use this as a ground for acceptance of the 
theory A, at least provisionally. This is the sense in which one agrees with what Ladyman means 
when he speaks of the term ‘induction’ as having two different connotations – one broader and 
the other narrower.
Indeed, there exist different points of view regarding the possible role of induction as providing, 
in a sense, a logic of confirmation of hypotheses that are now centred around the search for a 
probabilistic justification of induction. The latter is a refined and attractive version of the earlier,
relatively naive, view that a painstaking program of collection and examination of facts of 
observation in a given domain of discourse enables one to choose a hypothesis that provides the 
best explanation of the facts and, if the process of referral to facts is carried forward 
appropriately, can even provide a ground for confirmation of that hypothesis. There can be found
an extensive literature on the Bayesian theory ([GodfreySmith], [Talbot]) of justifying an 
inductive inference, one that is supposed to promise normative appraisal of such inferences, 
analogous, in some sense, to the normative role of deductive logic in respect of inferential 
reasoning acts belonging to a certain class well known in exact sciences (indeed, all 
mathematical derivations may be said to belong to this class). The Bayesian theory has found 
applications in artificial intelligence where particular tasks are carried out having features 
common with human inductive inference. This raises the question as to whether there is a 
probabilistic basis of human reasoning and inferential processes in general, and how far this can 
provide the ground of a rational appraisal of an inferential act. This we will briefly come back to 
in a later section in this book (refer to chapter 7, section entitled THE  RATIONALITY  ISSUE:  A  BRIEF  
OVERVIEW).
INDUCTION:  QUESTIONS  AND  ISSUES
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With this much of an introduction to the idea of inductive inference, I will now raise, as 
promised, a number of issues that will enable us to gain a deeper understanding of induction – 
what it stands for and how it is to be viewed in a broader perspective of reasoning and inference 
making in the context of human cognition in general. Some of these can be looked upon as 
pointers to a theory of induction where aspects of human cognition are examined and analysed, 
telling us how induction can possibly be realized in the human mind. A number of these issues 
will be addressed in greater details in subsequent chapters of this book.
The term ‘theory’ in the field of cognitive science does not carry quite the same connotation as that
applying  to  theories  of  physics  or  chemistry  since  theories  in  cognitive  science  are  relatively  more
speculative and vague, serving only to provide us with plausible explanations or viewpoints in respect of
this or that area of cognitive activity. Controlled experiments of substantial significance are rare,  and
definitive  conclusions  from  experimental  observations  are  equally  rare  –  at  times  providing  almost
comparable support to alternative and competing theories. Indeed, these ‘theories’ are themselves in the
nature of inductive inferences with quite wide gaps remaining in their structural and logical organization
and in their relation to facts of observation. Still, these theories of human reasoning and cognition are
useful  and  valuable  pointers  –  ones  at  the  cross-road  of  science  and  philosophy  –  towards   an
understanding  of  human  cognition  in  general,  and  inductive  inference  in  particular.  From  the
philosophical  point of view, theories of induction, sought to be arrived at  from the experimental  and
theoretical  base of psychology, provides  an instance of the  naturalistic approach in philosophy. This
approach is likely to give us new insights relating to traditional problems on epistemology, to which
analytic philosophy does not provide satisfactory answers since it adopts a contemplative approach rather
than looking at how exactly we come to possess our beliefs and our knowledge about the world.
Here  is  a  warning.  In  the  following  sections  in  this  chapter,  I  will  place  before  you  a  number  of
observations and statements  some of which, especially those in the section highlighting on beliefs and
emotions do not  enjoy direct  support  in  the cognitive  science  literature (the  same goes  for  parts  of
chapters 6 and 7). But, at the same time that I warn you on this, I also want to assure you that these are
not inconsistent with the literature either. I look at these as plausible ones – I wouldn’t know if you will
agree with me. I put these here nevertheless as indicative of a possible framework for having a good
understanding of the process of inductive inference which is, as of now, a baffling one indeed. Here I go.
A. UNCONSCIOUS  COGNITION
The first issue I want to raise is that of tacit cognition and the role of the unconscious in human 
cognition. The realization that unconscious processes play an all-pervasive role in human 
cognition is a relatively recent one. Of course, the unconscious has been looked upon for 
centuries as a playground of mystical and dark forces rampaging in the human mind, but has 
mostly been confined to folklore, poetry, art, contemplative philosophy, and literary imagination,
without a disciplined investigation into its role in cognition. It took centre stage in the science of 
psychology in Freudian investigations into the human mind, but then got eclipsed as Freudian 
psychology itself fell from grace in the academics and the viewpoint of behaviourism attained a 
position of dominance, when even the word ‘unconscious’ was anathema in academic 
psychology. The unconscious once again found a place of its own by the mid-eighties of the last 
century in the shape of a cognitive unconscious which differs somewhat from the Freudian 
unconscious, though one cannot rule out the possibility of an appreciable overlap and a 
correlation between the two (see, for instance, [Westen], [Bucci]). 
57
Beginning from the late nineteen sixties, several streams of investigation became visible in 
cognitive psychology, with their orientation towards the cognitive unconscious. These 
investigations, while maintaining their distance from the psychoanalytic unconscious, quickly 
broadened in scope and richness. 
Mankind has wondered about intuition – intelligence residing in the unconscious – for ages. The 
great physicist and philosopher Helmholtz highlighted the role of unconscious inferential 
processes in visual perception ([JohnsonLaird], p52; see [Reber], p15, for references to early 
speculation on the cognitive unconscious) and of intuition in scientific creativity, citing the case 
of Michael Faraday as a prime example of the workings of the intuition ([Boden], p 36). The 
notion of an unconscious reasoning mechanism distinct from the deliberative reasoning capacity 
of the human mind, such as the capacity for mathematical reasoning, was put forward by the 
philosopher-scientist Pascal ([JohnsonLaird], p 53) – a notion that anticipates the more recent 
dual-process theories of reasoning that we will have a look at later in chapter 7 of this book. And
a good number of scientists, mathematicians, and poets, while introspecting about the source of 
their inspiration in creative contributions, have wondered about their own unconscious 
capacities.
As for the  relatively recent resurgence of interest in unconscious cognitive mechanisms, I am 
inclined to trace it back to the seminal contribution of Michael Polanyi who expounded on tacit 
knowledge as a separate storehouse of cognitive skills and abilities in the human mind (‘a wholly
explicit knowledge is unthinkable’; quoted in [Collins], p1). Polanyi’s ideas acted as a major 
inspiration for Arthur Reber who was among the first to systematically take up the study of these
unconscious abilities in the course of theoretical and experimental investigations in cognitive 
psychology, and who was followed in quick succession by other pioneers, including Axel 
Cleeremans and John Kihlstrom who brought insight and diversity into the field. These 
investigations soon grew into a major activity, and terms like ‘implicit learning’, ‘tacit 
knowledge’, and the ‘cognitive unconscious’ soon gained wide currency, bringing to the fore the 
relevance and importance of unconscious cognition, which essentially relates to processes of 
acquisition, storage, retrieval, and manipulation of concepts, many of which are possibly of an 
atomic or elementary nature, without conscious intent, effort, or awareness: “the process by 
which knowledge about the rule-governed complexities of the stimulus environment are acquired
independently of conscious attempts to do so” (Reber, quoted in [Cleeremans1], preface). Today,
the investigations in unconscious cognitive activity cover a wider and much more diverse area 
compared to early days ([Koch], [Hassin et al ]) though, by the very nature of things, these 
involve a measure of speculative and indirect inquiry distinguishing it from other areas of 
scientific activity.
Though the range and variety of unconscious cognitive processes is thought to be enormously 
broad, we will be more specifically concerned with processes relating to inductive inference and 
to abduction (which is, broadly speaking, a type of induction, or at least a close cousin of it) 
where, in the context of the latter, we will be having a brief look at the process of creative 
thinking.
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With more and more attention focusing on the cognitive unconscious, the question of rationality 
in human cognition and inferential activity has assumed great relevance. The ‘logic’ of the 
unconscious, whatever it is, is not the logic that we have a tendency to ascribe to the human 
mind. Are there identifiable principles governing the workings of the unconscious that we can 
hope to discover in days to come, when we will gain understanding of what now appears to be a 
pervasive lack of rationality in human reasoning and inference making? This question is, to a 
considerable degree, co-extensive with that of how inductive inference is carried out in the 
human mind, or, how exactly the guessing game of induction is played out. 
Unconscious cognition will constitute the topic of chapter 5.
B. INDUCTION:  THE   ROLE  OF  HEURISTICS
As we have seen, induction is essentially a guessing game, though one that is likely to have an 
underlying ‘logic’ not known to us. We need to guess in most situations in life where strict 
reasoning is either too difficult, too time consuming, or not in the realm of possibility due to 
paucity of information. Indeed, even when sound deductive reasoning is possible, we do not 
commonly make use of deductive rules in a consistent manner because, simply stated, inductive 
inference is our ‘second nature’. We guess because our inference-making is intrinsically 
opportunistic in character and has no in-built loyalty to quality or rigour of the reasoning process 
– a trait we have, perhaps, inherited in the course of our evolutionary history, and one that, 
moreover, manifests itself to various degrees in the developmental history of individuals.
One factor of great relevance in this guessing game is the use of heuristics. Heuristics are 
produced as partial and ready-made clues to the solution of a ‘problem’ that a cognitive system 
may happen to face (like, for instance, a baby trying to seek out her mother – mother likely to be 
found in the kitchen, or a chess player trying to find a good move at a critical juncture in a game 
– grab the queen), clues that are themselves in the nature of guesses, not usually arrived at by 
solid reasoning. For a person engaged in making an inductive inference, the heuristics help her 
along to reach at a conclusion by making logical leaps, i.e., by making guesses. It is by making a 
judicious use of these partial solutions, or partial guesses, that the person climbs up, so to speak, 
an inferential staircase where, at each step, she makes use of heuristics activated at some lower 
level, so as to land on a higher level of her upward journey, finally arriving at the top. We are all 
familiar with ‘hunches’ or ‘gut feelings’ that help us to  navigate in uncertain and demanding 
situations, often propelling us towards a satisfactory solution to the problem at hand but, at times,
leading us astray too.
Heuristics are used not only in inductive inferences but in deductive ones too where these appear, in a
manner of speaking, as small ‘packets’ of truth residing in the cognitive mind from innumerable cues
picked  up  from past  experience,  that  find  their  use  in  making  ‘fast  and  frugal’  inferences  without,
however, the attendant risk of making the inference fallible. In this context, see [Roberts].
There exists an extensive literature of relatively recent origin on the issue of whether heuristics 
constitute a useful and essential means in our inferential activity, or are defects in our reasoning 
process, producing biases that make the reasoning deviate from norms of rationality. Do the 
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heuristics constitute a ‘fast and frugal’ method in inference making, or are these, predominantly, 
possessed of a nuisance value in the context of the reasoning process?
It seems that at least some part of the debate over this issue is an exchange at cross purposes. 
Heuristics are indeed a great help in the pursuit of inductive inference while, at the same time, 
they constitute the source of fallibility in the inferential process which is seldom carried out by 
following explicitly formulated reasoning steps based on explicit and specific rules. The 
difference in the two points of view stems from a basic issue, namely, whether it makes sense to 
speak of normative standards of rationality in human reasoning, especially in inductive 
inference. The point of view that heuristics constitute an essential, if fallible, ingredient in 
inductive inference, rests on the recognition that, when one looks closely at the inferential 
process, one finds that, on the one hand, the course of inference includes segments or stretches 
that appear to be rule-driven and rational while, on the other, these stretches are interspersed with
gaps that cannot be negotiated with such well defined rules. In other words, normative standards 
cannot be set for the inferential process as a whole which contains gaps where, precisely, the 
heuristics come in. 
We, in everyday interactions with our social and natural environment, incessantly keep on using 
heuristics of various descriptions – don’t put all your eggs in the same basket (quite reasonable, 
but not a guarantee of success), bribery always works (highly fallible, but still useful at times), 
old is gold (doubtful), once you have decided on a course of action, never deviate from it 
(headstrong) – all these are instances of heuristics that may help us take good and effective 
decisions in matters personal and social, though each is a half-baked belief, and may not work in 
a crunch situation. However, we often do make use of unproven beliefs like these in making 
judgments and decisions, and what is more, we are, at times, aware of which of our beliefs we 
are invoking and what judgments or decisions we are making. These are heuristics operating in 
the conscious domain. More importantly, heuristics may operate in the unconscious domain too. 
The unconscious mind is an ever-active system where elementary beliefs and concepts are born 
and continue to be operative, as participants of processes of an elementary nature, associating 
with other similar beliefs and rudimentary concepts, forming heuristics of a relatively more 
complex structure, and thus setting into motion a hierarchical process where heuristics act in 
conjunction with one another at various levels. It may so happen that this entire hierarchical 
process remains entirely confined within the unconscious mind, getting expressed in subtle ways 
in our behavior. Or again, it may surface into awareness where it may end up being part of 
conscious reasoning. In his widely read book Gut Feelings [Gigerenzer], Gerd Gigerenzer speaks
of heuristics appearing as hunches and gut feelings that dominate much of our reasoning and 
decision making, and calls these ‘the intelligence of the unconscious’.
The gaze heuristic has been discussed to some considerable extent in the literature (see                
[Gigerenzer]; in this context see also [Poddiakov] for a criticism of the idea of the gaze heuristic 
being an intuitive mechanism of a simple description). A fielder in a cricket match runs a big 
distance to catch a powerfully hit ball that makes a trajectory in the air. One can, in principle, 
work out the trajectory of the ball with mathematical precision provided that one has access to a 
great deal of data of a very intricate nature. But the fielder is no mathematician and has no 
computer at hand to get the calculations done – he, as a matter of fact, doesn’t have the faintest 
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idea as to what those calculations might be. But still, he makes the chase and eventually succeeds
in taking the difficult catch. This he does by the simple expedient of fixing his gaze on the ball 
and keeping his line of vision fixed with respect to his body. Does he do it with conscious intent, 
knowing whether and how such a tactic should work? Indeed, even if he is made aware of the 
trick by some colleague of his, much of his actual mental and motor activity occurs in the 
unconscious domain, involving a lot of processing, a massive use of cues, an equally massive 
aggregate of implicitly learnt lessons that have no more claim to truth than, perhaps, some 
success in the past, and a hierarchy of unconscious decisions, one feeding the next. Overall, the 
gaze heuristic seems to be partly unconscious and partly conscious. 
A heuristic is a kind of belief, of an elementary nature or, maybe, of a more complex type (when 
you are in the end game, play the king). It is some kind of a rule, a rule of thumb, that tells us 
how to proceed to an eventual inference or decision in a given context, where the context itself 
is, generally speaking, a greatly complex one if we try to get down to describe it in the minutest 
of details, so much so that an actual description of it may be a task that is computationally 
intractable. But the heuristic guides us nevertheless, drawing from the context and pointing the 
way to a judgment, decision, or action. And, inductive inferences typically involve a hierarchy of
judgments and decisions (‘actions’, in the general sense of the term). The success, as also the 
fallibility, of induction rests on the fact that it typically proceeds through a maze of beliefs.
The role of heuristics in inference making – especially in inductive inference – will be repeatedly
referred to in this book, especially in chapter 6, where it will be addressed in greater details (see 
sections HEURISTICS   IN  THE  INFERENTIAL   PROCESS:  THE  DUAL  ROLE  OF  BELIEFS and HEURISTICS  AS  
INTERSUBJECTIVE  AND  PERSON-SPECIFIC  RULES).
C. INDUCTION:  BELIEFS,   EMOTIONS,   AND  AFFECTS
Beliefs form a great and complex web in the mind of a person. Many of the beliefs hang together
with other beliefs in the web, one set of beliefs supporting and often reinforcing another, while 
some others are less coherent and may even be outright inconsistent when judged against many 
other beliefs in the web. In other words, one harbors within one’s mind a belief system with a 
rich, interconnected, and often strange or curious structure where there results a complex and 
dynamic pattern of tensions, pulls and pushes among the various components of that structure.
What is more, beliefs are sheltered in the unconscious mind where they reside and interact with 
other small and large beliefs of various descriptions, defying basic norms of rationality to a great 
extent. 
“The vast majority of beliefs, however, are not likely to be conscious or reportable, but instead simply
taken as granted without reflection or awareness. Such beliefs may be inferred from a subject’s behaviour,
but otherwise remain unconscious and enacted [in] largely involuntary [manner].”, [Connors-Halligan].
A mother believes one of her two children to be more intelligent than the other, based, perhaps, 
on a single long-forgotten incident in the past and refuses stubbornly to heed to more recent 
evidence to the contrary while, at the same time, never letting go of even a tiny piece of 
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‘evidence’ in favour of her own belief. Perhaps, too, her belief finds support from some other 
beliefs hiding in her subconscious mind, relating to bodily features (blue eyes, sharp nose) that 
she takes to be indicative of intelligence. Not that she is happy in her belief – on the contrary, she
may be relatively more loving to the child she takes to be weaker in the mind. Many of one’s 
beliefs one is aware of are in the conscious mind only to some extent, being entrenched within 
the unconscious like the submerged portion of an iceberg. 
There has been a lot of philosophical work on how belief compares with knowledge and, to what 
extent beliefs can be said to be true or false. Knowledge is supposed to be justified true belief, 
but questions of justification and truth are notoriously problematic ones. We will adopt here the 
‘commonsense’ or the ‘folk psychological’ view of belief, truth, and knowledge, in which truth 
is seen not as an absolute but a context-dependent concept, and knowledge is seen as belief that 
has been accepted as true in a given context. Beliefs are constantly in a state of dynamic tension 
where these are confronted with new facts of observation, and with requirements of consistency 
and coherence with regard to one another. Some of the beliefs entertained by an individual or a 
community are shielded, in a relative sense, from ongoing processes of confirmation and 
justification, and are held as sacred, once again in a relative sense. Others do not enjoy a similar 
degree of shielding and are subjected to processes of justification, correction and revision. 
Depending on the degree of effort expended towards the justification of a belief in terms of 
consistency with other beliefs and of facts of observation, these can be imagined to be arranged 
in a scale where, at one end of the scale are the beliefs that are protected and guarded most 
zealously while at the other are those beliefs that are checked and counter-checked 
conscientiously, and are eventually accepted as ‘knowledge’. The ones that are certified as 
knowledge are then spared further efforts at justification till there takes place a change of context
where new yardsticks of justification and confirmation make their appearance so that a big chunk
in the erstwhile web of beliefs undergoes a surgical operation and a new set of beliefs gain the 
certification of knowledge.
Looking at the set of beliefs that are not confirmed or justified as knowledge in a given context, 
some are actively defended against justification and count as dogma (beliefs that have gained the
status of knowledge also constitute dogma, but in a different sense) while others are not so 
defended, and are in the nature of ‘informed guesses’. 
In other words, we have, roughly speaking, three sets of beliefs – the ones that are frozen into 
dogma, others that are in the nature of informed guesses and are subject to processes of 
confirmation and justification and, finally, those that have gained the status of knowledge. 
However, this is only a very partial description of the web of belief, to which one has to add the 
other aspect, namely, that of the depth of a belief. This relates to whether the belief, with all its 
associated mental components, resides principally in the conscious mind or whether it has 
unconscious moorings, due to which it acquires a distinct significance.
Complementary to this structural view of the web of beliefs, is the functional view that informs 
us of the roles that the various beliefs play in the great laboratory of the mind. Stated briefly, our 
set of beliefs provides us with an exhaustive map to help us navigate in a highly complex, 
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confusing, difficult, and uncertain world (or, in a world which, in some sense, is perceived to be 
such). But the map is a very tentative one, made up in a long series of guesses, trials and errors 
during which it is put through an innumerable succession of small and big tests. It is corrected 
and patched up from time to time, and has been found to be reliable in respect of only a few 
landmarks (and that too, barring earthquakes!). As to the rest of its vast collection of indications, 
warnings and flagpoles, they are not reliable, but these are all that we have. We navigate with 
their help, we fail, we make a patchwork of improvement here and an improvement there which 
we are ourselves not sure of and, in the midst of all this, we succeed in making a number of good
landings, some of those breathtakingly good. This process of navigation involves the making of 
deductive and inductive inferences – on the one hand, making good use of the map and, on the 
other, making continual revisions in the map itself. 
The functional aspect of beliefs includes a psychological one wherein these make each of us face
the world (and ourselves too!) as a unique individual, equipped with a unique collection of 
psychological traits – an infinite number of finely tuned defences, stances, approaches, conflicts, 
weaknesses, and strengths. And it is here that beliefs and their complex dynamics are linked with
emotions, affects, moods, and feelings – a number of factors that are, in small or large part, 
rooted in our physiology. This makes beliefs essentially connected with and woven into a vastly 
more complex psychosomatic system that is, in a large measure, beyond our conscious control, at
least in the short run. The logic of inductive inference, if there is one, is to be sought by looking 
into this exquisitely complex arena where the drama of cognition unfolds.
While  speaking  of  the  role  of  beliefs  in  providing  meanings  and  explanations  to  ideas  and  events,
Connors and Halligan, in their  valuable paper on a cognitive account  of belief ([Connors-Halligan]),
make the following observation: “Given that any search for meaning will largely depend on pre-existing
beliefs  and  knowledge,  the  outcome  is  likely  to  be  highly  personal  and  idiosyncratic.  Overarching
narratives that are implicit in subjects’ pre-existing beliefs may be particularly influential in determining
the  outcome of  the  search.  In  addition,  subjects  may  adopt  particular  attributional  styles  –  habitual
tendencies to explain events in certain ways ..... – whilst also relying on heuristics to save on cognitive
effort .... Subjects’ emotion and mood may also be relevant influences at this stage. Explanations may be
selected because they are congruent with a prevailing emotion or dominant mood. Anxiety, for example,
may  foster  explanations  involving  threat  or  danger,  whereas  happiness  might  prompt  more  benign
explanations.  Alternatively,  explanations may be selected based on their affective consequences ......  .
Explanations,  for  example,  that  offer  certainty  and  comfort  or  maintain  self-esteem  and  internal
consistency are more likely to be selected over other explanations that do not provide these benefits,
providing they are sufficiently plausible and can be rationalised. Motivation and emotion may constitute a
particularly powerful determinant of evaluative beliefs ..... .”
Within the spectrum of loosely and solidly grounded beliefs are to be found – the heuristics 
(refer to the above paragraph from [Connors-Halligan]). These are beliefs (guess-works, really) 
that are especially active in cognition or – to be more specific – in inductive inference and, like 
all other beliefs, are themselves the product of an ongoing process of cognitive inference – at 
times goal-directed and at times apparently without identifiable goals. Once formed, these are 
used as building blocks for further inferential activity, a good part of which is inductive and 
goal-directed in nature. It is in this sense that inductive inference can be said to be a hierarchical
process – one stage of inference feeding into the next, where smaller guesses are made use of in 
making up broader guesses, and where there takes place a concomitant process of verification, 
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confirmation, and justification all along, the latter being an equally fine-tuned and fantastic one, 
giving the process of inductive inference a unique flavour and efficacy.
And, much of this continuing process of guessing and verifying goes on within the unconscious 
mind, with the involvement of emotions, affects and feelings. While a huge store of heuristics of 
innumerable descriptions supplies the building blocks for inductive inference, these heuristics, 
considered all by themselves, are still not sufficient for explaining the basic act of guessing 
because of the fundamental fact that guessing involves a decision by means of which a choice is 
made between available alternatives. This is where the context comes in in the form of 
background knowledge (prior experience, beliefs, heuristics, unconsciously stored cues), which 
fundamentally constrains the inductive process, providing a relatively small number of 
alternatives to choose from, and then arises the really crucial step – choosing from among these 
alternatives. Background knowledge is not of direct help here, because what one needs to 
compare in order to choose are disparate entities, with qualities that cannot be reduced to a 
common denominator. 
You have to choose between two students, one of whom has a great literary flair, and the other a 
remarkable depth of comprehension, there being no other academic criterion that can help you 
fix your choice. You are at a loss what to decide. There is no logical criterion available on which
to base your choice, because literary flair and depth of comprehension are disparate qualities. It 
is here that extra-logical factors come in and make themselves felt – factors that include affects, 
emotions, and feelings. One of the students belongs to a socially neglected and poor background,
while the other to an affluent one. Perhaps you have some sympathy for the socially neglected 
and deprived people, believing them to be more deserving of your attention. Perhaps you 
yourself have risen from such a background, and your belief has an emotional counterpart, 
generating a pleasurable affect in you, without any conscious awareness, as you contemplate 
choosing the less fortunate of the two students, and – you make the choice, based on this remote 
belief of yours (relating to your natural sympathy for the less privileged) that has an emotional 
content. It’s much like making use of a pole in order to a take a vault – your emotions and affects
act as your pole or as your psychological springboard in making a mental leap. This, however, 
raises a question: the use of psychological props such as beliefs, not directly relevant to the issue 
on which a decision is being sought, and ones such as emotions and affects, appears like having 
recourse to a coin toss in making a decision. Making decisions is of vital importance in reasoning
and inference making. Can it then be said that reasoning and decision making are guided by 
events of an essentially random nature. The answer has to be, No! But arriving at the answer 
involves going to great depths. At such depths, however, nothing is clear anymore. Still, we will 
take a plunge into these uncharted depths in chapter 6 in a spirit of fun and adventure. 
INDUCTIVE  INFERENCE:  SUMMARY
I’ll now summarize these few opening observations on inductive inference that I have brought up
in this chapter, adding a few concluding comments for the sake of clarity. Inductive inference is 
an all-pervasive cognitive act where one starts from a set of inputs, and proceeds to solve a 
‘problem’, where the urge to solve the problem arises from some sort of ‘trigger’ among the set 
of inputs (baby feeling a pang of hunger, too quiet all round, something unusual, where is 
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mother?). The quest to arrive at a solution to the problem involves a cognitive journey where 
there takes place a sequential processing of ‘information’ in which, at each stage of processing, 
information is drawn from environmental inputs and from a vastly rich internal store generated in
experience and prior acts of processing (in addition to a repertoire of innate capacities produced 
by evolutionary means – more on this later). The information, moreover, is not amenable to 
description in terms of a fixed ‘alphabet’ (i.e., a specific set of symbols) and possesses a 
syntactic as also a semantic content, the latter depending on the context in which the processing 
of the information occurs. In this, inferential processes taking place in the human mind differs 
from computational processing of a comparatively simple kind. 
At some of the stages of information processing, rules learnt in prior experience are made use of,
where these rules resulted in successful solutions to relevant problems in the past though, in spite
of history of prior success, few of these rules are foolproof. In the remaining stages of the 
inferential process there arises the need to adopt a choice between possible alternatives where 
environmental cues and stored information are not of direct help, as a result of which there arises
the necessity of a logical leap. And here, unknown to you, apparently remote beliefs (so remote 
as not be counted as relevant information in the context of your problem) linked with emotion 
and affect help you as psychological springboards in leaping across the logical gap. The resulting
inferential process may be one among a wide range of possible types. It may be a generalization 
from a number of observed facts (all ravens are black), the recognition of a pattern (this looks 
like the round figure I saw earlier, though with a few kinks at some points) or a face (oh, mom, 
this must be you when you were at school), or the production of a remarkable scientific 
hypothesis (the missing energy in the decay process of the nuclei must be carried by a massless 
particle that eludes detection). 
An inductive inference differs from a deductive one, depending on whether the conclusion 
arrived at is necessarily true in the given context of available information or whether the 
inference expands the information base by adopting a choice from among alternatives, all 
consistent with the context one started from. Very few inferential acts are strictly deductive in 
that the starting premises (the overt ‘context’) are not precisely defined and may have slightly 
varying alternative interpretations, a large number of premises (possible ones in the given 
context) having only slight relevance in the context of the problem at hand are ignored, and so 
on. And, in addition, the rules invoked for the sequential processing of information may not be 
rigorously tested and precisely defined ones.     
Inductive inferences are, basically, informed guesses and are ubiquitous in individual and social 
life, as also in specialized scientific inquiry, being almost co-extensive with cognition itself. 
Most of these inferential acts are carried out, in a great measure in the arena of the cognitive 
unconscious, in apparent defiance of norms of rationality, with the help of heuristics – half-baked
inferences themselves – where one set of heuristics are used to build another, more complex one 
in a hierarchical process. The heuristics form a part of a vast web of beliefs of various 
descriptions, where different sets of beliefs have different psychological roles to play in the 
cognitive process. On the whole, the web of beliefs acts as a map for the mind to navigate in a 
complex and uncertain world, at times sheltering it by making it refuse to accept unsettling facts 
and, at other times, by spurring it on to take difficult decisions. Beliefs – even relatively remote 
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ones – in conjunction with emotions, affects, and feelings, vastly expand the context of an 
inferential act that often goes unrecognized, especially since the cognitive subject remains 
mostly unaware of these. It is this expanded context that constrains and guides the inferential act 
to its desired conclusion. A completed act of inference involves innumerable sequential steps, 
many of which are branched and tangled, but not many of those follow definite rules that can be 
assessed in terms of extrinsic normative principles of rationality.
The role of context in inference making will be emphasized time and again in this book, where 
context will be seen to have two aspects to it – the external and the internal ones. The external 
context is set by the environmental inputs entering into the inferential process, and is essentially 
of an inter-subjective nature. For instance, the plaintive cries of a sick child may initiate 
inferential processes in both of its parents. Here the child’s sickness, its past history, its plaintive 
cries, the household circumstances, the availability or otherwise of a physician on call, all these 
make up the external context, both the parents being almost equally cognizant of it. On the other 
hand, the inferential process and the conclusions drawn by them are likely to differ greatly, 
depending on how they make use of their internal psychological resources. The latter include 
such diverse things as recollections of past experience, knowledge base, belief system, reasoning 
ability, emotional makeup and current mood of the two individuals involved. It is to be 
mentioned, however, that cues from the external context are picked up differently, and to varying
degrees, by different individuals, depending ultimately on their internal psychological resources 
and, moreover, the assimilation of many of these cues occurs tacitly. This is how the external and
internal contexts of an inference merge with each other, of which more later.
Within the internal context, factors of a deeply personal nature exert their influence upon the 
inferential process, mostly in the form of rules by means of which information is processed 
within the mind of an individual. Some of the rules used in an inferential process may be 
universal ones (such as the rules of mathematics), but most are likely to be of a less general 
nature. Among these latter, there can be found a gradation in respect of the degree to which the 
rules are specific to an individual. For instance, some of the rules may be in the nature of 
heuristics or beliefs shared by various different persons (if an assumption fails to produce a 
satisfactory result, TRY THE OPPOSITE) while many others arise in a specifically personal context (my
kid brother is deficient in mental skill, and I must protect him). What with the huge internal 
context involved in an inferential process and the non-universal nature of the rules made use of 
in the process, inference making in general and the making of an inductive inference in 
particular, is possessed of great complexity and depth, most of which goes unnoticed.
The term ‘background knowledge’ used by Leighton (in [Leighton]) and other cognitive scientists is an
indicator to the internal context of an inferential process.
As I have mentioned, the role of context in the human inferential process, and that of rules 
constitute recurrent themes in this essay. You will find a summary relating to these two at the 
end of chapter 7 (sections entitled THE  ESSENTIAL  ROLE  OF  THE  CONTEXT, and THE RULES OF INFERENCE 
MAKING ).   
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CHAPTER 5
THE COGNITIVE UNCONSCIOUS
Hidden cognition
You ignore the realm of unconscious meaning at your peril.
Jonathan Lear in [Lear]
I begin this chapter by quoting the opening paragraph of a relatively recent book on the cognitive
unconscious: “Over the past decade or two, a new picture of unconscious processes has emerged 
from a variety of disciplines that are broadly part of cognitive science. Unconscious processes 
seem to be capable of doing many things that were, not so long ago, thought of as requiring 
mental resources and conscious processes. These range from complex information processing 
through behaviour to goal pursuit and self-regulation.”, ([Uleman]).
A widely circulated story (relating to the purported advertisement of Coke in a movie theatre) on 
subliminal priming, which later turned out not to be based on facts, was an early indication of the
importance of the role of subliminal stimuli (i.e., ones received without awareness on the part of 
the recipient) in modifying a person’s behaviour. Investigations have now established that 
unconscious pattern recognition based on priming (an effect where exposure to a stimulus 
modifies subsequent response to related stimuli) can indeed occur under certain circumstances 
([Weisberg-Reeves], p238-241). In recent years there has taken place a veritable explosion of 
evidence and data collected in psychological and neuro-physiological investigations on what can 
be referred to as unconscious cognitive action.
The unconscious has been acknowledged since antiquity in folklore, literature, philosophy, and 
anecdotal introspective reports by a number of scientists on their own creative processes, as also 
in early psychological studies and investigations, and was finally made the basis of a theory of 
psychology by Sigmund Freud. That theory was subsequently banished from the mainstream of 
academic psychology for a variety of reasons but continued as a parallel psychological theory 
and practice, while academic psychology itself was dominated by the point of view of 
behaviourism which looked upon the unconscious (as well as the conscious) mind as a mere 
‘construct’ on the part of the psychologists that, along with most of the concepts in folk 
psychology, has to be swept aside for the science of psychology to progress and flourish. 
Behaviourism, however, went through a rapid decline, to be followed by the so-called cognitive 
revolution where mental processes like memory storage and retrieval, and the making of 
inferences, judgments, and decisions were acknowledged as ones of focal interest, and the 
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interdisciplinary subject of cognitive science began to take shape. A major impetus to the 
‘revolution’ came from the field of economics, including investigations on consumer behaviour 
(and studies in the management of business enterprises). The rapidly expanding area of computer
science, and the burgeoning field of artificial intelligence constituted the other major ingredient 
of the subject of cognitive science, which provided for the production of computational models 
of human mental processes. This entire complex process of paradigm shift ran parallel to new 
currents in the field of history and philosophy of science that had an almost unrecognized 
beginning in Polanyi and that found a definitive expression in Thomas Kuhn.
The psychology of the unconscious was brought in within the area of focal interest in cognitive 
science during the late sixties and early seventies of the last century, and became a trend to 
reckon with in cognitive psychology during the eighties and early nineties through works of the 
likes of Arthur S. Reber, Axel Cleeremans, and John F. Kihlstrom.  
Reber’s work started from a recognition of insights harvested from Polanyi that led to studies on 
implicit learning and implicit knowledge where, significantly, considerations in evolutionary 
biology were of focal relevance ([Reber], chapter 3), and where the latter underlined the 
antiquity of the origin of the basic, unconscious, learning mechanisms in the human mind. 
Cleeremans focused on the neural and computational underpinnings of unconscious cognitive 
processes ([Cleeremans1]), while Kihlstrom produced the first influential overall view of the 
cognitive unconscious ([Kihlstrom]).
THE  UNCONSCIOUS  AS  THE  ARENA  OF  COMPLEX  COGNITIVE  PROCESSES
These early works were then followed by broad currents in the field of psychological 
investigations in unconscious cognitive processes, and significant areas were opened up one after
another, indicative of the ‘primacy of the unconscious’ ([Reber], p 88). As Kihlstrom 
summarized the early phase of the work in the area, numerous findings of major significance 
were already indicative of a broad range of activities of the cognitive unconscious, including the 
execution of automatic processes, based on apparently innate procedural knowledge, subliminal 
perception (processing of subliminal stimuli), implicit memory, with indications that implicit 
learning was also a distinct possibility, and hypnotic alterations of consciousness.
Subsequent work has made it progressively clear that much of human cognitive functioning that 
was so long ascribed to conscious, attentive, and deliberative mental activity, was actually 
carried out in the realm of the unconscious, since the latter was capable of a great deal of 
complex psychological processing. In other words, there has taken place a gradual shift of 
paradigm in which the ‘old’ cognitive unconscious has been replaced with a ‘new’ cognitive 
unconscious, where the latter appeared to be capable of even such self-regularity features as 
intention, motivation, and self-reference ([Uleman]). These developments were the result of a 
multitude of methods and practices that made possible a great deal of concrete investigations, 
replacing a more speculative approach of the earlier period.   
THE  UNCONSCIOUS  VERSUS  THE  CONSCIOUS 
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An issue of fundamental significance that has come up in the wake of this paradigm shift relates 
to the very concepts of the ‘conscious’ and the ‘unconscious’, since the ongoing work in the field
has the tendency of making earlier concepts inadequate. Even the early pioneers were aware that 
a simple conceptual dichotomy between the conscious and the unconscious was likely to prove 
misleading ([ Reber], chapter2, chapter 4; [Cleeremans2]). Kihlstrom outlined an early ‘map’ for 
the ‘substratum’ of the mind by distinguishing between the unconscious, preconscious, and the 
subconscious ([Kihlstrom]). A few authors prefer to use a general term such as ‘nonconscious’ 
([Hassin et al]), perhaps implying that more specific terms may be needed to describe the 
structure of what is commonly referred to as the unconscious. 
In this book, I will refer frequently to unconscious cognitive processes in the context of inference-making
in general, and the making of inductive inferences in particular. As in the case of a number of other
psychological concepts, I will entirely confine myself to the discourse of folk psychology, in so far as such
concepts are not inconsistent with findings of rigorous psychological investigations (refer to [Stich] where
Stephen Stitch elaborates upon the view that the folk psychology of belief does not deserve a place in
cognitive science; contrary views are to be found in [Baker]  and [Hewson]). One has to remember that
psychology is itself a subject where, in spite of a vast body of meticulous work, conceptual homogeneity
is not of the same order as in physics or chemistry, and various different points of view coexist within the
discipline (an analogous, though not comparable, situation in a branch of physics is to be found in the
area where quantum theory is sought to be integrated with the theory of gravitation). This leaves room for
speculations  where,  however,  there  has  to  be  consistency with  the  massive  body  of  findings  of  an
evidential  nature.  Reber  famously  used  the  phrase  ‘sensible  speculation’  ([Reber],  chapter  3)  in  the
context  of discourse on implicit  learning in relation to evolutionary theory,  because he based all  his
speculative observations on findings from the current body of investigations over a wide area. This book
of mine contains, at places, speculations of a much more dubious nature since I have had little direct
acquaintance  with journal  articles,  which pour out by hundreds every  day,  in the fields of  cognitive
psychology and philosophy of science, and I base most of my observations on monographs in the fields,
taking care not to be inconsistent with these. I will say no more since I know that disclaimers are odious. 
UNCONSCIOUS COGNITION: THE ROLE OF EMOTIONS
My aim in the present chapter has been to highlight that, according to current views on the 
subject, the unconscious mind is capable of a great deal of complex cognitive activities, 
including ones where ‘cold’ cognition is intimately blended with emotion-based factors (giving 
rise to what is, at times, referred to as ‘hot thought’ ([Thagard]). There exists a large body of 
literature on the possible role of emotions in cognition, based on evidence of substantial value, 
and part of that literature pertains to emotions and affects in the workings of the cognitive 
unconscious (see, for instance, [Eich et al]; [deSousa]). Much of this book is focused on the 
possible role of beliefs, emotions and affects, operating within the realm of the unconscious, in 
inference-making in general, and in inductive inference in particular (see chapter 6). 
THE  UNCONSCIOUS  DETECTION  OF  SIMILARITY: THE  MAKING  OF  HYPOTHESES 
One particular focus of interest will relate to hypothesis-building, conceptual transformations, 
and creative episodes in science which, within the framework presented in this book, constitute a
very special kind of inductive inference (chapter 8). The emergence of hypotheses depends 
crucially on an important organizing factor in the establishment of correlations among 
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apparently remote ideas, and in the building of novel conceptual structures out of these, 
principally by means of the detection of similarity at the unconscious level. 
Similarity is a notion of great relevance in cognition (refer, once again, to chapter 8). The 
detection of similarity between perceptual inputs and the formation of appropriate inferences on 
the basis of such similarity is a basic mechanism in survival and natural selection. The 
mechanism underlying the capacity of such similarity detection is, perhaps, of an elementary 
nature based on associative covariance detection between the perceptual inputs. However, it is 
likely that the cognitive mechanism has the ability to induce rules of inference in a hierarchical 
manner, where rules at a lower level of complexity are made use of to induce those at a higher 
level, and where the associative detection of covariance among a series of successive perceptual 
inputs is likely to be one among the rules of inference at the lowest level. Based on the 
elementary capacity of detection of similarity of a coarse nature between objects in the 
environment, more complex and fine-tuned rules of similarity detection, first among objects, and 
then among concepts, are likely to be induced by the cognitive unconscious, resulting in a 
heightened capacity for the formation of novel conceptual structures – the hypotheses that 
germinate into theories in the ongoing process of scientific exploration (for background, refer to 
[Holyoak-Thagard]).
THE  ‘RATIONALITY’  OF  THE  UNCONSCIOUS
The cognitive unconscious is commonly contrasted with the conscious mind, and understandably
so. While spontaneous information processing activity within the unconscious mind of an 
individual continues without awareness and without overt intention on her part, conscious 
processes are supposed to be executed deliberately and intentionally, within the horizon of 
awareness of hers. Indeed the two-process theory of human cognition and rationality (see chapter
7 below) is based on the assumption of two types of processes being involved, where the two 
types correspond to contrary and complementary features of inferential activity reminiscent of  
those commonly ascribed to the unconscious and the conscious levels of the mind. However, this
approach, along with the concomitant use of terms like ‘levels’ or ‘strata’ (the unconscious being
a ‘substratum’ of the conscious), constitutes no more than a convenient description of processes 
that is, in all likelihood, a somewhat simplistic one ( [Reber], chapter2, chapter 4; [Cleermans2]),
though  convenient and useful too. One has to mention at the same time that the proponents of 
the two-process theory do not always associate the two processes with unconscious and 
conscious cognitive activities, confining themselves more to the consideration of computational 
features of the two.
In this context, a number of relatively recent findings shed a new light on the so-called 
conscious-unconscious divide that may prove to have far-reaching implications. Briefly stated, 
the conceptual attributes of consciousness may need substantial revision. As the body of findings
continued to grow on the capabilities of the unconscious mind for various types of complex 
cognitive processing, it appeared that what goes by the name of consciousness has a 
correspondingly small role to play in cognition as a whole, namely one confined to control and 
regulation of the cognitive process. For instance, within the framework of the two-process 
approach, it may conceivably play the role of a ‘decision-making centre’ performing the job of 
task-allocation, such a  decision-making job being compatible with the commonly held view that 
the conscious mind is capable of setting goals, and of working on the basis of an intentionality.
While some such view characterizes much of what I present in this book, it may turn out that a 
subtle shift of viewpoint is necessary in addressing the question as to how exactly the conscious 
relates to the unconscious since, at the end of the day, consciousness may turn out to be just a 
phenomenal impression of psychological processes within a mind that is, essentially, entirely 
unconscious, with features of complex self-regulation in which there is little room for a separate 
and specialized regulatory centre for cognitive processing. In other words, the aspects of 
regulation and intentionality are distinct ones, of which the latter poses subtle computational, 
psychological, and philosophical questions, with no clear-cut answers within reach.
One central issue of the conscious-unconscious divide relates to the computational question of 
the role of a working memory. It has so long been a basic assumption that the conscious mind 
differs fundamentally from the unconscious from a computational point of view, where the 
former involves a working memory that sets goals within a serial information processing 
framework, based on more or less well defined rules or principles, and that such processing 
requires attention, as also intention ([JohnsonLaird], p65- 66; [Weisberg-Reeves], chapter 2). By 
contrast, the processes within the cognitive unconscious were assumed to be based on distributed
transitions of an associative nature, without the involvement of a working memory. It now 
appears that, from the point of view of functionality, the unconscious mind possesses the ability 
to set goals and to hold information, resembling the role played by working memory ([Uleman], 
[Hassin], [Soto et al]). In particular, the parallel distributed processing (PDP) model (also 
referred to as the connectionist model), based on the computational abilities of neural networks 
offers a great many features, including those relating to a working memory, even without the 
necessity of assuming the existence of a separate specialized memory unit. Though the PDP 
Model ([Cleeremans1], [Bly-Rumelhart], [Boden]) is basically a computational one and does not 
enjoy firm backing within the tradition of psychological research, it can nevertheless be used as a
good metaphor, providing pointers to a host of possible functional features of the human 
cognitive process, including the ‘rationality of the unconscious’ (see, for instance, [Nisbett1], 
[Gigerenzer]).
CAUTION! The note of warning that I want to record here is that the ideas on unconscious cognitive activity
are not part of a solidly based theory, and much of these are conjectures and plausible epeculations though, at
the  same  time,  parts  are  indeed  based  on  conscientious  experimental  findings.  There  is  a  an  ongoing
controversy on how much of the theory of unconscious thought is admissible on evidence and how much is not.
The framework for a theory of inductive inference that I seek to outline in this book does contain conjectures
and speculations that are in the nature of interpretations on my part, not inconsistent with more disciplined
theoretical and experimental findings. I have stuck my neck out, without regard to whether the guillotine of the
science of cognitive psychology will descend on it and chop it off.
An instance of the ongoing controversy on unconscious thought theory referred to above is
to be found in [Huizenga et al].
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UNCONSCIOUS  COGNITION:  HOW  ‘HOT’  IS  IT?
I close this chapter with a few words on the possible relation between the cognitive unconscious 
and the Freudian, or  psychoanalytic, unconscious. In this book, I will not make overt reference 
to the latter, in deference to the major part of literature in cognitive science which has a tendency
to maintain a distance with the Freudian framework, perhaps because the latter is still felt to be 
too ‘hot’ – too infected with concepts of a primitive nature and with the idea of a primeval mind 
– to be accommodated within a respectable cognitive theory. The early phase of development of 
cognitive science was indeed one where it had a ‘cold’ and ‘respectable’ face. However, 
developments of a more recent vintage have made it imperative to take seriously to the idea that 
human cognition is crucially dependent on emotions and affects, and is therefore not as ‘cold’ as 
one would like it to be ([Thagard]; [JohnsonLaird], chapters 5,6). Even when one discounts a 
considerable part of the Freudian picture of the unconscious – the one that has turned out not to 
be solidly grounded – the psychoanalytic point of view may still prove to be useful in the 
working out of an integrated view of the cognitive unconscious, where a wide range of human 
emotions, including motives, desires and drives of various descriptions are involved in a 
cognitive process whose ‘rationality’ will have to be interpreted anew.
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CHAPTER 6 
THE PROCESS OF INFERENCE: BELIEFS AND EMOTIONS
The belief-laden quest
Remember that all perceptions, judgments, and beliefs 
are inferences and not direct readouts of reality.
Richard Nisbett in [Nisbett1]
BELIEFS  AND  BELIEF  SYSTEMS
Inductive inference is, essentially, the formation of belief. Myriads of external and internal 
stimuli impinge upon one’s perceptual mind every moment, of which some are selected out, in 
keeping with the context, and processed in association with the latter, to be eventually 
transformed into beliefs and to be incorporated into the belief system of the person concerned.
Incidentally, the issue of context is of great relevance in inference, decision making (which I will
count essentially as a form of inference), and the formation of belief, and has already made its 
appearance in various different places (various different contexts, I am tempted to say) in this 
book. Broadly speaking, context can be of external or internal type, analogous to stimuli 
received by the mind. When I am looking at a beautiful portrait, the canvass, the gallery, the 
people around me, the artist, the occasion of my visiting the gallery and viewing the portrait, and 
a thousand other things make up the external context of my act of viewing and appreciating. On 
the other hand, my past recollection of portraits of a similar kind, my admiration for the artist, 
the faint similarity of the face drawn in the portrait with my mother’s, my slight feeling of 
discomfort at the colour contrast in one part of the portrait, my elation at the sense of vitality and 
jubilation expressed through the portrait, my current mood of anxiety and depression, and a 
million other things in my mind and my emotions constitute the internal context. 
Many of these things, in some form or other, will make the content of my future memory of the 
portrait and of my act of viewing the portrait, and will be blended into my subsequent 
recollection of that memory. And, interestingly, that recollection will again depend on the 
external and internal context of the act of recollection. In addition, my viewing of the portrait, 
may lead to the formation of a belief to the effect, for instance, that age is finally catching up 
with the artist I admire as one of the foremost among the current generation. Here again, the 
belief is formed in a process of great complexity occurring amidst the external and internal 
context I mention above. The complex issue of the context in an inferential act has been and will 
be a recurring concern of ours in this book. 
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To come back to the question of beliefs and belief systems, beliefs constitute a most elusive 
entity in cognitive science ([Connors-Halligan]), even as our entire mind is permeated with 
beliefs that relate to almost all aspects of our thought process. Beliefs can be of various kinds and
various shades, ranging from mild predisposition to virulent dogma, from unconscious mental 
states to consciously held points of view, and from justified and true ones to overtly inconsistent 
stands on issues of various degrees of relevance in our life. Beliefs are arrived at in response to 
situations that a person or a group of persons faces, and are used as guide maps in subsequent 
response of that person or group to situations and scenarios that come up from time to time. Our 
belief system is our map to navigate in this largely unknown world ([Armstrong]) and as such, 
the beliefs have to have an optimum degree of permanence. If all our beliefs get revised under 
the slightest challenge from the world around us, then the belief system will be a very poor map 
indeed, and we would face disaster in trying to navigate with its help. If, on the other hand, all 
our beliefs were rigid and resistant to revision, then again these would be of no use because these
would then prove unequal to the task of making us aware of the complex and changing realities 
of the world. In fact, some of our beliefs are extremely resistant to revision while some others are
easily revised under the impact of facts of the world and of rules of tested efficacy learnt from 
past experience (to be precise, these rules are also mostly in the nature of beliefs) and eventually 
gain the status of knowledge. 
In the present section we will mostly be concerned with beliefs and belief systems of individuals.
Beliefs of an inter-subjective nature are also of great relevance in the collective life of 
communities and entire societies, where these form integral parts of culture, religion, folklore, 
rituals, and taboo. Communities of scientists also carry their beliefs in various forms. This raises 
the question as to how much of scientific theories are in the nature of social constructs. Or, to 
take up a much broader issue, how much of science in our times is socially determined? We will 
look at some of these issues in subsequent sections in this book.
BELIEF,   KNOWLEDGE,   AND  INFERENCE
It is of some interest to examine the relation of beliefs to conclusions drawn in acts of inference 
and, also, to items of knowledge. Of these, let us have a brief look at the latter relation first. It is 
sometimes said that knowledge is justified true belief, and I will not join issue with this point of 
view, though the questions of justification and truth are contentious ones. As I have mentioned, 
knowledge emerges out of an evolutionary process from belief in the course of revision of the 
latter under the impact of reality. However, we have already had a glimpse into the layered 
structure of reality, which makes it a fathomless entity, and there can, truly speaking, never be 
anything like ultimate knowledge (more of this later, because this is a central issue in scientific 
realism). With this little rider on the concept of knowledge, I should like to draw your attention 
to another, more subtle, aspect of the relation between belief and knowledge, and that happens to
be, in a sense, a psychological one. Beliefs mostly remain inactive or latent in our mind, and 
become active when we ourselves need to act in some way or other, say, under the impulse of 
fear, or craving for recognition, or of any other cause. The course we adopt in embarking on an 
action (which may, under special circumstances, even be an act of inference) is shaped by a set 
of beliefs becoming active and guiding us through in that course. Beliefs propel us into action 
(the tyrant is the root of all evil) and guide us through (smash the palace), but knowledge has no 
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such role. In the course of evolution of belief into knowledge the latter, in a manner of speaking, 
gets sterilized and cannot infect the mind with germs that make it febrile and pro-active. We 
make use of  knowledge in the course of action, but we are not spurred on by it. That role is 
vested in belief. Looked at another way, beliefs are, generally speaking, associated with 
emotions (more of this below) and, in the process of evolving into knowledge, get divested of 
these emotions.
Indeed, the web of beliefs in a person’s mind, along with the associated network of emotions, can be said
to identify the self of that person. In contrast, knowledge is like an encyclopaedia that she carries along
with her and makes use of as the necessity arises. Our closest and most intimate beliefs are tied to our
innermost selves by means of emotions. These are as completely resistant to revision as our own selves
are to change.
An inferential act is an act of a special kind where we are activated toward a goal or a purpose 
such as the purpose of solving a puzzle or a problem (how to calculate the energy of binding of 
this crystal?) where, generally speaking, the purpose is shaped by some event or situation that 
acts as the trigger for the action (have to have a Ph.D.). The trigger makes us aware of the 
necessity to solve a problem or to achieve a goal or purpose, and this sets in motion the mental 
process of making an inference. The process needs a number of inputs to proceed to its desired 
end. These are commonly referred to as the premises, while the end point of the process often 
appears in the form of a conclusion. For instance, I am feeling indisposed / physicians need be 
consulted when one feels indisposed /there is a physician nearby whose telephone number I have
in my diary / the physician is to be called over the phone. This is a particularly simple form of an
inference, where the inputs are in the form of propositions, and there is a well defined line of 
reasoning that leads me from the premises to the conclusion which is, strictly speaking, one in 
the form of an implied belief (he will cure me – a belief that activates me to make a phone call) 
but is, within the given context, a justified one.
Not all inferences, however, are of this simple type – indeed, very few are. Instead of 
propositional premises, the inferential process starts with external and internal mental inputs, 
possibly in the form of some kind of representations in the mind, and these are then processed so
as to lead to the ‘conclusion’ which is again, more often than not, in the form of a mental 
representation or mental state rather than of a proposition. This mental state is, generally 
speaking, in the nature of a belief that, at times, sets one in the course of some action. This said, I
must add that not all beliefs are formed by way of inferences aimed at achieving some goal or 
other. Beliefs are also formed passively as an individual (I have already mentioned that the 
beliefs of groups or communities will not be explicitly referred to for now) passes through 
experiences or situations. On finding an ailing old man lying by the roadside, I walk by him and 
find that others are doing the same, and a belief is formed, to the effect that this world is a 
heartless one. The only difference between the formation of this belief and a process of inference
as sketched above is that here the belief is formed without an apparent purpose. While I highlight
this distinction here, it is an arguable one since some underlying purpose or relevance may still 
be there, perhaps at an unconscious level, without being apparent (incidentally, heuristics are 
also little beliefs that are often formed spontaneously, without apparent purpose, by way of 
association of environmental stimuli or of ideas, mostly in the unconscious mind, to be made use 
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of in future inferential acts). One other point of distinction characterizing the instance under 
consideration is that the belief is formed as a latent one, without setting me on to a course of 
action, though it may be instrumental in doing so at some future point of time. On the other hand,
a belief and an inference are both produced by a processing of information in the mind. At the 
risk of some controversy, I may say that the end product of an inference is a belief, while a belief
is not necessarily arrived at by way of an overt inferential act.  
In particular, beliefs and belief systems are intimately associated with acts of inductive inference.
In an inductive inference, the mind works in a halting, groping way, without being guided in a 
clear-cut manner by rules, where the rules may be of a precise, logical nature or may be more 
diffuse ones, arrived at on the basis of prior experience and knowledge. A rule-driven process 
will be referred to as reasoning and is one where there is relatively less scope for guesswork that 
takes one beyond what follows from the starting premises by the application of the rules. In 
reality, no inferential process is completely rule-driven (we have seen how even mathematical 
reasoning, or reasoning acts of a deductive nature, involve informed guesswork typical of 
inductive inference) or is totally unassisted by rules. In other words, inferences are part deductive
and part inductive, which is why the end product of an inference is, generally speaking, a belief –
one that is fallible (or, is non-monotonic, if I may use a jargon), is arrived at by a mental process 
in the nature of a guesswork, and makes use of the context in a manner that is largely 
indeterminate. And, the other area of relevance of beliefs in inductive inference, relates to this 
question of context.
As I have tried to indicate in earlier paragraphs in this book, the context of an inference is a 
highly complex matrix made up of diverse factors. We will be concerned here with the internal 
context of an inference, which assumes relevance when the mind does not have clear-cut rules to 
fall back upon while being engaged in an inferential act. It then falls back upon the hidden 
context, the resources available within its own tucked-away treasure house, howsoever remote 
these might apparently be. What are the resources that can possibly be of relevance? Here the list
is virtually inexhaustible and it is here that we face a very deep issue.
While walking on a broken road, you are likely to come across a breach on which no plank or 
temporary bridge has been set for your benefit. What would you do to navigate the breach? You 
will jump across it or, if the breach is too wide for that, you get hold of a stick or a pole or of a 
branch of tree, whatever comes in handy, and you leap across, using it as a prop for propelling 
yourself. Likewise in inference. The mind gropes for a prop and makes use of whatever comes in
handy – most likely, some belief or other, since beliefs are always there in abundance, associated
with one another in a vast web, much like a social network where you just have to cry out for 
help and somebody or other, though perhaps of dubious efficacy, comes forward.
BELIEFS  AND  EMOTIONS
What is more, beliefs are often associated with emotions. It is precisely this association that 
makes a belief a device for spurring an individual into action – whether an act of aggression or 
one of submission, or one of a different kind, i.e., more generally, into taking a decision and 
acting upon it. And it is this association that makes emotions play a vital role, both in a positive 
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and in a negative sense, in cognition. The stronger the emotional association, the more resistant 
to revision is the belief while, on the other hand, this very association helps the owner of the 
belief in her cognitive act of adopting decisions, possibly without conscious awareness, in the 
course of making an inference. 
Aspects of the complex relation between emotions and beliefs have been discussed in [Frijda-Msquita];
[Fiedler-Bless] speaks of beliefs as being located ‘at the interface of affective and cognitive processes’.
An inferential act in real life differs from a conventional computer program in that decisions are 
to be adopted at several points in the course of the inference, based on judgements, for which 
sufficiently compelling inputs are not available. A judgement is, fundamentally, an extra-logical 
act because it involves the comparison of disparate and, possibly, conflicting items that cannot be
reduced to a common denominator. I have a limited amount of money at my disposal as I enter a 
departmental store and debate whether to purchase a cosmetic item for my wife or a toy for my 
child. The two options are disparate, and my judgement and consequent decision can never be 
logically sound – indeed it has to be dictated by incidental factors such as, for instance, how 
much more I value the smiling face of my child than that of my wife. In other words, it is my 
emotional make-up that plays proxy to my reason. 
So, here is a likely scenario. As I proceed in the course of making an inference, there occurs a 
processing of information that builds around a sequential application of rules, where the rules 
can be of various types and descriptions – mostly heuristic ones that have been formed by past 
experience in inference-making or, in other words, in interpreting the world we find ourselves in.
However, the sequence is not a neat, linear one but is tangled in a complex way, where there are 
branchings, backtrackings, and interconnections between parallel processing sequences. Within 
this complex and tangled information processing scenario, I face from time to time, an impasse, 
where my repertoire of rules and reason prove inadequate in the task of helping me along in 
making a judgement and adopting a decision. I inwardly grope for some clue, something in the 
storehouse of my mind that I can use as a support in my mental leap through the impasse, and I 
try to choose from a set of heuristics of, perhaps, dubious value for the task at hand. I make a 
number of trials with these and in each such trial I seek the help of background beliefs for 
guidance, and a wide web of beliefs presents itself. As I am about to apply one or more heuristic 
rules, one or more of these beliefs come forward to either approve or disapprove of my 
impending act, by invoking an insidious emotional reaction – some kind of pre-conscious affect. 
This reaction or affect acts as a signal, of either a positive or a negative nature, and helps me 
navigate through the impasse by either proceeding forward or backtracking and making a 
renewed effort. Neither the belief nor the affect is an infallible guide in my decision-making and 
I may eventually err in my inference. But inferences are never foolproof. What is important is to 
be able to arrive at an inference because, once arrived at, the inference can be tried, tested and 
improved upon or, in the worst-case scenario, may be rejected out of hand, to be replaced with a 
new inference – a new belief if you like. Shorn of the evaluative action of our beliefs and 
emotions as the cognitive mind invokes heuristics in bridging a logical gap, cognition gets 
paralyzed in its inference-making efforts.
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Significantly, the fact that our inferences are guided by heuristics, beliefs, and emotions of 
dubious authenticity, does not make the inferences entirely devoid of credibility and validity, 
since all these heuristics, beliefs, and emotions are products of past experience. While some of 
these are well founded and some others are distorted interpretations of reality, their overall effect
is to make us capable of an inference that is, frequently, not far from the truth. Inferences never 
cease. Once formed, an inference is not consigned to the cold storage. It continues to be tested 
and modified, if not within the visible space of conscious awareness, then most certainly in the 
invisible world of the unconscious. It is applied upon the world out there or subjected to 
consistency checks with our knowledge base and with the existing web of beliefs. In other 
words, our knowledge base, our beliefs, our inferences, and our emotional set-up are in a 
constant state of dynamic interaction – interaction among themselves and interaction with the 
world around us. The upshot is an enrichment of our knowledge base, an enrichment of the vast 
storehouse of heuristics, and a rebuilding of the great web of beliefs, with some of the beliefs 
acquiring the credibility of knowledge, some remaining in a state of suspension as ones of 
uncertain credentials, and some transformed into weird dogma. Human cognition is an ever-
active process – and is complex indeed.
Inference is not and, indeed, cannot be a neat linear sequence of information processing because 
such a sequence is possible only when the cognitive system is certain that it will lead to the 
desired conclusion. Real-life inferences are never made that way, except in the arithmetic class-
room. Instead, at every step of reasoning and inference-making, the cognitive mind fans out in 
the form of parallel processing of information – much as the experienced general sends out 
groups of detachments so as to locate and pin down the enemy. In pursuing all these parallel 
branches of information processing, each by means of an application of clusters of heuristics, the
cognitive mind continually carries out consistency checks against bits of stored knowledge and 
against heuristics, beliefs, and reason, thereby approving of or discarding one or more of these 
branches with a view to achieving some desired goal or purpose. In other words, there operates 
an ‘internal censorship’ in every inferential process, as Medawar tells us in the following 
passage: 
“In real life, of course, just as the crudest inductive observations will always be limited by some unspoken
criterion of relevance, so also the hypotheses that enter our minds will as a rule be plausible and not, as in
theory they could be, idiotic. But this implies the existence of some internal censorship which restricts
hypotheses to those that are not absurd, and the internal circuitry of this process is quite unknown. The
critical process in scientific reasoning is not therefore wholly logical in character, though it can be made
to appear so when we look back upon a completed episode of thought.”, ([Medawar],  p 53).
In the process of parallel exploration and concomitant evaluation of inferential possibilities, 
branches get connected and tangled, with the tangle eventually assuming the form of an 
inference – an inference that is seldom a sharply defined proposition since it is mostly in the 
nature of a hazy concept tangled with other concepts and beliefs in the mind, though sufficiently 
defined so as to be made use of in acting upon the external or the internal world. 
Imagine yourself engaged in some complex mathematical derivation, where you apply the 
universal rules of mathematics and logic but have to decide from time to time as to which of 
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several alternative courses of application of the various rules known to you are to be applied so 
as to successfully complete the derivation. Strictly speaking, you cannot examine all possible 
courses of application of these rules, if only because that would entail a prohibitively complex 
enumeration of the possibilities, and you allow your mathematical instinct to come to your help 
where the instinctual help comes in the form of a large number of heuristics, mostly bits and 
pieces of mathematical reasoning themselves, floating about in your unconscious mind. While 
you are proceeding with the derivation, the cognitive unconscious is not sitting idle, since it is 
engaged in small excursions and forays in parallel to your main line of derivation so as to tell 
you which course to adopt whenever a decision is to be taken. But now imagine that you have 
got yourself blocked at an impasse where your storehouse of mathematical knowledge and your 
repertoire of heuristics of a mathematical nature fail to bail you out. 
If you are circumspect by nature, and rely too much on secure mathematical reasoning, you will 
stare and stare at your worksheet, unable to proceed further. But your unconscious mind is not 
circumspect, and it does not sit back staring. It turns and looks at beliefs. In some distant past, 
you came across a derivation made by a peer in a remotely related area where the problem at 
hand, when looked at from the point of view of a higher dimensional space, got solved in an 
unexpected manner. You now make use of a heuristic that launches you on to a higher 
dimensional space, and you get the nod of approval from your belief that what the peer did 
would bring dividend to you as well. Luckily, your hunch does pay dividends, but the more 
important point is, it got you released from your mental block so that even if the hunch were to 
prove unproductive, you would backtrack and then make good use of some other hunch. This is a
hypothetical instance that I include here to bring home the point that the reasoning we employ in 
an inference does not always involve rules of the same degree of rigour – while some of it is 
made up of universal rules of mathematics or logic, some may be of an ‘inferior’ quality, and 
may even be in the nature of loosely woven beliefs, but it is the web of belief that keeps the 
inferential process going when reasoning of more reputable pedigree fails, and, through 
excursions, forays, and parallel processing, helps the process to reach a destination, somewhat 
like a drunken person finding home (perhaps his own) at dead of night. The cognitive mind is 
opportunistic by nature and does not hesitate to get drunk with disreputable stuff. 
As all of you must be aware of from your own experience, the formation of a belief is often 
associated with an emotion specific to the situation in which it originates and, so is its activation 
at a subsequent point of time. And, emotion and affect are not merely psychological entities, 
since they involve physiological and somatic factors as well. One thus has a highly complex 
system to look for when the question of the context of an inferential process comes up. 
Emotions and affects are not localized in this or that organ of the body. These find expression as 
responses of the entire mental and bodily system to situations of diverse types  –  responses at 
times intense and at times barely sensed. Likewise, a person’s web of belief is not localized in 
this or that neural aggregate ( on the other hand, beliefs of various kinds, such as those evoking 
responses of assent and dissent, are possibly associated with corresponding neural aggregates; 
see [Sacks-Hirsch] for a number of interesting observations) – it permeates his entire 
psychological being, weaving through the entire body of his conscious and unconscious 
thoughts. And this entire system of enormous complexity is potentially the ‘context’ of an 
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inferential act. It is from here that the mind draws its ingredients and springboards for 
negotiating and vaulting over the logical chasms it encounters in the course of an inferential act. 
Thus, in other words, an act of inference has strange and hidden aspects to it that cannot be 
captured in commonly invoked norms of rationality. The deeper and the more complex the 
substratum of the cognitive mind an inferential process gets drawn into, the more deviant it 
appears from reconstructions based on extrinsic rules by which the process is appraised and 
evaluated.  
The role of emotions in cognition is a topic under extensive investigation, and has now generated a quite
voluminous literature, inclusive of  [Alvarez-Gallart],  [Houwer-Hermans],  [Power-Dalgleish],  [Lamia],
and [Goel-Vartanian] (in addition to references already mentioned). 
HEURISTICS   IN  THE  INFERENTIAL   PROCESS:  THE  DUAL  ROLE  OF  BELIEFS
Speaking of the ‘hidden logic’ of an inferential process, one comes face to face with the role of 
heuristics in inference making. Heuristics, as I have mentioned, are rules of thumb that the mind 
makes use of in making judgements and decisions and in forming inferences, in which process it 
is often rewarded with success, but failure is not ruled out either. Heuristics are little beliefs of 
ours that keep on being formed, at times, without conscious awareness on our part, though we 
may subsequently become aware of some of those and even make use of those (in the endgame, 
play the king) while solving problems or making inferences. The scope of applicability of a 
heuristic may be limited to only some specific problem situation or may be a comparatively 
extended one spanning a whole class of problem situations. And, heuristics often work in tandem
with one another, and in clusters, helping and prodding us along in the course of an inference. 
Heuristics are, in a manner of speaking, hidden rules operative within the mind, though mostly of
an intrinsic nature, many of those specific to an individual – specific to her developmental 
history, to her response to innumerable real life situations in the past, and to her repertoire of 
experience tied to emotions and feelings. 
From a computational point of view (this is the view adopted in the theory and practice of 
artificial intelligence that tries to capture various aspects of human thought, learning, reasoning, 
and intelligence, thereby shedding light on human cognition at large), heuristics are the 
counterparts of rules and rule clusters made use of in computer realizations of inductive 
inference as described, for instance, in [Holland et al], where a rule typically operates upon 
mental representations of the internal and the external world, and can typically be described as 
an if-then operation upon such representations. The rules operate hierarchically, where an 
intermediate inference, arrived at on the basis of one set of rules, itself acts a rule for the next 
stage of inference, thereby realizing a complex and tangled sequence of ‘information processing’
whose ‘code’ is formed and lodged within inaccessible recesses of the mind.  
Heuristics are in the nature of clues to solutions of problems – typically, clues picked up from the
context within which a problem is defined, where both internal and external contexts are made 
use of by the reasoning mind, mostly in a tacit manner. As I have already mentioned, an 
inferential process involves the operation of rules more or less independent of the context 
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specific to the reasoning individual, as also clues generated from the context that is specific to 
the individual. A heuristic is a rule, mostly of a tentative nature, that can be of either of the two 
types. Thus, there are heuristics made use of by most individuals in some given situation (don’t 
ever argue with the boss), while there are others that do not transcend the individual and are not 
shared by others, the latter being, mostly, heuristics lodged in the unconscious mind.
In a manner of speaking, heuristics can be described as beliefs that are made use of as ingredients
in inferential processes and, commonly, are ones that are subjected to consistency checks to a 
greater extent as compared with many other beliefs that are resistant to revision. It is this fluidity 
of the heuristics that makes them useful in the generation of valid inferences. These are clues 
often produced ‘on the fly’ as the process of inference progresses, and some of these are also 
discarded in a similar manner as they fail to guide the reasoning mind properly toward an 
acceptable solution to the problem.
But how can it be ascertained whether an inference is progressing toward an acceptable solution 
at an intermediate stage of the process even before that solution is arrived at? Again adopting a 
computational point of view, one can conjecture that a process of inference is not just one single 
sequence of information processing, but a large number of sequences proceeding in parallel, as 
the mind tries out a number of alternative inferential pathways simultaneously, with diverse sets 
of  clues of objective and subjective natures (the former being clues shared by different 
individuals in a given situation, and the latter specific to the internal context of an individual). 
Most of these parallel paths of inference are discarded as it transpires, through consistency 
checks of various kinds, that these are not leading to any satisfactory solution to the problem at 
hand (this approach is getting too complicated – leave it and try something simpler), while the 
remaining ones are pursued till one or a few of these seem to engender a solution, or a number of
alternative candidates for a solution, appropriate to the need of the hour. This must be how the 
mind ‘scents’ the right path to the solution of a problem at hand. At every stage of an inferential 
process, and at each step of all the parallel inferential paths adopted in the process, the reasoning 
mind has to judge and to decide between alternatives in the context of a set of consistency 
conditions that an acceptable solution to the problem should meet with. However, these 
conditions are not always determined in a clear-cut manner in terms of subject-independent ones.
And here, as I have briefly explained above, is to be found a second, distinct, role of beliefs in 
the inferential process, a role that is intimately associated with emotions and affects. Thus, at 
times, as the mind prepares to take a logical leap, some belief lodged in it comes forward as an 
arbiter or evaluator as to whether that course is an ‘acceptable’ one. If the course of inference is 
at variance with the belief then a warning bell is sounded whereby the mind shrinks from 
pursuing the course in question by experiencing a negative affect. What is of relevance here is 
that the clamor of the metaphorical warning bell comes into being as a consequence of emotions 
associated with the belief that comes forward for the appraisal as to whether the inference is 
proceeding in the right direction. At times, the belief in question appears to be in consonance 
with the course of the inferential process, the direction in which the mind is ready to leap for 
making possible the onward progress of the process, when a pleasurable affect waves the process
on. This entire thing is, of course, contrary to what goes by the name of logic since, in terms of 
logic, the belief that appears in the role of arbiter or evaluator may not even be of direct 
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relevance to the problem at hand. Suppose, in the course of deciding upon the number of invitees
in a party, the number twelve comes up as a possibility, but the person in charge making the 
decision has an abhorrence for that number – an abhorrence of a very much personal nature 
(perhaps his son died on the twelfth of a certain calendar month) that has got nothing to do 
logically with the considerations necessary for making the party a success. Still, the prospective 
host recoils from the number and looks for ways to extend or to shorten the list of invitees (the 
case would have been different if the number in question were thirteen instead of twelve because 
then the dread of that number, though an ‘illogical’ one, would have been in the nature of a ‘rule’
shared by many individuals, and would resemble a ‘logic’, based on a rule). 
A traumatic experience like the one mentioned here  often generates  a  set  of beliefs,  associated with
emotions of an elemental nature, that have an overriding influence in setting the course of an inference, to
which these beliefs have even a remote relevance. 
   
Though, in the present instance of application of a rule (either an inter-subjective or a person-
specific one – these terms are further explained below), the drawing up of a list of invitees does 
not have to satisfy the needs of some objective truth, still it illustrates how ‘rules’ of diverse 
kinds make inroads in our inferential process. 
More generally, inferences are made necessary so as to guess at ‘truths’ of the world or to decide upon a
course of action in order that some goal or purpose is achieved. In order that the desired goal is actually
arrived at, inferences must have a commitment to the external reality – to correctly grasp some aspect of
that reality. Rules of various kinds are routinely invoked in the cognitive mind to guess at such truths.   
Briefly stated, as a juncture is reached in a process of inference where the reasoning mind is 
poised for a decision as to the possible efficacy of a heuristic in bridging a logical gap, the likely 
consequence following from the adoption of that heuristic (or of a cluster of heuristics) is judged 
against a belief (or, again, against a set of beliefs), where the result of the judgment appears as an
affect or a feeling of either a positive or a negative kind, in virtue of some associated emotion. 
An emotion, generally speaking, is an amplifying mechanism designed to make a subject 
sensitive to a situation, whereby she can either take evasive action or one of engaging into the 
situation with a positive frame of mind. It is this amplifying and evaluative mechanism involving
beliefs tagged with emotions that is possibly of crucial relevance in helping the reasoning mind 
navigate logical gaps in the course of an inferential process.
In summary, beliefs play a dual role in inferential processes in general, and in inductive 
inferences in particular. First, they are used in the form of heuristics in the step-wise progress of 
an inferential process, much in the same way as logical rules are made use of in a mathematical 
derivation, with the great difference that these are themselves in the nature of products of 
guesswork, and are often of dubious efficacy and, above all, may be highly subjective in their 
origin. The other role of beliefs is that of acting as evaluators and arbiters (‘internal censorship’) 
in the inferential process when judgments and decisions (involving a choice between disparate 
and conflicting alternatives) are to be made in navigating across gaps in which the use of 
heuristics, just by themselves, is not sufficient for the success of the inferential act. Here a belief,
in conjunction with the associated emotions, makes the reasoning mind alert as to whether the 
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course it is going to adopt is about to bring it nearer to the desired goal or to take it further away. 
This role of beliefs is a curious one since the belief in question may not be of direct relevance to 
the goal that the inferential process is to culminate in, but is still made use of as part of an overall
strategy in a broader context.
For instance, here is a hypothetical situation that I include more as a metaphor than as an 
illustration. Suppose that a mother is playing a game with her child, asking her to search out an 
object which she, the mother, has hidden somewhere around. At one stage in her exploring spree,
the child comes to a momentary halt, unable to make up her mind as to whether to enter into the 
kitchen or into the drawing room, when her mother issues a shrill command that she is not to go 
into the kitchen. Here, it is quite logical for the child to assume that the kitchen may be a 
possible hiding place, but the mother’s admonition has a different relevance, in a context broader
than the issue at hand.   
DETERMINISTIC  BUT  UNPREDICTABLE
The mind is a system of great complexity. One can look at an inferential process, or any process 
in which the mind participates, as a trajectory in a state space of an enormous number of 
dimensions (I will come back to this idea of exploration of a conceptual space at greater length in
chapter 9). Arguably, the trajectory remains confined to a subspace (in a loose sense) of a smaller
number of dimensions in any specific process of reasoning and inference, but that process may 
still be dynamically complex in the sense of being unpredictable while still being deterministic, 
where the latter term is used in a broad sense, meaning a process that is predominantly driven 
causally from one step to another by rules, though the latter may be rules that have a specifically 
subjective component, and ones that are fallible. 
HEURISTICS  AS INTER-SUBJECTIVE  AND  PERSON-SPECIFIC  RULES
Two terms that assume relevance in this context, and have featured in earlier paragraphs, are: 
inter-subjective and person-specific. Thus, rules of an inter-subjective nature are ones that are 
shared by individuals going through an inferential process defined by a given external context 
(external inputs, triggers, and goals). Referring back to an earlier example (a completely 
hypothetical one), if a number of persons are asked to draw up plans, each in an individual 
capacity, for arranging a party, several of them may avoid the thirteenth day of the month as the 
projected day on which the party is to be held, though that same day may come up as a likely 
possibility as a result of a few other considerations (it may, for instance, be a national holiday). 
Here the abhorrence for the number thirteen is a belief of an inter-subjective nature (which, 
however, may not be a universal one; rules may differ in their degree of universality). On the 
other hand, one particular individual may have an abhorrence for the number twelve because of a
tragedy of a deeply personal nature that is associated with the recollection of the twelfth day of a 
month, and he may even prefer the thirteenth day over the twelfth for that reason. What is 
important to note here is that both inter-subjective and person-specific rules are, under most 
circumstance, fallible in nature, being products of guesswork and of prior beliefs which, 
however, does not prevent the reasoning subject from making use of these in her reasoning and 
inference-making.
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The question as to their efficacy in arriving at ‘truths’ is a deep one; even though fallible, the rules are
linked to past experience and, when used in conjunction with rules of greater efficacy and the ‘internal
censorship’ in our mind, they often guide the cognitive process to a  point not very far from a successful
conclusion.
The issue of ‘rules’ in inferential processes has been addressed by Reber in [Reber] in a manner at once
subtle and nuanced.
According to the framework outlined above, heuristics play the role of inter-subjective and 
person-specific rules made use of by the reasoning mind in the course of an inferential process, 
while, generally speaking, a number of inter-subjective and person-specific beliefs are also 
involved in the process for the purpose of judgment and evaluation at various stages of the 
process, resulting in the decision as to whether the use of this or that heuristic in the bridging of a
logical gap is ‘acceptable’ or not. This latter purpose is served, in a large measure, by 
psychological and somatic signals generated by emotions associated with the beliefs.
Antonio R. Damasio has famously spoken of the role of somatic markers in the making of decisions and
inferences in [Damasio], mostly based on neuro-physiological and neuro-pathological observations.
The fact that inter-subjective and person-specific beliefs are often associated with emotions that 
act as amplifying mechanisms in the mind is of likely relevance in making some mental 
processes sensitive to initial conditions and, generally speaking, unpredictable, in spite of being 
deterministic. This is an issue we will take up later in this book, in chapter 9.
I close this section by emphasizing that beliefs in general, including the heuristics made use of in
inferential processes, are mostly lodged in the unconscious mind, without the reasoning subject 
being aware of the action of these (incidentally, the commonly used connotation of the term 
‘inter-subjective’ implies a conscious sharing of ideas or thoughts, which means that our present 
use of the term is an extension of this common usage). In other words, inferences are 
predominantly carried out by ‘hidden logic’ where we have now stretched the meaning of the 
term ‘logic’ far beyond its commonly accepted connotation. More specifically, we will 
occasionally be using this term to mean any set of rules – whether inter-subjective or person-
specific, and whether unconsciously or consciously invoked – that may be made use of in an 
inferential process. The set of ‘rules’, moreover, may not be a consistent one and may result in an
inferential act involving a network of branches and cross-links, making it a tangled process with 
complex and contrary features.
The mechanism, outlined in the present chapter, relating to the possible role of beliefs and emotions in
inference is in the nature of a speculation without direct empirical support – though one that appears to
me to be plausible enough so as to be accepted as a working hypothesis. It is not inconsistent with views
of experts in the field of cognitive science as revealed, for instance, in comments in [Stanovich], chapter
1, where Stanovich, by way of quoting the noted social and political theorist Jon Elster, speaks of the
distinction between ‘thin’ and ‘broad’ theories of rationality (the ‘rationality issue’ will be addressed in
the next chapter). The so-called thin theory “leaves unexamined the beliefs and the desires that form the
reasons for the action whose rationality we are assessing", while, in reality, "we need a broader theory of
rationality that goes beyond the exclusively formal considerations ... and that allows a scrutiny of the
substantive nature of the desires and beliefs in action." Here Elster (and Stanovich too) wants ‘desires’ to
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be included in an adequate appraisal of rationality, in addition to ‘beliefs’. I have not included desires in
building up, in the above paragraphs, a hypothetical scenario as to how the inferential process can actually
proceed  in  the  human  mind,  where  beliefs  and  emotions  play  a  vital  role  (incidentally,  desires  are
associated with emotions too). The inclusion of desires is essential when one goes on to examine the
values governing the inferential process (I comment on this once again in the next chapter). This book
pleads incompleteness in opting to steer clear of this all-important question of values in so far as these set
the goals and purposes of inferential processes in everyday life and in scientific explorations. Instead, I
look at the inferential process in the human mind as it proceeds with an aim to meet with  given  goals
(earning a Ph.D., or, winning a war). 
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CHAPTER 7 
REASONING AND RATIONALITY: THE INTRINSIC AND THE EXTRINSIC 
Epistemic irrationality
‘Though this be madness, yet there is method in it.’
Starting from the mid-sixties of the last century, there has been a great profusion of 
investigations, journal articles, books, critical analyses, and polemics in the literature in cognitive
psychology on the so-called rationality issue. What does it mean to say that, in making an 
inference, a judgment, or a decision, a person is being rational, or else, is deviating from 
standards of rationality? 
Standards of rationality rest on evaluation in terms of sets of normative rules. An act of inference
(or one of making a judgment or decision) made in conformity with a set of such rules then earns
the accolade of being rational. The question, however, comes up as to whether the rules are of an
intrinsic or extrinsic nature. The actual process of inference followed by an individual may 
involve the use of intrinsic rules specific to that individual or of inter-subjective rules that may 
differ from the rules invoked to evaluate his standard of rationality. In cases that the rules are of 
an inter-subjective nature, they may or may not not be universal ones like, for instance, the rules 
of logic. The rules that the individual makes use of can, moreover, vary from one inferential act 
to another similar one and, what is more, may not even be fully known to that individual, since 
they may operate tacitly. Indeed the ‘rules’ may be so diffuse as to be quite unlike what goes by 
the name of rules. This raises the question of the extent to which the process of reasoning and 
inference-making can be described and evaluated, by persons other than the individual drawing 
the inference, in terms of a set of explicit rules invoked for the purpose of evaluation. 
All this is sometimes expressed by saying that normative accounts of reasoning and decision 
making may differ from descriptive ones. However, this raises a subtle residual problem: can the 
internal psychological process in a person making an inference or a decision be at all amenable 
to a descriptive account by either the individual concerned or by some other person attempting 
the description?
Before engaging with these questions of central relevance, I’ll relate to you in a few sketchy 
paragraphs as to what type of norms the cognitive psychologists have had in mind in conducting 
their psychological investigations by means of tests conducted on individuals as also on groups 
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of individuals in the context of various types of ‘tasks’ given to them. It turns out that the 
performance of the subjects of these investigations is, generally speaking, rather ordinary, 
indicative of a rather low level of ‘rationality’ of these individuals. This makes necessary a re-
examination of the concept of rationality that these investigations seek to reveal. 
THE  RATIONALITY  ISSUE:  A  BRIEF  OVERVIEW
For the purpose of the present discussion, I will use the term inference-making to include such 
psychological processes as deductive and inductive reasoning, making decisions involving 
choices between available options, and making judgements as to the relative probabilities of 
beliefs in the face of available evidence. Evidently, the processes mentioned in this list are not 
sharply differentiated from one another, since there exists a good deal of diffuseness in the 
definition of each of these and, at the same time, a good deal of overlap. For instance, it is only 
appropriate that the term ‘reasoning’ should refer to processes involving the use of rules to some 
considerable degree where the rules should be inter-subjective or, more preferably, universal 
ones like the rules of logic. By this token, making a deductive inference should qualify as an act 
of reasoning. An inductive inference, on the other hand, is essentially one of informed guessing, 
where rules are defined much less sharply and the term reasoning is of dubious validity, though 
an act of inductive inference does involve the processing of information. On the other hand, an 
inductive inference involves the formation of new beliefs or the revision of our judgment as to 
how probable our beliefs are when faced with one or more new items of evidence. In the same 
vein, decision making involves the making of a number of inferences where one has to weigh the
consequences of choosing between a set of alternatives. 
Let us consider deductive reasoning first since it is a form of inference where one expects that 
people will be most ‘logical’, and will conform to normative or evaluative rules to a large extent.
Mathematical deduction is taken to be the ultimate form of deductive reasoning, but most 
psychological tests are performed with much more simple forms closer to our everyday exercises
in deduction, one widely studied form being syllogistic reasoning where a few premises are 
supplied and the subject is asked to check whether a proposed conclusion follows from these. In 
most cases, the answer is uniquely obtained by the application of modus ponens (‘affirming the 
antecedent’) or modus tollens (‘denying the consequent’) or combinations of these, or else (in the
case of more complex syllogistic tasks), by the use of Euler diagrams ([Manktelow], chapter 2), 
where these constitute the normative rules for this form of inference making. However, people 
do not always follow the normative rules (which, incidentally, are universal ones in that these do 
not involve inter-subjective rules of limited validity, or person-specific rules) and are commonly 
found to arrive at erroneous conclusions. In particular, errors are quite frequent in the case of 
syllogisms or logical tasks posed in abstract terms. Subjects perform better when the tasks are 
posed in terms of concrete themes and concepts that they can relate to, but then they appear not 
to follow consistently the valid rules of syllogistic reasoning, but to respond contextually, i.e., by 
relying heavily on their interpretation of the tasks and by referring to their prior knowledge, 
concepts, and beliefs. For instance, they are found to exhibit belief bias ([Leighton]; 
[Manktelow], chapter 4; [Weisberg-Reeves], chapter 11) i.e., they tend to avoid logically valid 
conclusions if these go against firmly entrenched beliefs of theirs and, conversely, favour invalid 
conclusions if these are supported by their prior beliefs. 
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Refer to our previous discussion of belief as an evaluative element in inference. Incidentally, a rule that
says that people often make inferences in syllogistic reasoning by weighting these with their beliefs held
in common with others (a fear of the number thirteen, for instance), itself constitutes an instance of an
inter-subjective but non-universal rule since it is not sanctioned by universal rules of logic but is still
found to be used commonly while assessing the performance of subjects in psychological tests. 
In other words, as far as the psychological processing of information goes, people often convert 
deductive tasks to ones resembling inductive inference (recall our earlier discussion of ‘problem 
view ’ and ‘process view’ in chapter 4) and arrive at conclusions that are fallible and are not 
strictly necessary consequences of the given premises. 
The next type of inferential tasks we will consider is decision making. Recall that we have used 
the term inference-making in a broad setting, where it includes the making of decisions. Suppose
you are in a gambling frame of mind and have two gambling options open, each with some 
specific probability of win and an associated pay-off in money terms, and you want to decide as 
to which of the two gambles to accept. In real life, we continually face such ‘gambles’ where we 
have to choose from a set of uncertain outcomes, with each outcome associated with 
consequences that may or may not be preferred by us when compared with the consequences of 
the other possible outcomes. In order to make a successful choice one needs to do some 
reasoning and inferring. More generally, most reasoning and inference-making tasks in real life 
involve a lot of implicit decision-making in that the sequence of information processing steps 
through which an inference proceeds require decisions to be made (mostly without conscious 
awareness) as to which of several alternate courses to follow in order to arrive at a successful 
conclusion. Psychological tests on decision making, however, are performed on explicit decision 
making tasks such as a concretely specified gambling situation.
The normative theory one starts with in gambling tasks is the expected value theory where one 
calculates the expected values associated with the various possible choices in accordance with 
their respective probabilities and value outcomes, and then makes the choice with the maximum 
expected value. However, for the sake of generality, monetary value is to be replaced with 
subjective utility, where the latter is based on a subjective scale of preference that may not be 
amenable to specification in quantitative terms ([Stanovich], chapter 2).  Further, the 
probabilities associated with the various different choices cannot, generally speaking, be 
assigned specific values. Still, a normative theory can be postulated in terms of a set of axioms of
choice ([Stanovich], chapter 2), where a subject can be said to make rational decisions if she 
consistently adheres to these axioms. Consistency with these axioms then constitutes the 
normative principle of decision making. 
For instance, the transitivity axiom tells us that if choice A is preferred over choice B and, in 
turn, choice B is preferred over choice C, then choice A has to be preferred over choice C. While
this appears to be unexceptionable enough as a requirement for rationality, actual psychological 
tests have shown that people’s choice is often stamped with context effects when it comes to the 
transitivity axiom or other equally logical axioms of choice. Thus, unknown to the cognitive 
psychologist, the question of choice between A and C may bring in subtle context effects in the 
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form of associations from past experience that result in C being preferred over A (for instance, to
take a hypothetical and unlikely example just for the sake of illustration, a person may have a 
preference of even numbers over odd numbers and, among odd numbers, a preference of those 
divisible by thee over those that are not, as a result of which she prefers 12 over 9 and 9 over 5, 
but when it comes to the question of choosing between an even number and a prime number, she 
may have a greater affinity for the latter, thereby choosing 5 over 12). Once again, the normative 
principle may be overridden by or conjoined with beliefs held by people, and the choices that 
people actually make in psychological tests of decision making deviate notably from what is 
assumed by cognitive psychologists to be the norm in decision tasks ([Stanovich], chapter 2; 
([Weisberg-Reeves], chapter 11)).
I will conclude by briefly outlining a similar deviation from the normative principles relating to 
belief revision. Do people correctly judge their beliefs to be true or false? Are the beliefs 
consistent with one another? Do people correctly update their beliefs when confronted with new 
evidence? In short, do the beliefs held by an individual correctly reflect the state of the world as 
perceived by her? All of these relate to what can be termed the epistemic rationality of a subject 
([Stanovich], chapter 1). If beliefs are all we go by when making inferences (which, in the 
present context, includes the making of decisions), then a necessary condition for the inferences 
to be on the right track is that the beliefs should have a good measure of correspondence with the
actual state of affairs ‘out there’, since the world at large is the ultimate source from which the 
beliefs are formed and, moreover, is the source of the ‘premises’ on which these beliefs are made
to operate (many of the premises are themselves in the nature of beliefs). Indeed, beliefs are the 
end results of inductive inference in the context of novel or salient situations, which implies that 
an act of inductive inference can be interpreted, in a broad sense, as one of belief revision by 
means of available evidence.
The normative principle for such belief revision is made up of the axioms of probability theory, 
along with a number of logical deductions from it, notably the principle known as Bayes’ 
theorem – a mathematical formula relating the ‘prior probability’ of a belief or a hypothesis (say,
H), to its ‘revised probability’ resulting from an ‘evidence’ (E) coming to light. The revised 
probability represents the degree of belief in H, given that E is true (i.e., is observed for a fact), 
and may be denoted by the symbol P(H│E) while the prior probability P(H) is the degree of 
belief in H without regard to E. The formula involves two other probabilities, namely, P(E│H), 
i.e., the likelihood of E occurring as a consequence of H and, in addition, the probability 
P(E│~H), i.e., the likelihood that E occurs as a consequence of any and every hypothesis other 
than H, the  two taken together determining P(E), the unconditional probability of E being true.
Epistemic rationality is said to obtain if a subject updates her degree of belief in a hypothesis (I 
avoid the clumsy phrase ‘degree of belief in a belief’) in conformity with Bayes’ formula. The 
question that immediately comes up is, can one ever hope to assign reliable values to all these 
various probabilities? However, it has been argued that exact probability values are, in effect, not
as important as consistency with the formula: what one needs to do in order to be counted as a 
rational agent is to be consistent with Bayes’ formula in a qualitative sense ([Stanovich], chapter 
3; see also [Rosenberg], chapter 5, where Alex Rosenberg examines the question of rationality in
respect of scientific hypotheses and theories), without regard to exact probability values. In order
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to test how rational a subject is, a cognitive psychologist provides a subject with values of the 
probabilities P(E), P(H), and P(E│H) (or values from which these probabilities can be worked 
out), and asks him to estimate what the value of P(H│E) would be. In large numbers of tests of 
various descriptions of this type, it has been found that people deviate in substantial measure 
from the axioms of probability theory (recall that Bayes’ theorem is a logical corollary of the 
basic probability axioms). For instance, subjects often neglect to consider the base rates, i.e., the 
unconditional probabilities of hypotheses and, at times, tend to place P(H│E) on the same 
footing as P(E│H). Generally speaking, a number of deviations from Bayes’ principle can be 
interpreted as implying that people assign a greater degree of significance to concrete evidence 
than to abstract statistical information which, in a sense, is a context effect once again. In other 
words, people pick out what is more salient to them with reference to their information base 
while ignoring information less salient in their perception. However, salience is perception-
dependent and is determined substantially by the belief structure of an individual, which goes to 
show that the way we set about to revise our beliefs when confronted with evidence, is itself 
dependent on our existing belief structure. 
One other major deviation from the basic logic underlying Bayes’ principle relates to ‘ignoring 
the alternatives’, i.e., not paying adequate attention to P(E│~H), the likelihood of the evidence E
being true under hypotheses other than the hypothesis H under consideration. In other words, we 
tend to revise our beliefs in a ‘dogmatic’ manner – while focusing on some particular belief H 
(which is more often than not made salient by a set of existing beliefs), we tend not to examine 
how likely it is that the evidence concerned can be explained in terms of alternative hypotheses: 
we are biased by our existing beliefs. 
All  these  deviations  in  probabilistic  inference  notwithstanding,  humans  are  found  to  be  pretty  good
detectors  of  frequencies  of  occurrence  of  various  kinds  of  stimuli  received  as  inputs  from  the
environment, and of degrees of covariation between groups of stimuli (see [Stanovich],  [Reber]), where
much of this ability of frequency detection seems to have been acquired in the process  of biological
evolution, and is in the nature of an innate or unconscious one. 
Significantly, the same Bayesian approach is commonly assumed to provide the normative basis 
of how scientific theories are confirmed by evidence coming up through experimentation and 
observation, because theories are based on hypotheses that are arrived at by inductive inference 
(one belonging to a special category, namely, abduction). The confirmation of scientific theories 
is a widely discussed and debated issue in the philosophy of science where there have been many
attempts at working out a normative principle of confirmation. No such logically sound 
normative principle has been arrived at (refer to [Rosenberg], chapter 5, mentioned above), 
paralleling the fact that no normative principle of belief revision can be formulated that describes
with any degree of universality the actual inferential processes of individuals.
RATIONALITY:  MISPLACED   NOTIONS
I will not dwell further upon how and to what extent actual inference-making by individuals 
deviates from normative principles made use of by cognitive psychologists in evaluating the 
level of rationality commonly achieved by people (see, for instance, [Evans_Over], [Elio], in 
addition to references mentioned above) . Indeed, the entire complex of cognitive processes in 
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individuals is heavily context-driven. For instance, the process of memory recall, one of great 
importance in inference-making, is biased by relevance which, in turn, is influenced by the 
immediate goal or purpose, and by available data, information, pieces of knowledge, 
associations, and beliefs (i.e., in other words, memory recall is, to a large extent, a ‘top-down’ 
process), since an unbiased search of the entire ‘data base’ in memory constitutes a 
computational task of enormous proportions ([Weisberg-Reeves], chapter 3) . Whichever way 
one looks at it, inference-making by individuals appears to be non-ideal and less-than-rational, 
having only a limited correspondence with objective normative principles supposed to be 
infallible guides to successful reasoning.
It is only rarely that people base their reasoning exclusively on deductive logic or axioms of 
probability, or axioms of choice, or strategies in game theory. Instead, they guess, mostly under 
situations of uncertainty, and make copious use of their beliefs and of an enormous store of 
heuristics – thumb rules, hunches, and clues – in arriving at inferences. And, remarkably, this 
entire complex process of inference-making is largely carried out by the cognitive unconscious. 
Significantly, the process of inference making turns out to be, on the whole, epistemically authentic in
spite of the deviation of the inferential processes from normative principles, as discussed above. This is to
be explained by referring to the fact that the belief-driven inferential process is heavily influenced by past
experience, in which past successes play a positive role as compared with past failures, and also to the
fact that inferences are subjected to incessant tests and checks, this time against rules that are relatively
more solidly grounded ones.
The large body of data accumulated over the years from rationality tests of varied types, has been
interpreted differently by different groups of cognitive psychologists. One major interpretation 
involves the viewpoint that human inference-making is a fundamentally flawed process, biased 
by beliefs and heuristics, the latter, according to this point of view, being the vehicles that take 
human reasoning away from normative efficiency. In contrast there is an alternative point of 
view that there is no question of any fundamental flaw being there in human reasoning which is, 
on the contrary, effective and adaptive. Human rationality, instead of being flawed or biased, is 
bounded ([Simon]; [Gigerenzer-Selten]) in the face of the fact that most real life inferential tasks 
are, computationally speaking, of unbounded complexity. Moreover, most inferential tasks are 
necessarily carried out under uncertainty and on the basis of incomplete data where, in the 
specific context of any particular task, the probabilistic and choice-theoretic approaches do not 
make much sense, and guessing becomes a necessity. In other words, because of uncertainties 
inherent in most situations, and of limitations of available data, and also because of bounded 
rationality in the face of unbounded complexity of most inferential tasks, humans have to place a
high value on being effective rather than normative, where the effectiveness is achieved mostly at
the level of the unconscious by means of acquired beliefs and heuristics that make possible fast 
and frugal reasoning ([Marsh et al]). Concurrently, the cognitive process draws upon 
biologically evolved capacities of the mind (refer to [Reber], chapter 3, mentioned earlier in 
chapter 5 of this book; we will again refer to ideas gained from evolutionary psychology in 
respect inferential processes  in later sections of the present book).
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Based on bounded rationality, the cognitive system makes effective use of its elementary 
inferential abilities (detection of patterns of covariance and similarities in environmental inputs) 
developed in a long evolutionary process – abilities that get diversified and sharpened in the 
developmental process of the individual, where communications with other individuals in a 
community sharing a common culture play a vital role. All this results in an effective inferential 
ability of an adaptive nature. The cognitive system of bounded abilities focuses on and makes 
use of the essential features of the inputs received from the environment, depending on its 
immediate goals, without entering into an unbounded search process when faced with a complex 
setting. Its belief system, along with emotional mechanisms of amplification helps in the 
‘selection’ of an effective inferential path.
The less-than-ideal and bounded rationality is, in essence, a strength since it limits the search for 
relevance and meaning in the multitude of environmental inputs and makes the search effective. 
In order to be able to judge and compare, a system has to be able to make a ‘meaningful 
selection’.
It is now time to collect what we have come up with so far so as to put together a plausible 
framework of the way the inferential process can conceivably be carried out in the human mind.
In so far as an inference involves a processing of information in the mind, it is in the nature of a 
sequential application of rules – broadly speaking, rules of implication – where, however, the 
rules are not of uniform measure of generality. At the top of the ladder are the universal rules of 
logic and mathematics – ones that are independent of context (the state of the world within which
the inferential process is carried out), including the specific context defined by the web of beliefs
of the individual, with their associated emotional referents, and the more general context of inter-
subjective beliefs. Then comes the less general class of rules that are of an inter-subjective nature
– ones that are not specific to an individual, but are still based on shared beliefs of a class of 
inference-making subjects. And, finally, one has to reckon with person-specific rules that are 
relevant within the inferential process of the individual but have no broader significance. Among
these, the inter-subjective and the person-specific rules are context-dependent – not only the 
belief-laden psychological context of the individual or of groups of individuals, but the more 
general contextual setting as well, the state of the world if you like, within which the inferential 
problem is defined, including its ‘inputs’ and the desired ‘output’. 
The rules (the universal ones and the inter-subjective and person-specific ones of a belief-laden, 
heuristic nature) operate upon beliefs generated in the various stages of the inferential process, 
and make use of the knowledge base, memories of past experience, and the tangled mass of other
beliefs, along with their associated emotional links. In this, the inferential process proceeds in the
form of a bundle of a tangled sequences of ‘information processing’ executed in parallel, 
eventually ending up in a ‘conclusion’ or an ‘output’ that is more often than not a more or less 
diffuse bundle of concepts and beliefs (either newly formed ones or ones produced by 
modification or revision of previously formed beliefs) itself.
And what is more, the rules are seldom of an explicit nature in that they cannot be formulated or 
described with any degree of completeness by the individual engaged in the inferential act, or by 
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an external agency – by, say, the cognitive psychologist. The reason is twofold – first, the 
person-specific or group-specific, non-universal nature of the rules and of the context defining 
the inferential process (‘personal knowledge’); and, secondly, the predominantly tacit nature of 
the process, where most of the processing is carried out within the unconscious stratum of the 
cognitive mind.   
When looked at within this complex setting, the mass of psychological data telling us of the less-
than-rational status of human inferential act does not appear surprising because the norms or 
evaluative standards invoked for the purpose of judging rationality are at odds with the actual 
manner in which the mind engages in inference-making. It is within such a complex setting that 
the rationality issue is to be addressed for an adequate resolution. Any simplification by 
restriction to a less complex setting is likely to result in an incomplete and misleading idea of 
rationality.
This, in essence, is indicative of the naturalist approach to the rationality issue. However, the naturalist
point of view cannot be limited to just the question of how the cognitive inferential processes actually
occur in the human mind, because that, even when amenable to being addressed meabingfully, amounts to
just  a  plain  description.  Of  equally  vital  relevance  are  the  issues  of  sharing  of  abilities  between
individuals  and  communities  so  as  to  develop and  improve  upon the  currently  existing  inferential
faculties, and of examining the goals and  values underlying the inferential processes. All this refers to
broader ethical and moral questions relating to human reasoning, inference, and decision making, and to
the question of responsible decision in a social context. The naturalist approach has to address all these
issues to be a really effective and useful one. These broader questions will not be addressed in this book
because of essential limitations on the part of its author, due to which he feels inadequate for such an
undertaking. 
THE   DUAL-PROCESS   THEORY
It is here that I want to draw your attention to a currently favoured view of the nature of 
information processing in the human mind – the dual-process theory. This is a view subscribed 
to by a good number of exponents in cognitive science and is based on the assumption, 
consistent with a large body of literature, that human cognitive process involves two distinct 
streams – process-one and process-two. Of the two, the former is a fast, non-deliberative, 
massively parallel and autonomous process, while the latter is a slow and deliberative one, 
predominantly based on sequential processing that makes copious use of working memory. 
Significantly, process-two is perceived as being capable of acting as the control of the cognitive 
process as a whole. 
The question of control is a complex and non-trivial one, though. Commonly, the controlling action of
cognitive processes is assumed to be exercised by the conscious mind. However, it is not unlikely that
much of the controlling action is, in fact, executed without overt awareness ([Wegner]). 
The dual-process theory is fundamentally in the nature of a suggestive and fruitful hypothesis – a
prototype theory that provides a framework for interpreting and explaining quite a large body of 
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observations and information. As in many other areas of cognitive science, it is a useful heuristic
itself.  
Process-two operates on the basis of rules of relatively more general scope such as the universal 
ones of mathematics and logic, and the inter-subjective ones that some relatively large group of 
individuals make use of while being aware of these as reasonably reliable beliefs, though not 
foolproof ones (a number of chess heuristics, for instance, or a few – too few? – of the heuristics 
that stockbrokers make use of). Process-one on the other hand, is based on ‘rules’ of a more 
primitive kind operating, in the main, in the unconscious recesses of the cognitive mind – the 
person-specific ones and the relatively more fallible of the inter-subjective ones, along with 
heuristics of some proven worth. While process-two is executed with at least some measure of 
focal awareness, process-one is more tacit and is in the nature of a default. While the rules in 
process-two are, broadly speaking, those of implication, those in process-one are less distinctly 
so, being based, to a larger extent, on processes of association. Finally, process-one is of an 
adaptive nature, where it is required to be effective in achieving some useful purpose or goal in 
the specific environment in which it operates while process-two is a deliberative one where 
epistemic goals acquire relevance. In other words, process-one is geared to achieving what is 
referred to as instrumental rationality, in contrast to process-two in which epistemic rationality 
(what is the world like?) is of greater relevance ([Stanovich], chapter 1).
 
What is of great significance is the manner in which these two process types interact in the 
course of an inference. This, of course, is a matter of speculation though, once again, one that 
may prove to be useful and suggestive in some considerable measure. It seems likely that both 
the processes run simultaneously though process-two has periods of relative latency while, at the 
same time, there occurs a continual transfer of control to it when it evaluates, by means of 
comparatively secure rules of implication, some intermediate idea, concept, or belief produced in
the course of activity of process-one, and passes on the ‘result’ of that evaluation to the latter 
which is then used as an ingredient in the further processing of information carried out 
autonomously of process-two. In this, process-two is likely to contribute its own quota of 
information processing (apart from evaluating and justifying what process-one has handed over 
to it), handing back a more ‘finished output’ to process-one.
Medawar  speaks  of  “a  rapid  reciprocation  between  an  imaginative  and  a  critical  process,  between
imaginative  conjecture  and  critical  evaluation”  ([Medawar],  p  44)  in  the  context  of  the  so-called
hypothetico-deductive method of  science,  championed by Popper.  The hypothetico-deductive  method
presupposes a distinction between phases of ‘discovery’ and ‘justification’ in scientific exploration. The
two, however, can be distinguished only notionally since they are but two aspects of the same inferential
process. The dual-process theory speaks of a more intimate mix of the ‘imaginative’ and the ‘critical’
processes where it need not even be necessary that there be two separate processes involved. A more
likely scenario is that the inferential process is a single complex one involving ‘imaginative’ leaps and
rule-driven ‘critical’ sequences. The latter picture of the inferential process is not inconsistent with the
one hinted at in this book.
The ‘context of discovery’ is seldom addressed and analyzed in logical and philosophical discourse, since
it is assumed to belong to the realm of psychology. However, psychology is no exception to the ‘logic’
engendered by the operation of causal  connections.  The ‘logic’  of the cognitive unconscious may be
something completely different from the logic found in textbooks, but it  does operate on the basis of
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‘rules’ nevertheless – rules of  less than universal validity. In particular, as repeatedly hinted at in this
book, the rules may have deep moorings in beliefs and emotions of a personal  nature. The apathy, found
in conventional logical and philosophical discourse, towards an analysis of the context of discovery was
questioned by Hanson, who looked for a ‘logic of discovery’, thereby contributing important insights into
the process of abduction. Hanson, however, fell short of analyzing the deeply psychological roots of the
logic of discovery ([Hanson1], [Hanson2]).  
It is in this transfer of process control from process-one to process-two and back (the “restless to-
and-fro motion of thought” spoken of by Medawar in [Medawar], p 48) where one is likely to 
find the clue to the way the reasoning capacity of an individual evolves in the course of his or her
developmental history, and to the remarkable difference in the reasoning capacities of 
individuals as also to the difference in modes of reasoning of individuals and across cultures. 
To be more specific, there are, in all likelihood, two things involved here, one dependent on the 
other. First, the quantity and quality of the vast repertoire of beliefs and heuristics that one can 
draw from in the course of an inference. And, secondly, the manner and the frequency of transfer
of control from process-one to process-two as mentioned above or, speaking in more general 
terms, the manner of interaction between the two processes. When one stops to think of it, there 
can be an infinite range of variation in the mode and efficacy of the inferential process, 
depending on the interplay of these two factors. But one cannot say more since one has to draw a
line here before indulging in dangerously unfounded speculation. 
Emotion-driven processes play a great role in leading to remarkable variations in the reasoning capacities
among individuals, and to the progressive development of the reasoning capacity of a single individual.
Success  in  an  inferential  act  is  a  potent  emotional  factor  that  inspires  enhanced  performance
in subsequent acts of inference of related kinds. Success elicits recognition and acknowledgement from
peers, and public approval as well – all of these intoxicating indeed. No less intoxicating is the internal
feeling of success, and the resulting sense of confidence, of which a likely consequence is a heightened
ability to  explore  possible alternatives  in an inferential  process  – picking up cues in profusion from
environmental  inputs  and  making  remarkable  use  of  heuristics  made  available  by  the  cognitive
unconscious  under  the  amplifying  action  of  favourable  emotions.  In  other  words,  emotions  have  an
amplifying psychological role that may produce dramatic effects in the development of cognitive skills.  
Numerous exponents of the dual-process theory converge on the opinion that process-one is of 
more ancient evolutionary origin than process-two, and there also appears to be a widespread 
acceptance of the view that the cognitive system, especially the one involved in process-one 
inference, comes equipped with a considerably developed tool-kit for adaptive thinking that has 
emerged in the course of biological evolution. While the ‘tool-kit’ is of an innate nature, it gets 
expressed ([Cummins]) in the course of individual developmental process – a process greatly 
influenced by the cultural environment of the individual. However, it is no less likely that the 
innate inferential capacity of evolutionary vintage is supplanted with capacities not originating in
biological evolution but ones developing in a secondary process in the course of the inferential 
history of the individual, though this is once again a point where speculation is apt to become too
nebulous.   
In any case, it is not unlikely that the dual-process viewpoint is a pointer in the right direction, 
though it is still somewhat in the nature of a suggestive hypothesis. While numerous 
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psychological experiments seem to support the viewpoint and appear to make the distinction 
between process-one and process-two reasonably sharp and well defined, evidence from 
neuroscience is less direct, since it seems unlikely that there exist clearly demarcated neural 
aggregates devoted to the two types of processing. It may, for instance, turn out that the dual-
process point of view will be supplanted by a more elaborate theory involving an integrated but 
complex processing system, with the inferential process circulating between various ‘depths’ of 
this system. But that, for now, is beside the point. What really matters is that the dual-process 
view is not in discernible conflict with known facts, is consistent with numerous psychological 
tests, and is a richly suggestive one, providing clues to a more enriched understanding of human 
cognition.
The contrast between process-one and process-two has an intriguing parallel with that between 
inductive and deductive inference, since it seems but natural to surmise that induction and 
deduction are based predominantly in process-one and process-two respectively. The observation
that every inference has aspects of deduction and induction intertwined with each other is then 
consistent with the one that process-one and process-two are deeply enmeshed in everlasting 
interaction with each other as well. Put differently, the dual-process point of view provides an 
enriched understanding of inferential processes in general and of inductive inference in 
particular.  
Finally, the dual-process hypothesis supplies an appropriate and enlightening perspective to the 
‘rationality issue’. Commonly invoked norms of rationality are capable, in some measure, of 
evaluating the performance of process-two but not of process-one which occurs mostly outside 
the domain of focal awareness and makes use of hidden resources presumably replete with 
heuristics, beliefs, and emotional links of a deeply personal nature. There exists a proposal that 
instead of one single rationality, one has to think in terms of two types of rationality, as espoused
by Evans and Over ([Evans-Over], p 8): a ‘personal rationality’, and an ‘impersonal rationality’. 
In a manner analogous to the dual-process view, it tells us that the rationality issue is more 
complex than what it has been supposed to be. 
I will wind up this section by pointing out that there is speculation in two directions here: 
speculation that cognition in general and inferential acts in particular involve two streams of 
processing of information at the psychological level – namely, process-one and process-two that 
have distinct and complementary characteristics; and speculation that cognition and inference-
making are based on person-specific resources and resources of an inter-subjective nature that 
have a kinship with person-specific ones. The former is a hypothesis shared by a good number of
experts in cognitive psychology and is acknowledged to be a richly suggestive point of view that 
is likely to pave the way to a more complete and meaningful theory of cognition. The latter, on 
the other hand, is more of a speculation, but one that dovetails rather seamlessly with the dual-
process view and gives it substance. But, at the same time, it increases the complexity of the 
problem of understanding human inference-making by one clear notch.
COMPLEXITY
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Does it pay to make a problem more complex than it at first appears to be? Shouldn’t one rather 
look for simplifications so as to reach at the heart of the problem? One does not really hope to 
have a compelling answer to this, as there is no compelling answer to the ultimately right method
to be followed in science. We will have more to ponder over this question in chapters to follow. 
But one can safely say that it does not really pay to make a problem too complex by bringing in 
all the innumerable details that may conceivably be relevant to it, because too much of details 
stands in the way of building up a meaningful theory. However, the question of complexity is of 
relevance at a deeper level of theory building. When looked at from such a deeper level, the 
question of the relevance of person-specific psychological resources in inference-making does 
appear to deserve attention. Related to this is the question of a basic non-determinability in 
psychological processes that is likely to have a bearing on the issue at hand.
THE  UNPREDICTABLE
Consider a dynamical system that is known to be of a deterministic nature, having some well 
defined causal rules of evolution of its own. Several questions at a deeper level now come up and
demand attention. First, even if the system in question does have a well defined set of causal 
rules of evolution of its own, can those rules be known to us? Can we fathom out what the rules 
are? Or, are there hidden substrata to the system that have an essential control over its behaviour,
ones that stand in the way of an external agency (the cognitive psychologist and the 
neuroscientist in the present context) fathoming out the rule(s) of causal evolution? The history 
of science provides us with a partial answer to this question that we will be presently having a 
look at. Secondly, how important is the role of the context in which the behaviour of the system 
is observed – what is the role of the environment in which the system is made to evolve? As far 
as the course of an inferential act is concerned, this is linked with the first question posed above, 
in that the internal context based on hidden psychological resources of an individual does seem 
likely to have an essential role in the dynamics of the cognitive system and so, we will now have 
to concentrate on the possibility of the external context having a role in the cognitive process. 
And, finally, even disregarding the question of context and that of the rules determining the 
system behaviour being hidden from us, does a deterministic system dynamics guarantee that the
behaviour of the system is determinable?
All these are questions of vital relevance for our purpose. Starting with the third of the above 
questions first, the answer is already known to be a big no. An overwhelmingly large set of 
dynamical systems obeying even simple dynamical laws of a deterministic nature are known to 
be non-determinable, where the lack of determinability arises from sensitivity to initial 
conditions ([Boden], chapter 9) engendered by an essential nonlinearity in the system behaviour. 
There may, however, exist large domains of observation where this non-determinability does not 
appear to be of essential relevance. A very big chunk of physics, for instance, rests on the linear 
behaviour of the harmonic oscillator and on the nonlinear but deterministic dynamics of two 
bodies interacting by means of the gravitational interaction, where results of stupendous 
relevance have been arrived at. At the same time, there exist well defined approximation 
schemes where weak nonlinearities of the oscillator and weak perturbations over the two-body 
gravitational interaction can be taken into account in arriving at remarkable results over an even 
broader range of observations, without any of the non-determinability coming to the fore. In 
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other words, just the possibility of non-determinability does not necessarily mean that the non-
determinability is relevant. This, however, does not tell us the whole story. There remain entire 
areas of observation where the non-determinability does acquire relevance. While a linear 
oscillator behaves in a determinable manner under a periodic external perturbation, the behaviour
of a nonlinear oscillator is of a wholly different nature, being, under certain circumstances, 
chaotic in nature. A similar incursion of chaos occurs in the behaviour of three gravitating bodies
under quite realistic conditions. One finds here that the question of non-determinable (but 
deterministic) dynamics is linked up with that of the contextuality of system behaviour, where 
the effect of the environment comes to the fore.
THE  ESSENTIAL  ROLE  OF  THE  CONTEXT
Speaking in general terms, there is, of course, nothing new in the observation that the 
environment influences system behaviour. There does remain the possibility, though, of 
something deeply intriguing in a certain kind of contextuality, of which the foremost example is 
that of a quantum mechanical system, where the idea of the system having some pre-determined 
value of an observable quantity regardless of measurements performed on it to reveal that value, 
is not a valid one. Here the very context of measurement determines which of a possible set of 
values comes up with what degree of likelihood. The case of the psychological state of an 
individual has an uncanny similarity with the quantum situation, though the contextuality of 
psychological states we are now looking at has little to do with quantum indeterminacy. The 
psychological state of an individual is often indeterminate without reference to his or her external
context (the internal context, on the other hand, is implicit in the very idea of a psychological 
state). Consider, for instance, a situation when an individual is to choose sequentially (choice 
between A and B, B and C, C and A) from among a set of alternatives. Does there exist a prior 
order of preference for the alternatives in the psychological state of the individual regardless of 
the context in which the choice is exercised? Not necessarily, because, for one thing, he does not 
always conform to the axioms of choice, of which the transitivity axiom is one. Consider, in a 
similar vein, a number of consumer items, with specified prices, available to a housewife in the 
market. But the mere availability with their price tags (along with a given set of internal beliefs, 
desires, and necessities of hers) may not suffice in uniquely determining her choice in a 
marketing expedition since the beliefs, desires, et cetera, find different expressions towards 
different sets of things and in different situations external to her. 
The question of context in the making of inferences in general, and of making an inductive 
inference in particular, is a deep and broad one, needing reference to ‘external’ and ‘internal’ 
aspects of the context, as I indicated in chapter 2 (see section entitled ALL  OBSERVATIONS  AND  
THEORIES  ARE  CONTEXTUAL) while referring to the contextuality of scientific concepts and theories.
More generally, any inferential act is constrained and conditioned by external and internal 
contexts in a complex manner. The external constraint includes signals received from the 
environment that set the purpose of the inferential act in question, including the ones that trigger 
the process of inference. The internal context, on the other hand, is made up by the mental 
resources that are brought to bear in realizing the course of the inferential process.  
98
What is important to realize is that these two aspects are not independent of each other and are 
deeply intertwined, and that neither can be made explicit in terms of a set of symbols having 
specific connotations. The external context, for instance, includes signals picked up by the 
cognitive mind – but, how does the cognitive mind decide which signals to pick out from among 
the infinite number of signals sent out from the environment at any given instant? Evidently, the 
decision depends on some kind of salience and relevance with reference to the purpose of the 
inferential process under consideration. But, salience and relevance are matters of judgment that, 
in turn, require a set of inferential processes where internal resources of the cognitive mind are 
activated. Moreover, a vast number of cues are picked up, at any given point of time, from the 
environment by way of tacit or implicit cognition. Some of these implicitly received inputs are 
made use of in the currently activated inferential process, while some others are stored in some 
form or other for use on future occasions. Myriads of cues picked up from the environment 
(mostly unconsciously) are made use of by the cognitive mind so as to make up the store of 
heuristics that act as rules in the inferential process (see below), again, mostly at an unconscious 
level. The rules constitute a major part of the internal context of the inferential process.
The internal resources of the cognitive mind mentioned above, some of which are brought to 
bear in any given inferential task, thereby setting the internal context of the latter, make up a vast
canvass. This includes the belief system of the individual concerned, her knowledge base and 
memory of past experiences and, over and above all this, her emotions and affects that play a 
crucial role in her inference making. Most of these internal resources are made use of within the 
unconscious strata of the cognitive mind, in the form of rules or, more generally, as causal links 
in the sequential process of inference. Rules made use of in inference are referred to throughout 
this book in a variety of contexts. I summarize below a number of major considerations 
underlying the idea of inferential rules.   
THE  RULES  OF  INFERENCE  MAKING
The process of inference is not a random or sporadic one. It has a point of origin in one or more 
mental representations that constitute the premises of the inference, as also a second set of 
representations making up the conclusion. In between, the cognitive mind proceeds through a 
series of intermediate sets of representations, where the transition from one set of intermediate 
representations to the next can be thought of as being effected by means of rules that operate in a
manner analogous to ‘if…then’ clauses used in everyday linguistic expressions and also in 
computational processes. In a more general description, the transition from one set of 
intermediate representations to the next may be said to occur due to a set of causal mechanisms.
Of course, one cannot rule out some involvement of sporadic processes in an inferential act, since the 
cognitive mind remains forever engaged in processes of an associative nature, with associations being 
established between elements of thought without any specific purpose. Indeed, this apparently aimless but
incessant process of association may be assumed to result in a vast repertoire of heuristics, to be made use
of in diverse inferential acts as the necessity arises.
A second qualification that seems necessary here is that the sequence of transitions in an inferential 
process need not form a well defined linear one where intermediate premises are passed through one after 
another. More plausibly, the intermediate representations form a clumsy tangle where the sequence 
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branches out, backtracks, and is criss-crossed with many sub-sequences that arise from ‘trials and errors’ 
on the part of the cognitive mind.
Finally, as I summarize below, the rules and causal mechanisms cover a wide spectrum as regards their 
structure, ranging from universal rules at one end to deeply person-specific ones at the other, where 
emotions and feelings make their presence felt. Possibly, some of the person-specific rules are so diffuse 
and implicit that it may be quite impossible to identify these as causal links. However, I adopt the position
that the cognitive process is predominantly a causal one, though the network of causation, in all 
likelihood, is vast, diffuse, and enormously complex. 
As mentioned several times in the foregoing chapters, the spectrum of rules acting as the 
causal links in an inferential process can, at a rough reckoning, be described as being 
made up of universal rules, inter-subjective but not universal ones, and finally, the person-
specific rules. The universal rules include those of logic and mathematics and, in addition, 
rules that have gained universal acceptance by the force of experience and have been 
incorporated as knowledge (if a liquid is heated, it will eventually turn into vapor). While 
universal rues are inter-subjective, not all inter-subjective rules are universal, notable 
among which are the ones imbibed from some particular cultural environment (old men 
are not to be relied upon; women are of a delicate mental make-up; the number thirteen 
brings in bad luck). Finally, person-specific rules can be more or less transparent ones 
(Mr. X has had a divorce recently: Mr. X avoids women) or, at the other extreme, may 
have their roots buried in some remote past, perhaps within a mass of forgotten 
experiences (memory of an unpleasant encounter with a certain person in long-forgotten 
past causing an avoidance of contact with persons with a similar facial appearance). The 
latter are of such a diffuse nature as to have, at times, only a vague or weak causal role. It 
is, however, a hypothesis worth entertaining that person-specific rules play a quite 
considerable role in inference making. On the face of it, person-specific rules can only 
lead to errors in an inferential act. However, at times these can be effective ones, being in 
the nature of heuristics formed out of cues picked up from the environment at varied 
points of time. For instance, a good physicist is likely to have a larger repertoire of 
heuristics of a mathematical and physical nature (perhaps being half-formed intuitive ideas
formed out of a minute study of some set of natural phenomena and also picked up from 
the scientific literature) than others around her. 
The majority of rules are in the nature of heuristics and beliefs, mostly operative within the 
cognitive unconscious. These constitute a part of the internal context of an inferential act. 
Another large part of the internal context is constituted by emotions and feelings, many of which 
are associated with diverse beliefs of an individual. Together, these make for a vast complexity 
characterizing the inner mechanisms of the cognitive mind.
 
 It was Ludwig Wittgenstein who famously pointed out that, speaking on logical grounds, rules can never be
formulated in unambiguous terms – there always remains the problem of interpreting and understanding
what a rule says, and any finite number of examples of application of a rule and any finite algorithm for
expressing  what  the  rule  is  meant  to  say,  has  to  be  ambiguous.  Saul  Kripke  [Kripke]  has  interpreted
Wittgenstein’s take on rules in the field of language. According to Wittgenstein and Kripke, there has to be a
tacit inter-subjective agreement on the universal application of a rule, defined by means of examples and
algorithms.  While  Wittgenstein’s  and  Kripke’s  approach  to  the  rule-following  paradox  is  essentially  a
logical-analytic one, it points to the deeply cognitive roots of how people come to follow rules. Indeed, rules
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are always interpreted from examples or algorithms in an inductive manner which is why they are, from a
strictly logical point of view, always ambiguous. We come to make effective use of rules by interpreting
them  within  some  given  context  where  the  context  exercises  a  constraint  in  effectively  removing  the
ambiguity. In this sense,  even the universal  rules of mathematics are,  strictly speaking, ambiguous, and
make sense to a mathematician only within the context set by her prolonged and continuing exposure to rule-
following practices of a very special kind. 
GUESSING   AT   INNER    MECHANISMS    OF   A   COMPLEX   SYSTEM
This finally brings us to the first of the questions listed above (refer back to section entitled THE 
UNPREDICTABLE). How completely can we know the inner psychological mechanisms that operate 
in the making of an inductive inference, or in the making of inferences in general, by an 
individual? Given the complexities of the external and internal contexts involved in inferential 
acts as outlined in the present chapter and in the last, the tenor of the answer is already evident – 
our knowledge of the inner mechanisms of an inferential act is indeed necessarily incomplete.
But, does this incompleteness imply that any attempt to guess at these hidden mechanisms is 
futile and doomed to failure? Can it be that the guess is destined to be fundamentally wrong? 
This is not the fate that generally awaits hypotheses and theories in science despite the fact that 
all of these are in the nature of guesses – some more solidly supported by evidence than others, 
and all are based on incomplete knowledge of the underlying mechanisms. Even when a 
hypothesis or a theory is incorrect, it is seldom fundamentally wrong since more often than not it 
does correctly capture some aspect or other of the workings of the system it is supposed to 
model.
The same goes for informed guesses relating to hidden mechanisms in inference-making. These 
do tell us something important about these hidden mechanisms in inference and in cognition, 
namely, that there exist processes and resources in a substratum of our psyche, as a result of 
which the commonly invoked descriptive and normative accounts of inference making miss out 
on aspects of essential relevance, and, at the same time, provide us with significant pointers as to 
what these processes and resources may be.
The hypothetical account of how the processes of inference making (especially, the process of 
making an inductive inference), set out in the above paragraphs, proceed in the human mind, also
point the way to a resolution of apparently conflicting points of view relating to rationality, i.e., 
to the integrated capacity for reasoning and for the making of inferences (including the making 
of judgments and decisions) in the human mind. It tells us that our reasoning is indeed biased, 
but also tells us that the bias does not make the reasoning fundamentally flawed since a bias may,
under circumstances, be more productive than strict neutrality in the judging of evidence, and 
may have an adaptive value. It tells us, in a similar vein, that the use of heuristics in reasoning 
and inference is indeed not a logically sound practice but, at the same time, may be an effective 
one. It is the context that makes the biases and heuristics of the human mind lead to confusion 
and error and also the context that, otherwise, makes these appear as resources possessed of a 
considerable degree of effectiveness. The same hypothetical account also tells us that the task of 
formulating descriptive and causal principles of inference-making through successive stages of 
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improvement is not a hopeless one, much as the task of describing and explaining the world at 
large is not a hopeless one, acknowledging, at the same time, that the successive stages are not 
likely to make a neat linear progression toward an ultimate truth since it may, in all probabilities,
involve sweeping changes in perspective as, indeed, all scientific journey does. But, we will have
to wait a bit before we take up the issue of the course of evolution of scientific theories in 
general.
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CHAPTER 8
ABDUCTION: THEORY IN EMERGENCE
The enigma of hypothesis formation
The abductive suggestion comes to us like a flash. 
It is an act of insight, though of extremely fallible insight.
Charles Sanders Peirce
Abduction is, in the main, the formation of hypotheses. Hypotheses, in turn, are needed for the 
purpose of providing explanations. Hypotheses, in other words, are germs of theories.
Abduction has been described as ‘reasoning is reverse’ (Johan van Benthem’s foreword in 
[Flach-Kakas]). Knowing that your wife has gone out, you can explain the crying of your 
newborn baby, who is dissatisfied with the attentions of her nanny, and also the absence of the 
familiar sound of the radio playing, both of which you detect before entering home on returning 
from your office. On the other hand, supposing that your wife has gone out before having had an 
opportunity of informing you beforehand, you reason ‘in reverse’ to explain the sound of crying 
of your baby and the absence of the sound of the radio playing, and come up with the hypothesis 
that your wife has gone out, so as to explain these two observations of yours. The hypothesis 
subsequently proves to be correct, but it was arrived at by guessing, since both the observations 
of yours could have had some other causal origin (perhaps your wife has fallen asleep, or 
perhaps she has upset the baby for some reason and the battery of the radio has run out).
This is an instance of abduction, though not of theory in emergence. Here there is no revision of belief,
only the inessential addition of new belief, and no new rule of operation on the beliefs. This is in the
nature  of  an elementary  hypothesis-making; the newly formed belief  will  shortly  attain the status  of
knowledge, and will be stored as such, perhaps in the short term memory. Hypotheses in science are
vastly more complex and more intriguing.
The making of hypotheses lies at the heart of abduction, and hypothesis is informed guesswork, where the
vast background of knowledge, beliefs, and emotions is made use of. “A dominant further factor, in solid
science as in daily life,  is  hypothesis.  In a word, hypothesis is guesswork; but it  can be enlightened
guesswork” ([Quine-Ullian], p 65).
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The method of science has been described as the ‘hypothetico-deductive’ one ([Medawar], p 45),
where there is a constant interplay between processes of forming hypotheses, deducing the 
logical consequences of the hypotheses, testing these consequences against facts of observation, 
and revising the hypotheses to ones with a greater explanatory power (the acts of testing and 
revising are based on what are commonly referred to as the ‘logic of confirmation’ and ‘logic of 
refutation’). This seems to be a fairly good description of the scientific method, though the 
question of ‘explanation’ and that of ‘scientific method’ are contentious ones. While the actual 
practice in scientific enquiry does not always fit with this scheme of things, it provides us with a 
convenient notional framework for discussing various aspects of the scientific process. For 
instance, as indicated by Medawar, a number of salient features of the scientific process are 
explained in terms of the hypothetico-deductive scheme. 
The issue of explanation in science has been a widely and critically examined one, with a large body of 
literature devoted to it. A big part of that literature is analytical and logical in nature, dating from Hempel 
and Oppenheim’s influential paper  [Hempel-Oppenheim] that introduced the so-called Deductive-
Nomological (‘D-N’) model of explanation. Hempel and others subsequently revised the model in several
stages, but the D-N model gradually lost appeal, as it was realized that explanation has more aspects to it 
than can be subsumed under a monolithic logical account. For instance, the relation of explanation and 
causation has for ever been a contentious issue. Pragmatist, naturalist, and cognitive-psychological 
approaches have been tried so as to have a coherent understanding of the idea of explanation, where 
elements of the D-N model also find their place, and a substantive understanding now appears to be 
within sight (for an introduction, see [IEP-Explanation], [Woodward]). In this book, however, I will go 
only by the common-sense meaning of the term ‘explanation’.   
The topic of ‘scientific method’ has also been a hotly debated one. We will have a brief look at it in the 
next and the final chapters of this book. In particular, the hypothetico-deductive method is crucially 
dependent on the idea of confirmation or corroboration of scientific theories where confirmation, in turn, 
relates to the judgment as to how and to what extent a theory reveals truths about nature. Theories of 
confirmation, however, quite frequently run into troubled waters precisely because scientific theories are 
arrived at principally by the route of inductive inference (see [Crupi] for the idea underlying the 
hypothetico-deductive approach; see also [Schurz], chapter 5, [Rosenberg], chapter 4, for background). 
The hypothetico-deductive method, while of notional value, does not describe science as it is actually 
done. 
THE   GENERATION   OF   HYPOTHESIS:  AN ADVETURE   INTO  THE  MYSTERIES  OF PSYCHOLOGY 
The hypothetico-deductive scheme as conceived by Popper and others, while acknowledging the 
psychological origin of hypotheses, actually gives it a wide birth owing to the fact that the 
psychological process of generation of hypotheses cannot be probed by philosophy and by logic. 
“[Philosophical views of hypothesis generation] All aim at demonstrating that the activity of generating
hypotheses is paradoxical, either illusory or obscure, implicit, and not analyzable.”, ([Magnani1], p 1).
The naturalist approach to philosophy, on the other hand, takes a hard look at what scientific 
practice itself has to say of this psychological process of hypothesis generation, where cognitive 
psychology makes a close scrutiny of this process as it is found to occur in individuals, and itself 
forms hypotheses as to the inner mechanisms underlying this process. In this, cognitive 
psychology gets a good measure of help from artificial intelligence where various aspects of 
hypothesis formation are realized by means of computer programming. At the end of the day, 
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though, it remains to be seen whether the process of hypothesis generation, while being, in the 
main, a causally determined one, is also fully determinable. 
Hypothesis formation is, of course, not something that is specific to science. The formation of 
hypotheses in some form or other, is a necessary adjunct to every act of inductive inference 
since, in the latter, the ‘conclusion’ or the ‘output’ is never a necessary consequence of the 
‘inputs’ one starts from. An inductive inference is rarely, if ever, a one-shot process where one 
straightaway forms a conclusion by some divine inspiration, but is one that has to go through 
several stages of reverse reasoning where hypotheses are formed and discarded, though one is 
not usually aware of such trial and error (at times, the cognitive mind takes advantage of past  
tirals and errors available to it in the form of recalled experiences and of relevant heuristics).  
With abduction being thus associated, at one end, with mundane acts of inductive inference of 
everyday occurrence, it assumes the form of the remarkable and awe-inspiring phenomenon of 
creativity at the other. In between, it provides the scientist with her staple food of the intellectual 
variety, namely, hypotheses of various degrees of plausibility wherefrom emerge the models and 
theories in the sciences.
ABDUCTION   AND  NOVELTY
In other words, abduction covers an extensive spectrum of psychological acts, where there is a 
corresponding spectrum of the degree of novelty associated with an act of abduction. When a 
child gleefully toddles to a nearby cupboard to retrieve a toy that her mother had previously 
hidden as a challenge, and then jumps to the mother’s lap for appreciation, she has definitely 
done something novel, as the mother is always the first to appreciate. And this first success in 
meeting the playful challenge of the mother transforms the world of the child (and that of the 
mother too!) as only a novelty can do. Then again, as a Ph.D. student forms a hypothesis 
regarding the mathematical calculation of the bond energy of a complex molecule which later is 
proven to be a useful one in the context of her dissertation, she has achieved something novel, 
that her supervisor happily appreciates. These are, however, not commonly appreciated as being 
remarkable except, perhaps, by a few intimate observers because the transformations resulting 
from these novelties do not cover a ‘conceptual space’ of a wide span. What brings out a really 
ecstatic and overflowing appreciation from a great number of people is that supreme creative act 
of a van Gogh or an Einstein. Leaving aside, in the context of this book, the creativity of van 
Gogh, that of Einstein is reflected in the observation that, as the theory of relativity emerged in 
the form of hypotheses in Einstein’s mind, the latter impacted on the entire edifice of theoretical 
physics to send a great number of previously entrenched concepts topsy-turvy and paved the way
to a host of new ideas and concepts.
The idea of the conceptual space is used here in the same spirit as in [Boden]. Roughly speaking, it stands
for the entire set of concepts in the mind of an individual. However, concepts are interconnected thought 
entities, and the conceptual space is endowed with a rich structure. The whole of the conceptual space is, 
strictly speaking, of little relevance since what makes more sense in any given context is some sub-space 
(in a loose sense) made up of concepts meaningfully related to the context. In an act of producing a 
hypothesis of some novelty, the relevant part of the conceptual space is restructured and enlarged, with 
new combinations of earlier concepts being formed and, in addition, strange and new concepts getting 
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included in an expanded conceptual space. It is the multitude of concepts in a conceptual space that get 
combined into beliefs, some of which get transformed into knowledge.  
While the idea of conceptual spaces is used in this book in a rather loose and intuitively defined manner, 
these are referred to in more concrete terms in various contexts in artificial intelligence, cognitive science,
and in semantics and linguistics (see, for instance, [Gärdenfors]). 
Briefly stated, when our beliefs and working rules of inference, including those of rigorous logic,
fail to make appropriate predictions or to explain a body of evidence, a hypothesis is called for  
wherein a new combination of beliefs, or an altogether new belief is formed, and a new rule of 
operation in our conceptual space emerges (more commonly, however, a new evidence is 
explained with the help of existing belief structure and existing rules, by way of adding a belief 
by simple combination or modification). Now, what we refer to as ‘new’ or ‘novel’ is, in a sense,
only seemingly so since the germ of the new must have been there within the womb of the old. 
Thus, new life is created from existing life by the dissociations and combinations of molecules, 
in accordance with chemical rules operating in the world of those molecules. The creation of new
life is a novelty principally because we are not fully aware of the actual mode of operation of 
these rules and of the complex dissociations and associations that take place (I do not mean to 
make a prediction as to whether these will eventually be known at some point of time in the 
future), and the process continues to elude conceptualization on the basis of the existing 
conceptual structure even after great efforts. Scientists know a great deal about the process, but 
they cannot re-create it. 
Paralleling the process of creative hypothesis-making by an individual, there takes place the process of
conceptual  change  and  emergence  of  an  entire  new  theory  in  the  collective  mind  of  a  scientific
community. In the former process the hypothesis emerges by way of receiving a certificate, so to say,
from the ‘internal censorship’ within the mind of that very individual, perhaps operating unconsciously.
In the case of a scientific community, a new theory emerges and is accepted as one in a complex process.
There are deep parallels in the two processes, since neither the emergence of a hypothesis in the mind of
an individual, nor the emergence and acceptance of a novel theory in the collective mind of a scientific
community is a simple or a straightforward process. Neither is driven by logic alone. Both depend on the
belief system, mostly operating, in one case, within the unconscious mind of an individual and, in the
other within the substratum of the collective consciousness of the community. The substratum in the latter
case is constituted, by individuals and groups within the community under consideration. The beliefs and
desires – even conscious ones – of individuals and various groups within the community circulate within
the latter as latent resources in its collective consciousness. Once a hypothesis emerges that impacts upon
an entire conceptual edifice, it is acknowledged as a novelty by larger groups of people, and even by the
person or the community that produced the hypothesis in the first place.   
In other words, the novelty is as much in the process itself as in the surprise and lack of 
comprehension of the beholder. Einstein’s thought process did not make a topsy-turvy of his own
conceptual world as much as it shook the conceptual world of the physicists of his time and it is 
this, more than anything else that made his hypotheses so novel. And this, in turn, relates to the 
fact that the mechanisms underlying the formation and emergence of the hypotheses were, by 
their very nature, not explicit to the physics community at large and perhaps not explicit, in a 
large measure, to Einstein himself. Most of these mechanisms operated in a substratum of his 
mind, where a large number of heuristics and beliefs relating to ideas in physics and mathematics
went through a prolonged process of association and dissociation, of feverish activity and 
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relative latency, the exact nature of which may not be fully known to cognitive psychology in 
days to come. And it is fundamentally the same hidden nature of mechanisms operating in a 
substratum of the human mind that lies at the heart of novelty in the child’s discovery of the 
hidden toy and in the Ph.D. dissertation where a new method of calculating the bonding energy 
of a complex molecule is presented.
The child’s feat, on the other hand, involves primarily a restructuring of her own world of possibilities of
action and thought and is a novelty in so far as her mother cannot imagine how this could come about –
the child herself has little awareness of novelty. Her unconscious feeling of novelty finds expression in a
sense of joy in her new-found ability.
There is, of course, a commonly (and, informally) perceived scale of novelty. The child’s feat is 
appreciated as novel by only a few other than her mother because such feat is observed routinely 
in almost all children. The Ph. D. dissertation is also a rather routine one unless it gives the 
community of chemists something that has a sweeping efficacy. But a restructuring of almost the
entire world of theoretical physics is rare indeed, and is perceived as a mind-boggling novelty.
In other words, novelty has two aspects to it: a transformation in the structure of a conceptual 
space whose mechanism is not explicit but is hidden within some unobserved substratum, and 
the extent and impact of that transformation. Added to this is the potential (and subsequently 
realized) ability to cause a further expansion of the conceptual space. A successful hypothesis is 
indeed possessed of novelty in this sense – it brings in new concepts, a new way of making sense
of those concepts, new explanations and predictions, and an expanded scope of making sense of 
the world around us, and over and above all this, is obscure as to its mechanism of emergence.
ABDUCTION:  THE NATURALIST   POINT   OF  VIEW
This hidden mechanism of the emergence of a hypothesis is precisely what the naturalist 
approach to the philosophy of science is interested in. While concrete investigations in cognitive 
psychology and in artificial intelligence struggle to understand aspects of this mechanism bit by 
painstaking bit, naturalist philosophy picks out cues from the results of these investigations to 
make generalizations so as to add meaning to our yearning (a fundamental yearning of mankind, 
if you like) to understand this world of ours, as also the world within ourselves, wherein 
epistemological questions in philosophy appear in a new light.  
It is this hidden mechanism that the dual-process hypothesis of human cognition and the 
hypothesis relating to role of heuristics, beliefs, and emotions – mostly entrenched in the 
cognitive unconscious – in inductive inference in general, aim at making a little more intelligible,
and a little less obscure. 
ABDUCTION:  THE   CRUCIAL  LINK  IN  SCIENCE
 
Abduction constitutes the crucial link between cognitive psychological processes taking place in 
the hidden recesses of the mind of the individual and that stupendous product of the collective 
intellect of humankind, the response of Mankind to the mysteries of Nature, that ‘legend’ we call 
Science. It is crucial not only because of its importance and relevance to the scientific process, 
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but more because it is enigmatic in nature, and mankind does not know how exactly the 
conjectures of science well up from within its own bosom. It is a helpless admirer of its own 
product of awesome fecundity, unable to reproduce it at will or even to comprehend it by means 
of logic or philosophy. 
Abduction, in so far as it constitutes the most crucial link in the scientific process, concatenates, 
on one side, conjectures and hypothesis coming up, mostly, from within the substratum of 
awareness of the individual, and collective deliberative powers of entire scientific communities 
on the other. In this, abduction may be said to constitute the link between the context of 
discovery and the context of justification.   
The  two  terms  have  been  greatly  discussed  ones  in  the  philosophy  of  science,  where  ‘context  of
discovery’  refers  to the psychological  process  by which novel  ideas  are arrived  at  while  ‘context  of
justification’ refers to the process where an idea is tested against facts of observation and also against
other ideas. Reichenbach, the noted philosopher of science, is commonly credited with introducing the
two terms into the discourse relating to scientific method. Historical and philosophical perspectives on the
distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification can be found in [Schickore-
Steinle].
THE  PROCESS  OF  ABDUCTION:  EXPLORATION  OF  A  CONCEPTUAL  SPACE
The context of discovery lies within the mind of the individual, made up of the enormously 
complex mosaic of knowledge base, combined with the vast repertoire of heuristics, beliefs, 
emotions and motivations of that individual, and is truly and specifically, personal. The 
individual, on being motivated, by means of stimuli coming from the world at large, in relation 
to some problem that does not find a solution within the conceptual framework of existing 
theories (how to explain the regularities of the hydrogen spectrum), looks at it from the vantage 
of this context, and lets it digest within the chemistry going on within the substratum of her own 
mind where there takes place extraordinary churnings of all the ingredients of inferential activity.
It is in this sense that abduction is a top-down process, like much of cognition at large, and 
differs from a ‘bottom-up’ one that is principally driven by continual perceptual inputs. To be 
sure, the mind does draw in conceptual inputs (and perceptual ones too, especially in the case of 
experimental science), but these do not drive the process of abduction on their own strength, 
becoming effective mostly by first being integrated within the contextual mosaic of the mind and
probably providing the latter with a fresh supply of heuristics. The inferential activity proceeds 
within process-one, but is continually referred to process-two as well where, in both the 
processes, there take place an effective ‘censorship’, preventing the inferential exploration from 
venturing too capriciously.
More specifically, inference in general and abduction in particular, has two aspects to it, as we 
have seen on earlier occasions in this essay. One is the aspect of an apparently spontaneous 
process of association between ideas circulating in the mind – once again, mostly in the 
unconscious hinterland in it – one that never ceases and that goes on producing new ideas, new 
hunches, new beliefs, even without any overt guiding purpose. And the other is that of the 
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‘censorship’, and the harnessing of the spontaneous process with the help of rules. The vast set 
of rules is mostly of a person-specific nature, but also has impersonal elements (inter-subjective 
and logical ones) finely woven into it where most of the rules are, strictly speaking, beliefs of a 
specific type, some of which are relevant in the context of the problem at hand and impart a 
direction to the inferential process. How the cognitive mind makes an effective whole of these 
two contrary aspects of the inferential process, is the great mystery that cognitive science is to 
explore and unravel in days to come, though a fundamental element of non-determinability or 
unpredictability is likely to come up in the process.  
The fundamental importance of the role played by the association between thought elements in the process
of making of inferences constitutes a basic idea in cognitive psychology that I have based on in this book
and forms part of what is broadly referred to as ‘associationism’, which has had a long history with a great
deal of critical appraisal both for and against. An account of associationism is to be found in [Mandelbaum-
SEP].
AMPLIFYING  MECHANISMS, INSTABILITIES,  AND  PARALLEL  EXPLORATIONS
We have had a brief look at the inferential process in chapters 6 and 7. The process of hypothesis
generation is but an inferential process of a special kind. Inferential processes, in turn, constitute 
a component of cognitive processes in general that take place within the overall dynamics of the 
human mind. And this dynamics is of a computationally complex nature. It is fundamentally 
nonlinear, made up of feedback loops, and has an immense number of relevant dimensions to it. 
Even as one tries to restrict the dimension by way of posing the problem of inference and of 
abduction in more or less specific terms, the reduced problem, in order to be meaningful, is 
likely to inherit the computational complexity of the human mind at large. For instance, there is a
great likelihood that the dynamics, even restricted to the problem of hypothesis-making is 
possessed of ‘sensitivity to initial conditions’, the essential pre-requisite of non-determinability, 
being symptomatic of an essential instability in the dynamics. Thus, a psychological process 
driven predominantly by rules proceeds along some specific trajectory in the conceptual space 
and is, on the whole, a stable one in that it does not deviate appreciably from that trajectory. On 
the other hand, a process of inductive inference continually branches out from the stable rule-
driven trajectory and follows a course of a globally exploratory nature because of instabilities 
being operative from time to time at certain junctures on a rule-driven trajectory. Once a 
trajectory branches out along new courses, there subsequently appear fresh rule-driven 
trajectories, again of a stable nature, till the occurrence of further branching(s) owing to 
instabilities. An instability is essentially an amplifying mechanism that aggravates an initial 
deviation from a stable trajectory (‘sensitivity to initial conditions’) whereby that deviation, 
instead of being smothered and corrected, eventually results in a globally distinct trajectory in 
the conceptual space.
In other words, a rule-driven process of inference is of a step-by-step local (more specifically, 
locally stable) nature, where, at any point of time, the next step in the process is determined by 
the application of some specific rule(s) on the results of only a few earlier steps (typically, on the
current psychological state of relevance) and, in this, the rules may fail to lead to any result 
based on the resources available in the current state. It is here that resources other than the 
currently operative rules become relevant, these being, precisely, beliefs and heuristics that are, 
in the context of the current psychological state, relatively remote ones. The reason why the 
psychological resources of a remote relevance get involved in the inferential process is that 
associative processes never cease in the human mind, and spontaneously and incessantly bring 
together resources from remote recesses within the conceptual space. As an impasse or a 
psychological gap is arrived at, at some point on a rule-driven trajectory within the conceptual 
space, these associations create new possibilities in the form of local perturbations over the 
trajectory, one or more of which may now be amplified so as to result in a fresh trajectory or a 
set of trajectories along which the inferential process proceeds once again on the basis of rules 
where, perhaps, one or more new rules have now become operative.
Inferential processes are, thus, of an immense vitality, where a major contribution to this vitality 
comes from the operation of relevant emotions and affects, because these emotions and affects 
are among the basic mechanisms underlying the processes of amplification within the human 
mind (interestingly, emotions and affects also play a stabilizing role when needed). When, at 
critical junctures in an inferential process, the need of fresh conceptual explorations arises, a 
likely thing to occur is that a set of relatively remote beliefs and heuristics become involved by 
means of spontaneous processes of association, some of which acquire relevance and introduce a
local instability through a set of associated emotions and affects, thereby initiating fresh branches
of rule-driven trajectories. The affects can be, broadly speaking, of two types – positive and 
negative ones, of which the former give rise to the instabilities while the latter have the effect of 
smothering of perturbations whereby the inferential process continues to retain its local 
character. In other words, certain beliefs, with their associated emotions, assume the role of 
evaluators, either ‘approving of’ or ‘frowning upon’ perturbations around a trajectory. 
An inferential act is an exploration. It consists of an exploration of the conceptual space made up
of ideas and concepts by proceeding along a trajectory in that space, where the trajectory is 
generated by the operation of rules of various types. However, the conceptual space is one of an 
immense size, with a large number of dimensions to it where these ‘dimensions’ are linked with 
the diversity of the external reality that is captured by the cognitive mind. In any act of inference-
or hypothesis-making, the conceptual space has to be necessarily truncated to some manageable 
size where only a limited set of relevant ideas and concepts make up the space to be explored, 
but even so a rule-driven trajectory of a simple type may not be effective in the exploration of 
that truncated space. There are two aspects here that need to be examined. One is the effective 
‘size’ of the truncated space that is to be explored, while the other is the efficacy of the process 
by which that space is actually explored.
Evidently, the effective size of the conceptual space that needs to be explored in guessing at the 
reason why the baby is throwing a tantrum is quite negligible compared to the size and the 
‘dimension’ required for guessing at an explanation of the black body spectrum. In cases such as 
the latter, the need may, moreover, arise whereby the ‘size’ and ‘dimension’ of the space one 
starts with has to be substantially increased midway during the process of abduction since the 
earlier size proves to be inadequate in producing a hypothesis of requisite explanatory power. It 
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is here that the idea of proliferation of the inferential trajectory in the conceptual space comes 
up.
Trajectories proliferate in the conceptual space by mean of local instabilities whereby a single 
rule-driven trajectory branches out into more than one trajectories of a similar nature but where 
new sets of rules and a larger repertoire of beliefs and heuristics are brought into the process of 
exploration. The reasoning process, in other words, fans out along parallel trajectories, some of 
which may later be found to move further and further away from any satisfactory solution to the 
problem at hand while others may run along more favourable courses and may, in turn, give rise 
to further episodes of branching, and so on. In trying to form an effective hypothesis the mind 
starts with some general idea as to what is needed in order to arrive at a satisfactory explanation 
of the phenomena in question or, in other words, what, generally speaking, would constitute a 
solution to the problem at hand. For instance, it may be necessary to find a formula that fits a 
graph, or a number of graphs, obtained from experimental observations, where a formula 
obtained from an existing theory is found to deviate considerably from the graph. If, at an 
intermediate stage of exploration, a tentative hypothesis results in some formula that deviates 
from the graph to an even larger extent than the initial one, then the line of reasoning leading to 
that intermediate hypothesis has to be abandoned or kept in abeyance while, on the other hand a 
better fit with the graph would be indicative of an acceptable line of reasoning.
A mundane act of inference-making or abduction involves a conceptual space of relatively small 
size, and the trajectory resulting from a line of reasoning needs to fan out to only a small extent 
before a reasonably acceptable hypothesis is arrived at. To be sure, even such a mundane 
instance of abduction involves some episodes of branching and some vaulting over logical gaps, 
and this constitutes novelty of an embryonic type. But further along the scale are those acts of 
hypothesis building in which local instabilities and branchings occur in abundance so that all the 
parallel branches along which the reasoning process proceeds make a highly effective search of 
the conceptual space and also transforms the conceptual space itself by drawing in concepts and 
ideas that were earlier left outside the confines of the truncated space the process started with. 
The newly inducted ideas, beliefs and concepts then enter into the never-ceasing process of 
association and eventually cause further proliferation of the process of exploration, ending up, in 
rare instances, in a veritable implosion and the emergence of a radically novel hypothesis. 
The question of  scientific creativity has been analyzed and examined from various different angles in
[Boden], [Rothenberg], [Magnani2].
ABDUCTION:  THE  SETTING  UP  OF NEW  CORRELATIONS
The association between fleeting ideas and the resulting involvement of some of these in the 
inferential process may be looked upon as events whereby correlations are established between 
seemingly remote ideas, beliefs and heuristics with reference to the goal or purpose (finding a 
hypothesis that will lead to a formula fitting a graph) towards which the process has been set in 
motion. It is conceivable that this process of setting up of correlations within a conceptual space 
may feed upon itself, resulting in a grand correlation centred around some nuclear conglomerate 
of relevant concepts, whereby a remarkable conceptual structure of stupendous novelty emerges 
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for the whole world to see and admire. In this, the reasoning process gets transformed from the 
local exploration of a limited conceptual space to a highly correlated global exploration of a 
greatly enlarged one where, in all probability, the rules of exploration get transformed in stages 
to more and more efficacious ones (perhaps approaching rules of more and more general 
applicability). Such a process, resembling a phase transition in a macroscopic aggregate of 
molecular units (such as the transition from a disordered gaseous state to a much more ordered 
liquid state) would then count as one of abduction located at the other extreme of the spectrum of
novelty as compared to a mundane act of abduction of daily occurrence. The spectrum is 
indicative of the fact that, while acts of inference and abduction performed during the daily 
routine of an individual involve logical leaps in common with creative abductions of great 
significance in science, the latter is a process of rare occurrence indeed, involving the setting up 
of correlations between remote ideas and concepts wherein these ideas cohere to give rise to a 
hypothesis of remarkable novelty. In this, a great scientific hypothesis resembles great poetry or 
great music where remote, varied, and disparate feelings and emotions are brought together into 
a creation of supreme beauty that, at the same time, is elusive too.
What is spontaneous and elusive in a scientific hypothesis produced in a creative act of 
abduction in the mind of an individual is subsequently captured, at least in some tangible 
measure, in the scientific practice of an entire community of scientists where the latent 
possibilities in a hypothesis are now realized by deliberative analysis, by the detailed working 
out of ideas, and by means of experimentation and observation. The drama now moves over, in a 
manner of speaking, to the arena of the context of justification.
THE  REASONING  INDIVIDUAL:   AN  ATOM   IN  A  COSMOS,  AND  A  PRODUCT  OF  EVOLUTION
 
The individual is not an isolated atom removed from the rest of the universe. Howsoever 
withdrawn she may appear to be while a hypothesis brews in her mind and she confines herself 
within the cocoon of her own mental world, she is but a microcosm of society at large, 
encapsulating within herself an enormously large set of greatly varied inputs from the latter in 
the form of beliefs, ideas, and ideologies, most of which are tacitly acquired without awareness 
on her part. Within this matrix of ideas and beliefs imbibed from the world around her, she is 
acutely focused – again, perhaps, without being fully aware of it – on some of the unresolved 
conflicts and problems in that world, among which one or a few belonging to a common family 
may set her mind, principally the unconscious hinterland of it, to frenetic activity. Why and how 
some particular unresolved problem activates the mind of an individual is again a matter of 
psychological chemistry, where her prior developmental history that determines her existing 
body of beliefs, motivations, and psychological propensities acquires relevance. Given the right 
fit between these propensities and some particular problem that ‘appeals’ to her, her cognitive 
mind, aided by the amplificatory role of her emotions and affects, takes over. The rest will, 
perhaps, be history.
Along with ideas, beliefs and motivations imbibed from the world around her, the individual 
inherits a large number of inclinations and capabilities of a psychological nature from the 
unfolding history of biological evolution, of which she is a product. These appear as innate 
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psychological capabilities in her. The processes of spontaneous association of ideas of an 
embryonic nature, and a number of embryonic ‘rules’ of inference are, in all likelihood, part of 
such inheritance. Further rules of inference and a vast repertoire of heuristics are subsequently 
added in the course of the developmental history of the individual under consideration.
THE   PARABLE  OF  THE  TWO  CHILDREN
Here is a hypothetical, though, perhaps, not wholly unfamiliar, example of how a ‘sensitivity to 
initial conditions’, and a resulting local instability may play a determining role in the 
developmental history alluded to above. Imagine two children of nearly the same age growing 
within the common environment of a family and receiving similar training and instructions. One 
day the two are asked to solve a number of arithmetic exercises when one of them receives a bit 
of extra praise and appreciation from a number of elders in the family on her performance while 
the other, by default, felt slighted in some measure. This seemingly insignificant event may 
trigger a course of development of far-reaching consequences, when the first child engages 
feverishly in mathematically oriented activities and self-training, eventually developing a great 
mathematical ability, while the second child shies away from mathematics and becomes 
indifferent to exercising his mental faculties. This can be taken as an apt metaphor for what 
actually happens in the mental world of an individual because here the role of emotions in 
amplifying the response to an event of psychological relevance is in evidence. 
ANALOGY:   THE  GREAT   ORGANIZING   PRINCIPLE  
I will wind up this chapter by way of dwelling upon a number of factors that often play a great 
role in inferential processes of individuals, especially in processes of abduction resulting in the 
formation of scientific hypotheses. Of these, the foremost is the idea of similarity. Sensing the 
similarity between ideas and concepts belonging to disparate parts of the conceptual space is one 
of the great faculties of the mind that has, in all likelihood, evolutionary roots, and that is capable
of playing the role of a uniquely efficacious organizing factor in a conceptual space. The 
psychological ability of sensing of similarities between perceptual inputs (a certain habitat 
somehow appearing to be similar to one of an earlier experience, where a predator was 
discovered hiding) is, of course, possessed of a distinct adaptive value for individuals and may 
therefore be fixed as a heritable trait in the course of evolution of species. As this faculty gets 
enhanced in the course of the developmental history of an individual by means of explorations of
an inferential and abductional nature, where the ability of sensing of similarities between 
perceptual inputs gets transformed into the ability of sensing similarities between conceptual 
constructs and then blossoms into a unique psychological ability, it creates correlations between 
concepts residing in far-flung recesses of the mind, and thereby enlarges the conceptual space 
explored in the course of the formation of a hypothesis, making a coherent whole of a great 
number of apparently disparate ideas. In the process, new ideas get woven into the conceptual 
edifice of earlier vintage, which is now pruned of a number of obsolete and burdensome concepts
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belonging to it. The new-found conceptual structure is now the embryo of a theory, to be taken 
up and developed by an entire community of scientists.
FURTHER   PRINCIPLES:  SIMPLICITY  AND  ELEGANCE
    
The other organizing factors of relevance are simplicity and elegance. The faculty of developing 
of hypotheses having a quality of simplicity is again, arguably, of evolutionary origin where it 
facilitates the production of efficacious hypotheses and saves wasteful exploration of the 
conceptual space. The idea of elegance is, in all likelihood, a derived one but is capable of 
effecting a correlation within a conceptual space and also an enlargement of that space, whereby 
new ideas are inducted in that make a coherent whole with ones belonging to the limited space of
earlier vintage. However, the beneficial role of the belief that ideas of simplicity and elegance 
have an inherent ability to generate useful hypotheses leads to the further belief that the 
mechanisms underlying the external reality – to which all hypotheses are ultimately directed – 
are also of an essentially simple nature. Such beliefs are inductive inferences at a higher level, 
made use of in the processes of abduction in diverse specific areas, and may not correspond to 
the external reality at large. In other words, the useful organizing principle of hypothesis-
building, to the effect that hypotheses should be simple and elegant in keeping with the nature of 
the reality that they pertain to is, in all likelihood, of limited relevance. A belief in this principle 
is formed and developed in the course of inferential processes conducted within external contexts
of relatively simple structure, and may not be of a deeper relevance, being inadequate in contexts
having a computationally complex and prohibitive structure. 
ABDUCTION:  THE   INSPIRATION  OF  SCIENCE  
 
In summary, acts of abduction cover a wide range inference-making, with a correspondingly 
wide spectrum of the degree of novelty associated with those. Of especial relevance to the 
scientific process are the generation of hypotheses in the minds of individuals that can be either 
of limited significance in the field of science (a Ph.D. thesis whose findings do not have a wide 
impact) or, on the other hand, can be of such great relevance as to initiate a new theory with a 
novel conceptual structure. Such processes of creative abduction involve, in all likelihood, a 
highly efficacious mode of exploration of a conceptual space where a cascade of local 
instabilities, resulting from amplifying mechanisms associated with emotions and affects, lead to 
a proliferation of inferential branches running in parallel and where there occurs a transformation
of the conceptual space, with new sets of concepts and new rules of operation in an enlarged 
conceptual space getting involved in the process. At the same time, there appears a correlation 
among seemingly remote concepts and beliefs, as a result of which the concepts acquire a new 
coherence. An organizing principle of great relevance in bringing about this correlation and 
coherence is that of similarity.   
Simply stated, abduction constitutes the element of inspiration in the progress of science.  
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CHAPTER 9 
SUMMING UP: SCIENCE AS AN INTERPRETATION OF THE WORLD
The complexities of truth
Many reflective people read with a sense of bemusement the 
obituaries so frequently (and so gleefully) written for scientific realism.
Philip Kitcher
Scientific theories pertaining to the workings of Nature have two interfaces: one with the minds 
of individual scientists and of communities of scientists, and the other with – Nature itself. At the
first interface, theories are produced and given a finished form, since individuals produce 
hypotheses that are transformed into finished theories in the hands of communities of scientists. 
And, at the second interface, a theory looks out to the world and gives us a perspective view of 
what lies out there – how wheels move within wheels. 
SCIENTIFIC  THEORIES:  BASIC  ISSUES  OF  RELEVANCE 
We have focused on a number of aspects of the processes of inference and abduction taking 
place within the minds of individuals, these being predominantly ones of unconscious cognition 
where beliefs and emotions have a large role to play and where the mind essentially engages in 
an act of informed guessing, while at the same time relying on concomitant processes of testing, 
checking, and justifying. Further processes of development, testing, and justification of theories 
are carried out by communities of scientists where numerous individuals communicate, compete,
and co-operate – finally producing finished theories that find general acceptance by the scientific
community. We will have more to say on this aspect of scientific theories in this chapter of my 
book, before I summarize all our considerations in the next, final chapter.
The question that comes up at this point is: what kind of picture a finished theory draws of 
nature? How reliable, complete, and accurate can one expect it to be? In what sense can a theory 
be considered to be an improvement over previously developed ones, and whether a theory can 
be expected to be so complete and perfect that it can be described as forming a part of the 
ultimate frontier of human knowledge? All these pertain to the second interface that scientific 
theories come to possess, and will also occupy our attention in  the present chapter.  
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As for the effect of the scientific community, and of society at large, on the scientific process, 
there is once again an entire spectrum of opinions. At one extreme, there is the point of view that
social exchange among scientists and socially monitored scrutiny of the intellectual output of the 
individual scientist purges the latter of the stamp of individual beliefs, attitudes, and 
idiosyncrasies, and produces theories of a doubly objective character – objective in the sense of 
independence from subjective notions of the individual, and again, in the sense of being a correct
and faithful representation of the mechanisms of nature. And, at the other extreme of the 
spectrum one finds the view that it is the society at large that essentially constructs our theories 
of nature by mechanisms insidious and pervasive.
The business of science is to explain – explain whatever is at odds with existing and established 
hypotheses and theories, and then to develop applications of the concepts and theories resulting 
from the process of abduction, giving rise to explanation over some specific area of inquiry. In 
this, science has to seek for truth, for unless it catches a true picture of some slice of nature, it 
cannot successfully produce explanations and make use of the explanations in developing 
applications of these. This entire matter of inferring ‘truth’ from success in achieving 
explanations, and of the sense in which a successful explanation adds to our knowledge of the 
world, is fraught with subtle and conflicting issues of philosophy, both ontological and 
epistemological. The ontological questions all relate to the basic one of what the inferences of 
science are true of – are these inferences and hypotheses true of a mind-independent world, or do
these inferences provide us with just a set of effective means of operation in a phenomenal world
that is the only world we can meaningfully talk about, while all talk of the actual world is, 
simply, so much of idle speculation? 
The epistemological questions, on the other hand, revolve around the veracity of the statements 
that science offers us. Since, in arriving at inferences, the mind operates on representations of 
the world out there, everything depends on how these representations are arrived at. There is an 
undeniable gap between the representations and the real world that cannot be bridged in any 
foundationalist way with no vestige of doubt. This brings in a fundamental scepticism towards 
the theories of science that is very hard to shake loose. One such issue of scepticism questions 
the attitude of science towards unobservable entities and theoretical constructs, asserting that  
‘truths’ about those should not, in all honesty, be accorded the status of genuine truths since 
these are, at best, nothing more than instruments of manipulation in the world of concepts. 
Moreover, the truths of science are defeasible: they are subject to revision from time to time in 
the light of new evidence or a new conceptual framework. What sort of truth, then, does this 
speak of?
Indeed, the vary rationality or, one can say, the very rationale of science is not immune to 
challenge. Does science have a well defined aim? Has there been, in the history of science, a 
discernible progress towards the fulfilment of that aim? In what sense do the successive theories 
and the successive waves of conceptual change in the world of science bear testimony to a 
cumulative progress made possible by the methods of scientific exploration? Or, to be yet more 
insistent, can one at all speak of a specific set of methodological hallmarks to be found in 
scientific endeavours, in contrast to those in other areas of human interest?
116
REALISM  OR  ANTI-REALISM? 
Volumes have been written on questions alluded to above, and many more will be written in 
days to come, since none of these questions admit of a clear-cut answer acceptable to all. None 
of the attempts at answering these can be likened to an exercise in arithmetic, since the way one 
approaches questions of this sort depends on one’s point of view. One can be a realist or an anti-
realist, and even that does not describe one’s point of view completely, since there are so many 
shades of realism and so many shades of anti-realism. To be sure, the exchanges between the 
realists and the ant-realists are not sterile or wasteful, since these help to throw a number of basic
questions in sharp light, and that light may help one to choose a point of view, since a point of 
view is not really a bad thing when one sets out on an intellectual exploration.
However, a point of view is not so bad only so long as one acknowledges it as such and does not 
set out to prove his own point of view as being the right one. Because that starts the acrimony. 
For instance, you cannot ever prove that there exists a real world out there, to anybody who is 
bent upon looking the other way, simply because it is not a matter of pure logic but one of 
experience, and experience is no logic. Different persons sum up their experiences differently. In
the course of our experience, each of us makes very many inductive inferences of various kinds 
and magnitudes. The existence of a world out there regardless of my thoughts is a matter of one 
such inference, a huge generalization (though seemingly a ‘natural’ one), one of an enveloping 
nature, but a non-deductive inference nevertheless. You can say that this inference has helped 
you in innumerable ways in making further inferences and in moving ahead in life, but that still 
does not make it an irrefutable one. ‘Very well, then’, you say – ‘give me a refutation’. But I 
can’t do that, you see, because this issue has not been settled to everybody’s satisfaction – not 
ever, nor can it ever be. 
What is more, the response to the basic ontological question need not be a simple yes-no type 
answer. For instance, one may admit the existence of entities observable or unobservable, but 
may raise doubts about the theories pertaining to those entities, since inference to the existence 
of entities is more a matter relating to scientific practice than to theory. Theory building, in this 
view, is to be distinguished from the actual manipulation of natural entities where the latter, 
rather than theoretically postulated mechanisms, are of more direct relevance. As we see below, 
it is indeed of some use to distinguish between the question of the existence of natural entities – 
some of which we can observe more directly than others – and that of the concepts and theories 
abstracted from actual existence. This is an issue of some complexity and is related to the one I 
address below: to what extent can truth be attained regarding the mind-independent world, 
assuming that one exists. At the same time, as I briefly mention below, the two issues of 
existence of entities and of the theories of the way these are correlated with one another, can be 
separated from each other only conditionally. 
Two books widely referred to in this context are [Cartwright] and [Hacking]. 
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Linked with this basic question of the existence of a mind-independent real world, there arise a 
lot of other questions, some of which I have hinted at earlier in this chapter. But here a further set
of considerations assume relevance. Once again, the answers to these other questions depend on 
one’s point of view, but now there arises the tendency of answering these within a dichotomous 
framework – with reference to one’s position on the big basic question that lets one think in 
terms of two distinct camps having contrary orientations – the camps of realism and anti-realism.
For instance, granting that there exists a real world, is it possible to progress in a cumulative 
manner towards a true and complete description of that reality and of the mechanisms inherent to
that reality? This is a question of understandable relevance, to which I doubt if a final or ultimate
answer can be found, though I do have a point of view, as you may also have (incidentally, my 
take on the big question is, yes, there does exists a world out there independent of my mind or of 
anybody’s mind; indeed, our minds are part of that world). However, this question of the 
possibility of progressive attainment of truth about the world needs a distinct domain of 
discourse as compared to the one relating to the existence of a mind-independent world. In other 
words, even when one subscribes to a positive answer to the basic ontological question, one may 
legitimately raise doubts about the nature and quality of truth that can be attained in describing 
the mechanisms of the world and about the way our knowledge about the world advances 
through successive waves of conceptual transformations.   
This relates to the question, raised above, as to whether one can admit the existence of 
unobservable entities of science while, at the same time, denying the legitimacy of theories about
those entities. Indeed, the question of existence of these entities is deeply linked with that of the 
theories about these. For instance, the existence of electrons cannot be delinked from its 
properties that tell us how it interacts with other entities in this world, where the latter, in turn, is 
linked with theories describing the electron and all these other entities. Of course, it is possible to
imagine that something answering to the name of an ‘electron’ exists regardless of our current 
theory of particles and their interactions. For instance, the concept of the electron is likely to 
survive in the event of a possible revision of the standard model of elementary particles (the 
concept was there even before the emergence of the standard model). In a bigger context, this is 
analogous to a partial independence of the question of the existence of a mind-independent world
and that of our theories of the world – mind-independent or not.
THEORIES:  FROM  THE  IMMEDIATE  TO  THE  REMOTE
Theories about the world do not come in hermetically sealed packages delivered by divine 
intervention, but are built up in a long and arduous process of cognitive quest, where the quest 
starts with our mundane day-to-day interactions with the parts of the world immediately 
accessible to us. The inferences arrived at in the course of that interaction are primarily in the 
nature of inductive ones – tentative, fallible, open to revision and sharpening from time to time,  
but effective nevertheless. The process of our cognitive quest in the accessible parts of the world 
is punctuated with events of a substantial conceptual transformation in one specific domain or 
another. For instance, we learnt that water does not exist in the liquid phase under all conditions 
of temperature and pressure, and that realization must have resulted in a big transformation in 
our conceptual framework while, now that this fact has been incorporated within our conceptual 
framework, it does not make us wonder even for a moment. On the other hand, the question of 
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the properties of water near the critical point, which is a much more specialized one, has been a 
matter of very definite concern to the experimentalists and theoreticians, and have been the 
subject of a deep and radical theoretical-conceptual transformation regarding phase 
transformations. In other words, mundane experiences and generalizations make way to 
progressively deeper theories in any domain of experience about the world. Put differently, the 
journey from the immediate to the remote in the world of concepts and theories is, in a sense, a 
continuous one and, at each stage of the journey, the cognitive system builds upon what is 
available and apparent to what is relatively more remote and inaccessible.
Kitcher explains in [Kitcher2], chapter 2, how Galileo convinced his critics of the existence and motion of
remote heavenly bodies observed by means of the telescope. His logic was essentially based on the idea
that there was nothing in principle that distinguished between the sighting of a remote earth-bound body
and a heavenly body that could be observed with the naked eye, and similarly, between the latter and a
remote heavenly body that could not be so observed.
Put differently, theories are transformed in successive waves of conceptual transformation, 
starting from our mundane day-to-day concepts, and get built up in a hierarchical process where 
conceptual layers are built one upon another, and where ‘truths’ pertaining to one conceptual 
layer get revised in the succeeding layer. But, a truth that gets revised is no truth at all, and the 
currently accepted ‘truth’, that resulted from the revision of the ‘truth’ belonging to a former 
conceptual layer, will itself get revised in days to come and hence, likewise, is no truth at all. 
This appears to destroy the very idea of truth.
THE  TWO  FACETS  OF  TRUTH
The term truth carries two implications – an implication of inter-subjectivity, and one of pointing
to a perceived (or perceivable) fact of the world. Within a given context, truth, broadly speaking, 
refers to a perceived fact, where the perception (with or without the aid of relevant instruments) 
does not depend on the perceiving subject (within reasonable limits of variability of individual 
perceiving power). As the context changes, the fact may appear in a new light and may be 
perceived differently. Suppose that a certain biochemical reaction is found to occur at a constant 
rate within a given range of physical conditions. Suppose further that the course of the reaction 
depends on the temperature of the medium in which it is made to take place, but that fact was not
known or suspected at an earlier state of knowledge. The constancy of the rate of reaction was 
then a truth in that state of knowledge. However, imagine that it has subsequently been 
discovered that at a much higher temperature the course of the reaction becomes oscillatory. The 
truth has now become more complex in nature. And, in the future it may assume a yet more 
complex form when the currently undetected dependence of the course of the reaction on some 
other physical parameter is discovered and recorded. The successive forms, differing from one 
another, in which scientific truth appears also depend on the currently existing theoretical 
framework and on the history of its successive transformations. For instance, scientists, on 
observing the transition from a constant to an oscillatory behaviour in some mechanicals system, 
may be in an exploratory state of mind as to the possible nature of the course of a chemical 
reaction, which may influence the way they set up their experiments.
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The above example is, perhaps, a simplistic one, but it tells us that ‘truth’ is a complex concept 
indeed. It is, at times, asserted loosely that truth is a relative concept, but that does not mean that 
truth can vary from person to person (since if such a variation is indeed found to occur, then it 
has to be symptomatic of some peculiarity of circumstances that needs separate investigation). 
Truth, to be more specific, is relative in the sense of depending on the context in which facts of 
observation are recorded, but not in the sense of being dependent on the perceiving subject.
The context in which the truth of this or that scientific theory is judged keeps on changing, where
the context itself is a concept of some complexity. For instance, it includes both internal and 
external factors with reference to which a fact of the world is perceived – internal ones relating 
to the current state of concepts and theories within a given domain, and external ones to 
conditions and circumstances under which the fact obtains. Let us consider the external context 
first, focusing on the domain of observation, or the horizon within which a theory is constructed 
and applied. Mendel’s theory of inheritance was confined within the domain defined by the 
phenotypic characteristics of species, where the molecular unit of inheritance could not be 
accessed or investigated within the then current scope of observations, and it was this that set the 
horizon, or the context, in which the theory was constructed. The conclusions of the theory, 
which were true within the context, were all reformulated in terms of genes and DNA in the 
altered context of cell biology, chromosomal studies, and molecular biology. None of Mendel’s 
conclusions were literal truths when looked at from a more recent perspective and, by the strict, 
non-contextual definition of truth, these were no truths at all. Nevertheless, these were truths 
indeed since, by the then current standards of knowledge and reasoning, these did not require any
personal belief to be interpreted and judged – anyone willing to perform a series of breeding 
experiments could see the veracity of these truths. To be sure, the origin of the theory was within
the personal confines of Mendel’s mind, albeit with inputs from contemporary thought and from 
painstaking observations over a long period, and the inferential processes responsible for his 
theory were most likely of a strange and deeply personal nature, as we have tried to guess at in 
chapters 6, 7, and 8. But once formulated, his formulation had the stamp of a genuine scientific 
theory precisely because it was now open to all to be verified by experiments of diverse design 
and to be checked for consistency with the then established body of concepts. This is all that a 
theory needs in order to be accepted as true, and this does not require truth to be non-contextual 
or immutable. What is specifically interesting in this context is that, the transition from Mendel’s
theory of inheritance to the later day genetic theory involved a sea change in the relevant 
conceptual framework, where the true statements of Mendel’s theory lost their literal 
significance in the new framework, but could nevertheless be interpreted as ones being of 
genuine relevance in the latter.
I will come back to this issue of the contextuality of scientific theories and truths, since this is of 
great relevance regarding the question of the nature of scientific progress. For now, however, I 
switch to the question of the extent and manner in which scientific theories refer to aspects of the
real world. Once again, informed discourse on this question needs subtle and complex 
considerations but I will be brief and direct here.
A scientific theory is a representation of a part of the world, arrived at by cognitive processes. 
The true conclusions of  the theory are not literally true since these are inferences within a 
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representation that refers to some part of reality but is not a facsimile of that part itself. It is 
somewhat like a portrait of a lady, where the portrait is a representation of the lady but not the 
lady herself. Features of the portrait refer to or, are indicative of, features of the lady but those 
features are the result of an interpretation on the part of the artist, and the relation between the 
features of the lady and those of the portrait is not a simple, geometrical one.
There is possibility of some confusion here that needs be clarified: the lady herself is perceived by the
artist as a representation in his mind, while the picture is an expression of that representation in a different
medium. Thus, the representation of the lady in the portrait tells us (but again, in a skewed manner) how
the lady is represented in the mind, only partly conscious, of the artist. Apart from the artist himself, there
are three parties to the story: the lady herself, the representation of the lady in the artist’s mind, and the
the expression of that representation in the portrait drawn by the artist.
In representing reality, we make categories, comparisons and distinctions. The question thus 
arises as to whether analogous schemes of categories, comparisons and distinctions apply to 
reality itself. In other words, does the representation have a relation of exact correspondence with
reality, on the strength of which one can define truth? Can one, in the language of mathematics 
and cartography, make a one-to-one mapping from the lady to the portrait, setting up this 
correspondence? This is a question difficult to answer since ‘reality’ is accessible to us only 
through the representations, and we are never sure as to what the ‘features’ of reality are. But the 
relation between a theory, which is a consequence of a representation, and the part of reality 
under consideration, has to be, in some sense, one of  correspondence since, otherwise, the theory
could not have been successful in explaining relevant issues pertaining to reality or in developing
relevant applications. This is once again, the argument of success and effectiveness implying 
truth in a theory, where ‘truth’ can be interpreted as a correspondence, in some sense that cannot 
be made fully explicit, to features of reality.
Features of the portrait of the lady in question do indeed correspond to some of those possessed 
by the lady herself, but the correspondence is strange and elusive. A portrait done by a great 
artist does strongly resemble the person painted in it, but the strength of the resemblance does 
not always lie so much in the physical features of the person portrayed as in what is commonly 
termed her ‘personality’. It is the personality that complements the physical features of the 
person which the artist captures with an uncanny vision – a vision in which the inner self of the 
artist reaches out to that of the person portrayed, with a great sensitivity. In this sense the portrait
is an interpretation of a person by the artist, where its features refer to those of the person in 
strange and elusive ways.
Representations in science are of a similar nature. The scientist, in making a hypothesis, gets into
a strange mode of thought where her inner world reaches out to a part of the outer world in an 
intimate communion and she finds a vision not shared by people around her. This, of course, 
refers to the complex cognitive processes occurring within her mind, principally in hidden depths
of it, the final outcome of which is a hypothesis subsequently accepted and worked upon by her 
peers. The hypothesis is eventually made into a theory that is now a representation of a part of 
reality – distinct from the internal representation within the mind of the scientist, but a 
representation all the same. The representation is essentially a model (in this context, see [Giere], 
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chapter 1; according to Giere, the model corresponds to reality in the sense of an analogy) of that
part of reality that the scientist and her peers are interested in (this sets the external context of the
representation) that refers to and resembles the reality much as the portrait does. But, at the same
time, the model is elusive and skewed because it has its moorings in the internal context defined 
by unarticulated beliefs and modes of thought of individuals who, in the final analysis, are 
microcosms of a community of scientists and, in a broader sense, of an entire culture. This is 
what constitutes the dual aspect of a hypothesis and, eventually, of a theory and, indeed, of any 
interpretation of reality. Every child, in the course of her development, makes millions of such 
interpretations, makes millions of predictions, based on anticipations, without being aware of 
those. Most of these predictions fail in small ways, but many others succeed, and this course of 
failures and successes continues throughout her subsequent developmental history.
A theory enjoys only a skewed fit with nature principally because it is a  contextual description of the
latter,  and  necessarily  ignores  anomalies lurking  at  remote  corners  bearing  testimony  to  hitherto
unrecognized aspects of natural reality. Equally responsible for this are the modes of thought of an entire
scientific community, and its beliefs tied to the existing body of knowledge and the existing theoretical
framework.
In other words, the duality of ‘truth’ defines all our representations of the world, ranging from 
the mundane representations in day-to-day activity, right up to the most rigorously thought out 
scientific theories, where imagination mixes with judgment, intuition mixes with deliberation, 
and induction mixes with deduction. The difference between a ‘trivial’ representation and a 
complex and elaborate one lies in the exact degree and manner in which these contrary aspects 
intertwine and interact, giving a unique flavour to each individual representation conceived by 
the human mind.
The dual nature of  representations gives rise to enigmas and questions. How can a 
representation, which involves aspects of imagination and intuition, be true of the reality it is 
meant to represent? Is the truth of a representation a relative one? Is the representation, infected 
as it is by beliefs and modes of thought of individuals and communities, irredeemably committed
to giving us a false conception of reality, regardless of where that reality is situated?
      
While theories can indeed be false, those that survive and propagate have truth imprinted in them
– a truth that is inter-subjective and not relative, but one that is contextual, and a truth that, at the 
same time, is conditioned by the modes of thought of individuals and communities.
If a number of schoolchildren be asked to describe their school building, the descriptions given 
by most of them will be true representations of the building but will still be different from one 
another in the way they make their representations. The difference will lie not only in the literary
styles and the modes of expression, but also in little ways in the content of each representation. 
This, of course, means that truth, even though inter-subjective in nature, is a complex thing. 
When asked what they find in front of them, each will say that she finds the school building and, 
at this level, there is absolute agreement in the ‘truth’ they speak of. But when it comes to a 
question of describing the building, their descriptions will differ in the aspects of the building 
they focus on. And, this difference reflects the difference in modes of thought of the children. 
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Depending on the internal context defined by belief systems and modes of thought of individuals
and communities, different aspects of reality are represented differently in scientific theories as 
in the descriptions offered by the schoolchildren. 
To summarize, truth is objective (in the dual sense of being inter-subjective and of referring to a 
common reality) but is contextual, and is conditioned by an underlying subjective world. In other
words, truth, a feature of supreme relevance in representations, is a concept of exquisite 
complexity, incorporating within itself deep tensions between contrary facets. The huge turmoil, 
conflict, and confusion suffered by human beings in the pursuit of truths of this world are 
therefore in the nature of a pre-ordained and unavoidable destiny, for ever throwing men into 
depths of despair. Truth is not something given to us that one can sit back and discover passively,
but is something one has to work for, struggle for, and stake one’s soul for.
Anti-realists lose no time in focusing on the subjective aspect of the representations embodying 
scientific theories, and assert that the theories are socially constructed ones. And, realists, in a 
spirit of dichotomous thinking, emphasize on the aspect of truth, often underplaying the aspect of
interpretation. But the truth about truth is more complex, as I have tried to tell you, and one 
needs a picture of science where this contrary and complex nature of truth is included. Of course,
the tension between the contrary aspects of truth shows up in the works of philosophers of 
science, many of whom express their concern on this dual nature of truth. Realists do accept that 
truth is not a simple and given feature of a theory, and acknowledge that there is a sense in which
one can say that truth is ‘constructed’. And, antirealists do acknowledge that there is something 
like truth in a theory in the sense of the effectiveness of the latter. In other words, realism and 
ant-realism are two camps set up by us, the great classifiers that we are, by force of a 
dichotomous mode of thought to which we appear to be committed in life, and the borderline 
between the two camps is not an indissoluble one.  
 The descriptions offered by different schoolchildren of their school building are skewed with 
respect to one another, and also skewed with respect to the building itself as it stands as a piece 
of reality, and this very skewness is a symptom of the fact that each of the offered descriptions is 
an interpretation generated in the mind of an individual student, which is thus somewhat of a 
misfit when considered in relation to reality – a representation that refers to and corresponds to a 
part of reality, but is not a facsimile of it. The correspondence is strange and exotic in the sense 
that it is conditioned by the mode of thought peculiar to some particular student or other. The 
case of a scientific theory is of a similar nature.
The two-faceted, tension-ridden and complex nature of truth raises deep questions for both realists and
anti-realists, and people perceiving themselves to belong to one camp or the other face genuine problems
in coming to grips with what exactly it is that the truth of scientific theories refers to. A case in point is
Popper’s attempt at explicating the idea of scientific truth in terms of the concept of ‘verisimilitude’ that
he introduced ([Niiniluoto],  see also [Corvi]). The idea of verisimilitude, however, is more of a formal
nature, seeking to capture the complex process of achieving truth in a succession of stages, than one in
line with the cognitive-naturalistic approach where, moreover, one recognizes that the search for truth is
contextual and episodic.
HYPOTHESIS   AND  THEORY:  THE  INDIVIDUAL  AND  THE  SCIENTIFIC  COMMUNITY
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Here we have to contrast the aspects of interpretation and construction inherent in a hypothesis to
those in a theory: the former is conditioned by the mode of thought of an individual and the latter
by that of a community – the scientific community that examines and accepts a hypothesis, and 
develops it into a theory. We have had a glimpse into the process of inference and abduction in 
the mind of an individual where beliefs and emotions of that individual have a role to play. 
However, that role is, in a sense, an indirect and supportive one since the beliefs and the 
associated emotions make possible an effective conceptual search and conceptual re-organization
without themselves being used as ingredients in the formation of the concepts and conclusions in
the inferential process. It is true that the process makes use of heuristics that are in the nature of 
beliefs themselves, but those heuristics are ones that are constantly tested against evidence and 
against previously tested concepts, and are revised sequentially so that the final conclusions that 
emerge, and the conceptual reorganization that accompanies the inferential process, have a 
measure of confirmation, justification, and truth built into these. The stamp of the individual that 
remains in these final inferences and concepts consists of an overall conditioning of the latter by 
the mode of thought specific to that individual. For instance, a scientist may be concerned more 
with analytical-deductive thinking than with intuitive-explorative one, which directs her 
inferential process along a course different from the one that she would have adopted in case she 
had a different mode of thought.
The processes of conceptual organization realized by the inferential activity of a community of 
scientists have an analogous character. In trying to understand this, one has to appreciate that the 
scientific community, in turn, is a part of a society at large just as the individual scientist is 
immersed within the psychological and intellectual ambience set by the group or community 
within which she works. The analogy extends further in so far as the scientific community can be
thought of as being a cognitive system itself. The inferential activity of the individual scientist 
has a deliberative component and a component of an intuitive nature, where the latter occurs 
mostly within the unconscious sphere of cognitive activity. This unconscious cognitive activity 
is, moreover, based on massively parallel processes in a network of independent neuronal 
processors, where the connection schemes between the processors lend a great variety to the 
processes actually taking place in the network ([Cleeremans1], [McLelland-Rumelhart]). It is 
this unconscious substratum that is the seat of latent beliefs and emotions that, on being 
activated, make possible the inferential activities within the mind of the individual. The 
processes of acceptance, testing, and development of scientific theories by a scientific 
community in any specific area of investigation also has a deliberative component wherein a 
theory is thoroughly criticized, analyzed, and tested against available evidence before acceptance
as a valid theory. However, this entire process is conditioned by underlying beliefs and value 
judgements located in a cognitive substratum, where the substratum is made up precisely of the 
individuals of the community who carry within their minds the latent beliefs and values of the 
society at large. Analogous to the (computationally) parallel processing within the cognitive 
unconscious of an individual, one has an essentially similar process of exchange and 
communication among individuals of a scientific community, based on which the deliberative 
activity of the community as a whole finally takes shape. 
Ronald N. Giere, in his valuable book  [Giere], draws attention to ‘collective cognition’, or  distributed
cognition in modern research establishments such as the European organization CERN where a large
number of individuals, along with computers and various instruments making up an enormous set-up,
form a huge cognitive system. The individuals operate, to a large extent, in parallel, communicating with
one another by means of language. In reality, cognition may be distributed over wider networks such as a
scientific community or even a more widely spread society sharing a common culture – “….cognition is
not only embodied, but also embedded in a society and in a historically developed culture.”, ([Giere],
chapter 5).
The dominant conditioning effect on the scientific deliberations of a community in some specific
area of investigation is exercised by means of a paradigm ([Kuhn1], chapter 5) which is in the 
nature of a tacit way of approach or a point of view in the problem area under consideration. Put 
differently, a paradigm is a heuristic of major relevance, or an exemplar, a tacitly accepted 
conceptual kernel, that acts like an organizing principle around which various conceptual 
elements get crystallized into a coherent whole, thereby giving rise to a complete theory and its 
ramifications. While the paradigm is a conditioning factor, the major active factor in the 
formation of a theory is, of course, a hypothesis that initiates the process of theory building and 
itself acts as the conceptual focus of the theory. This distinction between a conditioning factor 
and an active component in a cognitive process is a useful and relevant one.
Strictly  speaking,  a  major  hypothesis  or  a  new theory  emerges  in  violation  of a  reigning  paradigm
whereby a new paradigm is brought into existence. Still, the distinction between a conditioning factor and
an active factor in inference making and theory building is one of relevance.
Kuhn  introduced  the  idea  of  a  paradigm in  a  specific  sense,  namely  that  of  an  exemplar  of  major
significance. “Close  historical  investigation  of  a  given  specialty  at  a  given  time  discloses  a  set  of
recurrent  and  quasi-standard  illustrations  of  various  theories  in  their  conceptual,  observational,  and
instrumental applications. These are the community’s paradigms, revealed in its textbooks, lectures, and
laboratory exercises. By studying them and by practicing with them, the members of the corresponding
community learn their trade” ([Kuhn1], p 43). However, it is of considerable value to extend the idea to
one of  a tacitly held guiding principle in the broader context of cognitive science and in the study of
scientific practice. Kuhn himself underscored the  tacit aspect of a paradigm by asserting that the latter
was not a set of principles that could be spelt out in explicit logical terms. In any case, the idea of a
paradigm is so fertile that it has been stretched, interpreted, and adapted in a great many ways and in a
great  many contexts,  though always around a core meaning,  namely, the one of a tacitly entertained
exemplar. Kuhn himself used the idea in subtly different ways and I plead guilty to having taken similar,
if less deserved, liberties in the present book. However,  in all such usage, I have tried to specify the
meaning by implication to the extent possible. 
While the paradigm is a major conditioning factor in the process of theory building by a 
scientific community, other latent factors also play a role, where these relate to cultural 
influences of the society at large and the social value system. All these latent effects operate 
through the cognitive substratum of the community provided by individuals, institutions, 
dominant groups, and power structures. Taken together, these make up the mode of thinking and 
reasoning of a scientific community and set the goal of scientific exploration in various areas of 
inquiry.
THE  AIM  AND  METHOD  OF  SCIENCE:  THE  QUESTION  OF  VALUES
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The question often arises as to whether science is a rational enterprise. Rationality of an activity 
or an approach involves two considerations – first, a specification of the aim of the activity, and 
secondly, an understanding of the method followed in the activity with reference to the aim, i.e., 
in other words, an appraisal of whether the method is appropriate with reference to the aim. The 
commonly assumed rationale of mankind’s scientific activity is often stated in terms analogous 
to the way one evaluates individual inferential and decision-making processes: science, it is said, 
is motivated by a combination of instrumental and epistemic aims. Instrumental rationality is 
motivated by the aim of being effective, where the effectiveness is judged with reference to 
whatever goals may set the activity – either individual or collective – in motion. Epistemic aim, 
on the other hand, relates to the acquisition or use of truth. For instance, investigations on the 
toxic effect produced by a certain bacterial specie may be undertaken with the aim of 
understanding ways to treat a disease caused by it, and the effectiveness of the methods followed
in these investigations may be judged by checking whether a means of treating the disease is 
actually realized in the process. On the other hand, the epistemic rationality of the investigations 
is to be judged by checking what new pieces of knowledge relating to the life processes of the 
bacterium and to the cellular and biochemical causes linking the bacterial toxin with the disease 
in question are gained in the process. Generally speaking, epistemic virtues reside in an 
instrumentally effective inferential and decision-making activity, since effectiveness is rarely 
achieved without a good understanding of the relevant part of reality. The commonly cited goal 
in the case of science is ‘human welfare’, in the service of which science sets about gaining 
knowledge, or a true understanding, of the world. At times, the epistemic aspect is cited as being 
the fundamental criterion of doing science, and philosophers and workers in foundational issues 
in science are fond of underlining the truth-seeking aim of science.
In reality, the goals and motivations underlying the scientific enterprise in the modern world are 
complex, conflicting and, at times, dark. There is the individual scientist, there is her superior, 
there is the institutional head, there is the fund-giving agency, there are governmental policies, 
there are dominant interest groups, there is public opinion, there are media campaigns, and there 
are factors operating on an international scale. In every area of human interactions there are, 
moreover, power relations. Goals of scientific investigations in various areas of interest are 
ultimately set by this entire complex of factors, and often appear in contrary forms, depending on
who is viewing the goals. The individual scientist may look at her research project as a means to 
gain genuine understanding of the mechanisms underlying some natural phenomenon, which 
means that her personal goals are probably epistemic in nature, though these need not be purely 
epistemic since there may be admixtures of career ambitions, monetary aspirations, peer rivalry, 
craving for peer recognition, and similar other ‘worldly’ motives in her scientific pursuits. The 
institutional head and the fund-giving authorities, on the other hand, may have completely 
different perspectives, not unconnected with interests of dominant power groups. This brings us 
to the question of values underlying the business of science. We will return to this later in this 
essay and will see that there is no logical or preferred approach to this question as there is no 
such approach to the question of rationality of science and of scientific method. Questions 
relating to science as an individual and social endeavour are as open as those in any other field of
126
human concern. One can never sit back and engage in the consultation of charts and graphs to 
pronounce on the correctness or otherwise of the course of science.
Interestingly, the epistemic concern continues to remain as one of constant relevance among all 
these conflicting pulls and pushes on science. One has to correctly understand the atomic nucleus
in order to drop a bomb. Even in its most worldly and dark pursuits, science has to go for truth. 
And truth, as we have seen, rests on interpretation – the process of basic relevance when 
cognition confronts the world. On the one hand, truth has to aim for a correspondence with 
elements of reality while, on the other, it has to build upon prior experience of reality, a prior 
conceptual structure, and prior beliefs and preferences resulting from individual and social 
inferential processes. It is a disproportionate concern with the second, interpretational, aspect of 
truth that produces the idea that truth is constructed. Once again we fall prey to a fundamental 
fundamentally dichotomous way of thinking resulting from our craving for simplicity. In order to
avoid the complexity and strain of examining an issue having conflicting and contrary aspects to 
it, the mind tries to grasp the dominant aspect. But the ‘dominant aspect’ is somewhat a myth – it
depends on the point of view. 
SCIENCE  AS  A  TELESCOPE:  THE  ‘OBJECTIVE’  AND  THE  ‘EYEPIECE’
The point of view of realism tends to grasp the reality-oriented aspect of truth while the point of 
view of anti-realism harps on the cognitive and constructive aspect. An illuminating analogy 
would be to think of the ‘objective’ and the ‘eye-piece’ of an astronomical telescope. In viewing 
a remote object, the objective lens system of a telescope is aimed at the object, while the 
eyepiece lens system focuses the rays on to the eye. The telescope itself cannot be reduced either 
to the objective or to the eyepiece. I will now consider in succession the ‘objective’ and the ‘eye-
piece’ of science – its truth-seeking aspect and its interpretational aspect, keeping in mind the 
admonition that science is neither the one nor the other, but a complex whole made up of the 
two.
The reality-oriented aspect of truth is, moreover, contextual. The truth we learn about nature is 
always partial, with ever-expanding scope. Imagine the objective of a telescope – let’s say, of 
one of Galileo’s favourites – aimed at various different celestial bodies, while the magnification 
and the resolution achieved by means of the instrument get increased from time to time. In the 
process, there emerge ever newer pictures of the firmament, spectacularly causing kaleidoscopic 
changes in our conception of the heavens. This, then, can be taken as a metaphor (and, at the 
same time, an instance) of how science acts as a telescope designed to probe nature, with its 
objective constituting the external context of observations and theory building, seeking to arrive 
at ‘truth’.
Continuing to refer to the actual telescope (an imagined one, though, perhaps a favourite one of 
Galileo’s), the eyepiece handles the job of collecting the rays passed by the objective and 
focusing those on to the eye and, in the process, it introduces aberrations and diffraction effects, 
whereby the image formed by the telescope differs from an exact and ideal representation of the 
object and only corresponds to it in some complex manner. In terms of the allegorical telescope 
representing the probing of nature by science, the aberrations and diffraction effects that depend 
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on the detailed structure of the eyepiece are indicative of the role of our existing conceptual 
framework – the internal context of observations and theory building – in the process of making 
up the interpretation of nature that science provides us with.
 As our concepts and our instruments capture newer and newer aspects of nature, scientific 
theories are said to approximate more and more an ideal and perfect description of reality ‘out 
there’. However, the exact sense in which science progresses in its endeavour to unearth the 
mechanisms of nature has raised controversy, and some strife.
APPROXIMATIONS   IN  SCIENCE :  THE  METAPHOR  OF  CONVERGENT  AND  DIVERGENT  SERIES
Imagine a sequence of numbers approximating the irrational number ‘pi’, defined as the ratio of 
the circumference and the diameter of a circle. The rational number 3.14 is a good approximation
for many purposes, but a better approximation is provided by the number 3.1416, where two 
more decimal places have been filled up. Even this, however, does not constitute an accurate 
description of ‘pi’, and the number 3.14159 constitutes a still better approximation. The quest for
capturing the exact value of ‘pi’ does never end, since the successive rational approximations 
never suffice to produce the exact value which, in the language of mathematics, is an irrational 
one. What one needs is to set up a convergent series for ‘pi’  and go on adding up to successive 
terms of the series, numerous such convergent series being known for approximating the elusive 
number. Interestingly, the number, while being elusive, has an indubitable existence as an 
irrational number (and a transcendental number at that), it being only the case that any attempt at 
capturing its value in terms of a rational number can never meet with final success.
Does science approach a description of reality in successive waves of cognitive advancement in 
an analogous manner? It is often said that science is approaching more and more towards an 
ultimate truth about nature, though that truth will forever remain beyond our grasp. Is the 
progression of science, then, something analogous to an approximation of ‘pi’ by means of a 
convergent series? In reality, the progression is of a much more complex nature, somewhat 
analogous to the approximation of a function by an asymptotic series.
ASYMPTOTIC  SERIES  AND  SINGULAR  APPROXIMATIONS
Consider a function of one single variable like, for instance, the distance (s) covered by a car as a
function of time (t) where the latter is the independent variable and the former the dependent 
one. A complete knowledge of the function would enable us to depict the relation between the 
two by means of a graph. But suppose that such a complete knowledge is not given to us and that
we attempt an approximation by means of a power series, aiming at a good description of the 
graph at all points close to some pre-assigned value of t, say, near t=0. Now, the power series is 
in the form of a sum of an infinite number of terms and one can, for any given value of t (close to
t=0), add up the successive terms, hoping to approach the corresponding value of the dependent 
variable s in a manner analogous to the way the value of ‘pi’ can be approached by means of a 
convergent series.
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An asymptotic series does provide an approximation, but one of a more complex nature. As one 
goes on adding successive terms for any given small value of t, the series at first appears to 
converge to some value, but when a good number of terms have been added, the sum begins to 
diverge. An excellent approximation to s for some given value of t can be obtained by summing 
up, say, the first ten terms of the series, but the quality of the approximation deteriorates as one 
sums up the subsequent terms while, for a larger value of t, a larger number of terms may be 
needed in order to obtain a reasonably good approximation.
Scientific investigations often aim at guessing the relations between dependent variables and 
relevant sets of independent variables (there may be more than one independent variables in any 
given problem) from observed data, and any such relation arrived at by analysis of the data is 
typically expressed in the form of a series. However, a relation depends, in general, on a set of 
relevant parameters that are indicative of the conditions under which the proposed relation holds.
One can now ask the question as to how the relation under consideration depends on the value of 
some parameter, which we denote by the symbol p? This is of a more involved nature than the 
one of the graphical relation between a dependent and an independent variable, since now the 
graph itself gets changed as the parameter varies. If the parameter is made to change by a small 
amount, the graph also changes, which is commonly expressed by saying that the relation 
between the dependent and the independent variable gets perturbed by the variation of the 
parameter. One can again express the perturbation in the form an approximation by means of a 
power series where now the power series contains terms with successively higher powers of the 
parameter p.
In numerous instances of practical interest, the power series turns out to be asymptotic in nature, 
in which case one is left with a singular perturbation around some reference value of p, say, 
p=0. For instance, when a plane wave of light, corresponding to a bunch of parallel rays, is made
to pass through a circular aperture and then captured on a screen placed on the other side of the 
aperture, a distinctive pattern of variation of light intensity (dependent variable) with distance 
(independent variable) along any line passing through the centre of the illuminated patch is 
obtained, where the graph of the variation is found to be oscillatory in nature, the oscillations 
being confined to a narrow region near the border of the illuminated patch. The relevant 
parameter here is the ratio p=λ/a, where λ stands for the wavelength of light used and a for the 
radius of the circular aperture. The oscillations are indicative of the wave nature of light, due to 
which the parameter p typically has a small but non-zero value. On the other hand, the limit p=0 
corresponds to an idealization in the description of optical phenomena that goes by the name of 
‘ray optics’ or ‘geometrical optics’. In this ray optic description, where the wave nature of light 
is ignored, the variation of light intensity is depicted by a uniform intensity inside the illuminated
patch, which abruptly drops off to zero value at the border of illumination, with the zero intensity
continuing into the shadow region on the screen. This differs qualitatively from the oscillatory 
variation that obtains for any non-zero value of p, however small. This is a well known singular 
perturbation problem in physics. It tells us that the description of optical phenomena in terms of 
the wave theory is fundamentally different from a description in terms of the ray theory, because 
the latter ignores an essential aspect of light.
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In an optical experiment of the type indicated above, the ratio p sets the context. In a large class 
of experiments the actual value of p is so small that one can assume p to be zero and still come 
up with a good number of predictions arrived at with the help of the ray theory, but all such 
predictions fail when one focuses on a narrow region around the border of the illuminated 
circular patch, where one observes oscillatory variations in light intensity (it is in this sense that 
one can say that the ray theory, while being a useful and effective one within a certain context, 
enjoys only a skewed fit with reality). In order to investigate these oscillatory variations, one has 
to design experiments with apertures of small radius (in which case the non-zero value of p can 
no longer be ignored), which corresponds to observations in a different context – a context where
a new theory is needed beyond ray optics and that theory is commonly referred to as ‘wave 
optics’.
This is how the question of contextuality in the description of reality by scientific theories comes 
up. A theory that suffices in a given context is to be replaced with one of a different foundational
structure when the context changes in such a way that previously ignored aspects can now be 
ignored no longer, and a consideration of those aspects makes necessary a modified theory with 
an altogether new texture. However, the older theory remains woven into the newer one in a 
relation of some complexity, as the ray theory is woven into the wave theory of light, where the 
complexity often finds expression in terms of an asymptotic approximation.
SINGULAR   REDUCTION  FROM  ONE  THEORY  TO  ANOTHER
A much discussed case of such singular transition from one theory to a succeeding one is that 
from the classical to the quantum description. In order to illustrate the singular nature of the 
relation between classical and quantum mechanical descriptions, it is illuminating to refer to a 
particle moving along a straight line and encountering a potential barrier – a region where the 
classical theory forbids the particle from entering because of insufficient energy possessed by it. 
This stricture of classical mechanics is, however, conditional on the Planck constant (h) being 
ignored. However, the Planck constant, though having a small value, cannot be ignored in all 
contexts, and there do exist situations where a particle, on encountering a potential barrier, can be
seen to tunnel through it with a small but no-zero probability (the process of emission of alpha 
particles from nuclei occurs by means of such quantum mechanical tunnelling). The dependence 
of the probability of tunnelling on the parameter h turns out to be of a singular nature, where the 
behaviour of the particle for a small non-zero value of h differs qualitatively from its behaviour 
when h is ignored as not being of any consequence. A similar story, indicative of a singular 
relation between the classical and quantum theories, can be told regarding the celebrated formula
for the black body spectrum first derived by Planck.
The quantum context is thus distinguished from the classical by the non-zero value of the Planck 
constant h. In any context in which the Planck constant is negligibly small compared to the 
relevant action(s) (a physical quantity characterizing a dynamical system, analogous to its energy
or momentum), a classical description suffices (though, only conditionally) in describing the 
behaviour of the system, while in an altered context, where h can no longer be ignored (in the 
domain of microscopic systems, for instance) a different description is necessary where, from the
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mathematical point of view, the transition from the former description to the latter is singular in 
nature.
Not all transitions from a more restrictive theory to a less restrictive one (the classical theory is 
more restrictive as compared with the quantum theory because it holds in a restricted context 
where the Planck constant can be ignored as being negligibly small) are however, of a singular 
nature. For example, the transition from Newtonian mechanics to the mechanics based on the 
special theory of relativity is, from the mathematical point of view, non-singular, and special 
relativistic formulas in mechanics go over to Newtonian formulas in the limit of relevant velocity
ratios (p = v/c, where v denotes any relevant velocity characterizing a dynamical system of 
interest, and c stands for the velocity of light in vacuum) going to zero, in a smooth or non-
singular manner. In other words, the behaviour of a dynamical system as described by the special
theory of relativity for small but non-zero values of v/c does not differ qualitatively from its 
behaviour as described in the Newtonian theory. Still, the special theory of relativity involves a 
major conceptual reorganization as compared to the Newtonian theory.
Indeed, a major conceptual restructuring becomes necessary whenever some relevant aspect of 
reality, which was ignored in the earlier theory, now assumes significance, in consequence of 
which, parts of reality appear in a new light, as if a new dimension is added to reality. Often, the 
new ‘dimension’ becomes ‘visible’ in virtue of the fact that some specific natural parameter (p), 
which was not taken into account in the old theory because of a restricted domain of 
observations, now assumes an essential role in an expanded domain. This is the case in optics 
where the ray theoretic description fails in a domain in which the finite non-zero value of the 
ratio p = λ/a (here a stands for a typical length scale in the observational context) becomes 
significant. In quantum theory, on the other hand, it is the non-zero value of the ratio p = h/A (A 
stands for the typical value of the action of the dynamical system under consideration) that 
assumes relevance. And, in the case of the special theory of relativity, the ratio p =  v/c plays the 
corresponding role. In each of these cases, an attempt to force nature into a straightjacket by 
assuming that p is negligibly small, results in anomalies and inconsistencies whenever the 
context of observation needs the non-zero value of p to be taken into account. In other words, 
there are certain natural borders that cannot be crossed (from zero to a non-zero value of p) 
without an appropriate conceptual restructuring, since a new ‘dimension’ or aspect of nature is 
revealed across any such border: nature now appears in a new perspective.
The idea of perspectival realism espoused by Ronald Giere in [Giere] is analogous to that underlying the
contextuality of scientific theories.
THE CROSSING OF BORDERS: SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
Events of restructuring of theories resulting from an alteration in the observational context and 
the crossing of such natural borders in various different fields of scientific investigation are 
momentous ones. One feels inclined to identify these with the scientific revolutions that Thomas 
Kuhn spoke of ( [Kuhn1], chapters 9-13). There have been numerous protestations from 
philosophers of science questioning the validity of the concept of scientific revolutions, but many
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of these are in the nature of logical and analytical discourse where events in real life, belonging 
to the real world, are viewed in the abstract, and stringent demands are imposed on the way these
are to be analyzed and classified. Nothing in this world can be described in terms of pure 
categories, devoid of conflicting and contrary aspects, and every description is valid only 
contextually, and the description of events of conceptual restructuring in science as revolutions is
no exception. For one thing, revolutions occur in all scales. In order to understand this, one is to 
look at periods of scientific activity that Kuhn referred to as normal science, in contrast to 
revolutions. As with the idea of scientific revolutions, Kuhn’s reference to ‘normal science’ has 
also raised controversies because of a tendency to assign undue and disproportionate significance
to the concept of normal science. Normal science refers to much of the day-to-day activity of 
scientists where conceptual restructuring is not needed and where one can discern an unspoken 
allegiance to some conceptual paradigm. All these ideas of paradigms, normal science, and 
scientific revolutions are nothing more than descriptions, in the spirit of naturalism, of the way 
things appear to be in the practice of science, in respect of its epistemic aspect. These tell us how
things are, and are not proclamations of how things ought to be, though the distinction between 
the two, which is not always a sharp one, seems to have been disregarded, at times, by Kuhn 
himself, perhaps by default rather than by design. In particular, normal science is no 
subservience to the authority of people who have been responsible, fortuitously or otherwise, for 
the introduction of new ideas and concepts in a field.
NORMAL  SCIENCE:  CONCEPTUAL  RESTRUCTURING   AT  ALL  SCALES
In real life, one often follows a certain set conceptual pattern till a new and more versatile pattern
makes its appearance. We often benefit from following a set pattern, though the danger of falling
a prey to the pattern is, of course, always there. Indeed, seeds of new concepts accumulate in an 
invisible process even as one is engaged in the mundane practice of following a set conceptual 
pattern, and what one needs is to recognize these as they germinate so as to make possible a 
conceptual reorganization. In other words, periods of following a set conceptual pattern and 
events of conceptual reorganization are inextricably linked with one another, and a distinction 
between the two can be made only provisionally and within given contexts. 
Indeed, quiescent states in which seeds of new ideas are nurtured, and phases of conceptual 
restructuring, alternate in various scales. What appears to be a period of normal science from a 
bigger perspective, involves definite conceptual changes when looked at more closely, where, 
however, concepts undergo a revision on a smaller scale, within a larger framework that remains 
unchanged. For instance, within the framework of the basic ideas of fluid dynamics, there have 
been vigorous attempts at introducing new concepts for the understanding of the remarkable 
phenomenon of turbulence, and a number of new ideas have indeed been introduced that have 
had far-reaching consequences even outside the field of fluid dynamics. Research on turbulence 
has progressed in the spirit of normal science within the framework of basic ideas in fluid 
dynamics (where, in a manner of speaking, the paradigm is set by what is referred to as the 
Navier-Stokes equations), but when looked at more closely, there have taken place conceptual 
revolutions within the area of turbulence, a notable example of which is constituted by a number 
of fundamental ideas of Kolmogoroff and others introduced some seventy years back.
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Incidentally, the concept and study of turbulence in fluid dynamics is also associated with a 
certain parameter of crucial relevance, namely the Reynolds number (or, in a different context in 
fluid flow, the Rayleigh number): as a critical value of the parameter is crossed, the nature of the 
flow changes qualitatively and, from a mathematical point of view, singularly. Once again, the 
Reynolds number can be said to set the context in which one investigates the mechanisms and 
characteristics of fluid flow.
THE  COMPLEX  RELATION  BETWEEN  THEORIES:  EMERGENT  PHENOMENA
As theories succeed one another in any given field of investigation, consequent to contextual 
changes relating to the domain of observation of natural phenomena (such as, observations for  
small and large values, respectively, of the parameter λ/a in optical set-ups), there occurs a 
conceptual restructuring where two consecutive conceptual frameworks do not bear a relation of 
direct correspondence. Of the two theories in question, the earlier one usually applies to a more 
restrictive context (in a relative sense) as compared to the succeeding theory, whose concepts are
of a broader scope. It is often the case that many of the concepts of the earlier theoretical 
framework do not have counterparts in the later theory, though those can be interpreted within 
the new and expanded theoretical framework. It is often said that the former theory is reduced by
the latter (i.e., the later one), or that the latter theory reduces to the former (for instance, in the 
case of succession of the classical theory by quantum theory, by restricting the description of 
phenomena to a domain where the ratio h/A, introduced above, can be ignored). However, the 
idea of ‘reduction’ often involves considerations of a complex nature, and is associated with the 
concept of emergent phenomena (such as the phenomenon of tunnelling that emerges across the 
border separating classical and quantum mechanical descriptions), commonly associated, from 
the mathematical point of view, with singularities.
Michael  V.  Berry,  the  great  mathematical  physicist,  spoke  of  asymptotics,  singularities,  and  theory
reduction in a remarkably suggestive cameo article in his typically lucid and insightful style. “In science
we strive to integrate our experiences, observations, and experiments into a single explanatory framework
- 'a theory of everything'. Of course this goal has not been achieved, and probably never will be. What we
have instead are the partial descriptions provided by biology, chemistry, physics, etc., and, within these,
the various subfields such as fluid mechanics and quantum mechanics. The different areas of study do not
fit tidily together. Particular difficulties arise when a more general description is supposed to encompass
an older, less general, one, usually by providing a microscopic explanation of its principles. It is hoped
that a less general theory can thus be 'reduced' to a more general one. But this comfortable 
picture is often spoilt by certain classes of higher-level, or 'emergent', phenomena...... .”, [Berry]. 
Berry speaks of the relation between two theories, of which one is supposed to get reduced to the other in
the limit of some parameter (δ) going to zero (analogous to the parameter  p  introduced earlier) where,
however, this limiting transition is often  not a smooth one. “We shall see that very often reduction is
obstructed by the fact that the limit is highly singular. Moreover, the type of singularity is important, and
the singularities are not only directly connected to the existence of emergent phenomena but underlie
some of the most difficult and intensively-studied problems in physics today.”
In this book I have tried to adopt an approach in keeping with the spirit of the ideas underlined by Berry
in this article of his, which is likely to prove to be one of major importance in the philosophy of science.
He considers a number of concrete examples of the relation of reduction between theories in physics,
where the ‘reduction’ is more complex than what at first appears to be the case. 
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It is the complex relation between prior and succeeding theories in various fields of scientific 
investigation that can be subsumed under the idea of incommensurability of theoretical 
frameworks, mooted by Kuhn.
“The normal-scientific tradition that emerges from a scientific revolution is not only incompatible but often 
actually incommensurable with that which has gone before.” ([Kuhn1], p 103.)
Even as two theories appear to be incommensurable with reference to each other, there still remains an
enveloping language by means of which the two theories can be examined side by side.
Feyerabend also had much to say on the notion of incommensurability, though not quite in the same context 
([Feyerabend], chapter 15). Polanyi spoke of incommensurability in his own terms of reference, and his ideas 
may have had influenced Kuhn and Feyerabend in the formulation of their views (see [Jacobs]).
 As with the other ideas that Kuhn introduced, the one of incommensurability has been the focus 
of quite considerable controversy (reviewed in [Soler et al], [Devlin-Bokulich]). But, once again,
this idea of Kuhn’s finds a natural resonance with what one feels as one goes through histories of
theories succeeding one another in the annals of science. It is precisely because of this resonance 
that Kuhn was able to strike in the minds of men, at a level deeper than that addressed in formal, 
analytical, and philosophical discourse, that his work ushered in a new era in the study of science
as such. Of course, Kun did no more than point at the basic idea and did not make it much more 
explicit, and the idea itself may get transformed in days to come, but the fact will remain that 
Kuhn did point at something of central relevance in the study of how scientific theories 
appearing in succession are related to one another. A number of concepts likely to be of 
considerable significance in such a study are the ones relating to contextuality, reduction, 
singularity, and emergence (refer to [Batterman], [Chibbaro et al ], [Bokulich]). 
The notion of contextuality (as mentioned earlier, this term is used to mean context-dependence) 
of scientific theories and of contextual truth that I have tried to outline in the present essay can 
now be summed up. 
CONTEXTUALITY   IN  SCIENCE:  SUMMING  UP
In any sphere of scientific investigation and at any stage of evolution of scientific ideas, some 
part of reality is studied within some definite context that is, typically, not recognized explicitly 
by the investigators, since there remain transitional borders that go unnoticed. With an expansion
of the domain of observation of facts and phenomena, and with the gradual evolution of ideas 
within a given theoretical framework, an altered context emerges where previously unrecognized
borders are recognized and crossed, new aspects or ‘dimensions’ of nature are revealed, a new 
perspective emerges, and the texture of the relevant theory gets transformed. There results an 
altered conceptual structure in which many of the concepts of the previous theory are replaced 
with new ones, though these former concepts can be interpreted from the vantage point of the 
newly emerging theory. The earlier theory is often subsumed within or reduced by the 
succeeding one where singularities and emergent phenomena are commonly met with. In a sense,
the earlier and the later theories are incommensurate with each other. Though incommensurate, 
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both are of epistemic value within their respective contexts. The truth of either theory is 
contextual but not relative in the sense of being principally a matter of arbitrary interpretation by 
individuals or communities.
This last notion of truth as being relative to interpretation or construction, and not as one of 
referring to reality is commonly associated with the anti-realist view of science. However, we 
have seen earlier in this book that, even from the realist point of view, while truth is focused on 
to reality, it has a second facet, since it emerges in a protracted cognitive endeavour, which is 
basically in the nature of an interpretation of reality.
This admixture of the element of interpretation in scientific theories makes the latter suspect 
when judged against the criterion of objectivity, but that, of course, is no reason to simplify the 
notion of truth by ignoring its interpretational aspect. As we have seen, truth is a complex thing 
where its correspondence to reality is conditioned or constrained by its cognitive origin, where 
cognition is nothing more than an interpretation while, conversely, it is an interpretation aimed 
at and answerable to reality. This, as far as I understand, is the naturalist perception of truth – 
truth as it is, not truth as it ought to be. 
The naturalist point of view examines and addresses the idea of scientific truth by recognizing both its
cognitive-interpretative aspect and its commitment to reality, which entails complexities and tensions in
the notion of truth. Philip Kitcher recognizes the two contrary aspects to truth and has examined these
from various angles. Based on Kitcher’s ideas on the notion of scientific truth, one can have a broad view
of the issues involved in an authentic discourse on scientific theories as bearers of truth, though that
discourse may eventually turn out to develop approaches and interpretations differing somewhat from
Kitcher’s. I have found [Gonzalez2] to be a useful source-book for this. 
THEORY  CHOICE:  THE  PROBLEM  OF  ‘UNDERDETERMINATION’
This is supposed to raise a problem with theory choice. How do we choose a theory as being a 
correct one, especially as we recognize that, when judged against available evidence in any given
domain of scientific investigation, there may be not one but, in principle, an infinite number of 
theories compatible with the evidence (the problem of ‘under-determination’ of theories by 
evidence). In reality, it is seldom the case when the scientific community faces the task of 
choosing between alternative theories, all compatible with the body of observed facts in some 
given domain of enquiry, though it often happens that several alternative hypotheses are offered 
to explain anomalies in the area under consideration, one of which survives criticisms and 
scrutiny from various quarters and, in some special cases, a number of mutually compatible 
hypotheses that cohere with one another evolve into a theory. A hypothesis is a result of an act of
abduction, and abduction by its very nature is a guesswork aimed at producing a sufficiently 
consistent and effective explanation of a number of facts of observation. It is an act of cognition 
which, in turn, is based on interpretation against a body of items of knowledge and beliefs 
accumulated in past experience. There may, in principle, be numerous possible hypotheses 
consistent with facts of observation, but only few of those are also consistent with the knowledge
base and the beliefs that make up the internal context of the cognitive act, and fewer still survive 
the intricate and subtle process of hypothesis generation, some of whose salient features have 
been outlined in chapter 8. Thus a hypothesis is not an exercise in logic alone, but a complex and
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intricate inferential process constrained by a great many cognitive factors conditioned in a long 
history of evolutionary development.
All the crows I have observed in the city of Kolkata during my lifetime have been black. From 
this I generalize that all crows are black. I could also generalize to the effect that all crows in the 
city of Kolkata are black, and those in the city of London are white, which is logically 
compatible with the facts of observation on which I generalize. Or I could choose from an 
infinity of similar ‘generalizations’, but the latter do not conform to features of past 
generalizations that have been found to be fruitful and effective (I do not enter into the question 
of the biological features that define a crow and assume that a crow is unambiguously identified 
by sight, without reference to its colour), and so I do not entertain these. The cognitive apparatus 
within me has developed certain processes of arriving at relevant and meaningful generalizations
(meaningful not in the sense of logic but in the sense of making sense of this world and surviving
in it), which make most of the above generalizations irrelevant in the context of my inference. 
Imagine for a moment the phase of history when the framework of classical physics was being put 
together, principally around Newtonian mechanics and electromagnetic theory. All the observational facts
collected up to that point of time were compatible with the theory of relativity and with quantum theory 
as well. Why, then, were the theory of relativity and quantum theory (or, to indulge in a further flight of 
fancy, the quantum field theory) not considered and adopted by physicists and mathematicians of the time
who were equipped with astounding reasoning ability? The reason is precisely the same as that in the case
of your child suddenly crying out in an adjacent room, and you making the inference that she must have 
hurt herself while not even imagining the possibility that a snake has entered the room and bitten her 
which, however, is compatible with the fact of the child having cried out. In either case only those 
theories and hypotheses were entertained that, in addition to being logically possible, were consistent with
the context. Hypotheses are made in accordance with the context, building upon ideas and notions that 
have accumulated in past experience (while, at the same time, bringing in novel elements as necessary) 
with the aim of solving specific anomalies, puzzles, and problems, because that is the way that human 
cognition works. In making a hypothesis, the cognitive mind does not think of anomalies and problems 
that may come up in a different context – one that is not of current relevance. The black body problem, or 
the puzzle of photo-electricity, or the frame-independence of the velocity of light were not of relevance in
the context of eighteenth and nineteenth century physics, which is why the quantum theory or the theory 
of relativity were outside the realm of possibility at that stage even though these were all compatible with 
facts of observation accumulated up to that time – no fact of observation were logically in conflict with 
these (and, what is more, these subsequently turned out to be successful theories, contrary to the example 
of the crows mentioned above). 
Hypotheses and theories are not plucked out of thin air but are built upon past successes in much the same
way that natural selection acts in the emergence of new species – bringing in novelties within the existing 
pool of genetic material. 
Looked at this way, a scientific hypothesis is hugely constrained by the internal context of 
knowledge and beliefs of an individual and of the society, while being consistent with the 
external context set by facts of observation, where certain aspects of phenomena go unnoticed. 
Consequently, only a few distinct hypotheses can, in practice, compete with one another in any 
given field of investigation at any given point of time. As with the beliefs of an individual, 
numerous different reasoning attitudes, modes of thought, and half-formed scientific ideas, along
with relatively remote beliefs, set the internal context of a scientific community in respect of its 
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choice among such competing hypotheses. All these factors making up the internal context play 
a role in defining the attitudes and preferences of various different sections of the scientific 
community towards the competing hypotheses, as a result of which the choice among these 
hypotheses assumes the form of a complex and often protracted process but, in the end, the one 
of greater epistemic value usually prevails, and a new theory is built up around it. 
While a scientific theory has to be, in some sense, a true description of some aspect of nature (recall,
however, the complexities inherent in the concept of truth of a theory), a more immediate requirement
that it has to satisfy is that of  consistency  – consistency with the existing body of knowledge and with
observational and experimental evidence relating to the relevant field of inquiry. Theories are ultimately
accepted or rejected on grounds of consistency, though a consistent theory does not necessarily attain a
desired standard of truth. In contrast, an emerging  hypothesis  is often not consistent with the existing
body of knowledge, since it bears the stamp of a belief. It is accepted by a section of working scientists
only  because  it  promises to  reveal  novel  ‘dimensions’  of  nature.  If  the  hypothesis  does  succeed  in
delivering the goods, then it finds its place in some new theoretical framework, where it meets with the
requirement of consistency within an emergent theoretical framework.
The new theory does not appear in one single package ready for the market. Once a number of 
anomalies appear within an existing theoretical framework (explanation of the black body 
spectrum, explanation of the line spectrum of hydrogen), there occur many failed attempts at 
framing a hypothesis that can explain at least some of these anomalies. In the case that more than
one hypotheses are offered, the question of choice among these comes up, which sets in motion 
currents of criticism, appraisal, and analysis, where non-epistemic factors play their role 
alongside epistemic ones, as indicated above. At times, several hypotheses are offered and found 
useful (Planck’s hypothesis, Bohr’s hypothesis) before these are collated to form the nucleus of 
an emerging theory (quantum mechanics). 
In this respect we once again observe a similarity in the ways in which a hypothesis is formed in 
the mind of an individual, and a theory takes shape in the scientific practice of a scientific 
community. Each of the two processes involves factors of a non-epistemic nature, based on prior
attitudes, emotion-linked preferences and beliefs, but each, at the same time, involve epistemic 
judgements and consistency checks, as a result of which the end product, in the form of a 
hypothesis or a theory, has to be of epistemic value (while being, at the same time, conditioned 
by non-epistemic factors). As we have seen, this epistemic value is not generally in the nature of 
a logical soundness, but one relative to current aims and goals and relative to the context (such as
the one set by the Reynold’s number in fluid flow, or by the parameter λ/a in an optical set-up) in
which some part of nature is observed and studied. 
SCIENTIFIC  PROGRESS:  SOCIALLY  DETERMINED  OR  SOCIALLY  CONDITIONED?
The anti-realists put emphasis upon the non-epistemic aspects of theory choice so as to assert 
that the succession of theories in the evolution of scientific practice is socially determined – a 
point of view apparently conforming to the views of the likes of Kuhn and Feyerabend ([Kuhn1],
[Feyerabend]). In particular, Kuhn’s observation that successive theories are incommensurate 
between them and that the progression of scientific theories is not of a cumulative nature 
converging to some ultimate truth are, on the face of it, supportive of this anti-realist point of 
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view. However, we have seen that these notions do have a realist interpretation as well, where 
the incommensurability and the non-cumulative nature of scientific progression are 
consequences of the contextuality of theories in the sense outlined above. Science has a 
progressive aspect to it since it unravels the mechanisms of nature layer by layer, across a 
succession of natural borders, and the metaphor of a convergent approximation to some final 
truth has to give way to metaphors of a more complex nature such as the one of approximation 
by means of a succession of  asymptotic series – each describing a limited approximation in 
some specific context, where it is conceivable that contexts appear in an unending succession: 
Nature has an infinite number of distinct ‘dimensions’, and is inscrutable to the end.  
The question as to whether and how one can locate continuing progress in the history of science has been
a contentious one. In particular, Kuhn and Feyerabend have been interpreted as having been opposed to
the idea that there has been a continuing progression or development in scientific theories and practices. 
In the case of Feyerabend, such an interpretation of his views has been fostered by his contrary way of
saying things – a way that was meant to jolt people into questioning the received view. In fact, he had too
much of sense in him to question the continuing discoveries in science in a naive way. What he did want
to highlight is that  there cannot be a predetermined yardstick of progress  in line with the commonly
perceived and advertised ‘methods’ of science. He, above all, was against the mindlessness in the name of
‘intellect’ in science. “ 'Progress of knowledge' in many places meant killing of minds.” ([Feyerabend], p
3).
Kuhn, on the other hand, was remarkably lucid in what he meant to say, but the import of what he said
was, at times, not transparent because of its novelty. Moreover, he was too engrossed in bringing in new
ideas in bold strokes of the brush to finish these with detailed explanations. He was fully cognizant of the
continuing evolution in science, and never questioned the fact of scientific progress but, at the same time
he was concerned with setting right the underlying notions. He advanced the insight that the scientific
process achieves distinction by way of eliminating, in a large measure,  disagreement on  foundational
questions. Generally speaking, progress depends crucially on creative contributions, and scientists in any
given area of research are capable of identifying and agreeing upon these creative contributions precisely
because  they share  a  common paradigm and are generally  reluctant  to  engage in  controversies  upon
foundational issues. It is only in the backdrop of normal science that scientific revolutions make sense,
and progress in science is tied with the occurrence of such revolutions. What is novel in Kuhn’s discourse
on progress is that progress occurs through a succession of theories  incommensurable with reference to
one another, and is therefore of a complex nature ([Kuhn1], chapter 13) where, moreover, the complexity
repeats itself at various scales nested within each other.
The spectrum of  views  on scientific  progress,  to  be  found in the philosophy of  science  literature  is
discussed in [Niiniluoto].
In other words, it is possible to recognize and accept the fact of scientific progress (or of a 
continuing evolution and development in the sciences) while at the same time raising deeper 
questions as to the nature and relevance of that progress. These deeper questions, however, need 
not imply that the evolution of scientific theories is driven predominantly by non-epistemic 
factors – ones without valid reference to mechanisms inherent in nature. 
But, like an albatross, the non-epistemic factors involved in the interpretational aspect of truth 
cannot be shaken off, which is why the traditional dichotomy between realism and anti-realism is
not considered to be of overriding relevance in the naturalist approach to the philosophy of 
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science. The naturalist point of view adopts the approach of science itself – when confronted 
with a choice between apparently conflicting descriptions of reality, science delves deeper and 
comes up with a broader, if more complex, description. The case of apparently contrary aspects –
epistemic and non-epistemic – in the notion of truth is of a similar nature, needing a deeper and 
broader view.  
The naturalist approach acknowledges the involvement of individual and social beliefs, cognitive
preferences, and modes of thought in the interpretational aspect of scientific theories – factors 
not recognized by realists who are anxious to demarcate their position from that of the 
antirealists, and who are possessed of a disproportionate concern for the aspect of objectivity of 
truth, and its epistemic value in the description of nature. 
The social beliefs, cognitive preferences, and modes of thought cannot, however, be in the nature
of determining factors in the continuing unfolding of scientific theories describing and decoding 
the mechanisms inherent in deeper and deeper layers of reality.  At the end of the day, the 
theories have to stand the test of reality and hence, whatever individual and social factors get 
involved in the formation and acceptance of hypotheses and theories, these are at best in the 
nature of conditioning factors.
Philip Kitcher’s take on scientific progress is somewhat in the same spirit  as Kuhn’s: “...  I offer an
analogy to show how my picture of science as providing objective knowledge does not entail that there is
some unique, context-independent goal toward which inquiry aims. That analogy will also suggest a quite
different  way of  thinking about  the goals  of  the sciences  and about  scientific  progress.”  ([Kitcher2],
Introduction). The analogy Kitcher speaks of is that of map-making that illustrates the type of scientific
realism he wants to espouse – the one he refers to as ‘modest realism’, where scientific progress is not
driven  teleologically  to  some distant  but  fixed  epistemic goal,  but  is  geared  to  meeting and solving
problems of a contingent nature. It is this process that is socially conditioned. In particular, Kitcher relates
the issue of scientific progress with that of social values. 
The ideas about the scientific process raised in the present essay are in line with those developed by Kuhn
and Kitcher.  
EVOLUTIONARY  PSYCHOLOGY  AND  CULTURAL  INHERITANCE
All our cognitive quests are rooted in psychological processes in individuals and in social groups
and communities. What is more, all acts of cognition are continuations of a prolonged 
evolutionary process – a process that is now recognized as forming an integral part of biological 
evolution – one that can be referred to as the process of cognitive evolution ([Hagen]). The idea 
of cognitive evolution may be broadened to include two aspects – a long term aspect within the 
process of biological evolution and a short term aspect of adaptation in the course of 
developmental history of individuals and societies, where the latter makes use of and realizes the 
capacities inherited in the evolutionary process. Evolutionary psychology talks of dual 
inheritance ([Workman-Reader], chapter 14) – modes of thought and cognitive traits acquired by 
genetic inheritance, and those acquired by cultural inheritance. Ideas, concepts, and modes of 
thought propagate culturally by processes that have a resemblance to the process of evolution by 
genetic means, though one need not read too much in this resemblance. Cultural inheritance has 
features of its own, and is seen to be expressed in various different cognitive traits in and across 
139
cultures distributed over the globe [Nisbett2]. Inferences, hypotheses, and theories developed by 
individuals and by scientific communities within different cultures are stamped by deep-rooted 
cognitive traits differing across cultures while, at the same time, possessing epistemic value. This
is somewhat like the fact that competent chefs from different culinary cultures all cook excellent 
and delicious food, but all cook differently, and the food cooked by them have different kinds of 
taste. Or like the fact that great musicians from different cultural backgrounds all produce great 
and stirring music, but music of different kinds (such as, for instance, Indian and western 
classical music).
Evolutionary and social roots of human cognition, as also of cognitive  values,  have been insightfully
discussed in [Tomasello1], [Tomasello2]. 
Basic ideas in evolutionary psychology can be found in [Cosmides-Tooby], [Buss], [Sterelny], in addition
to references mentioned earlier.
Cultural inheritance entails variations of modes of thought, beliefs, and value systems across 
cultures as also within cultures – since there exist sub-cultures within cultures (of which the 
family is an instance, being the bearer of a micro-culture) – all of which result in a conditioning 
of the interpretation of reality that, principally, is the business of science. All these taken together
contrive to set the general course of scientific exploration that the individuals within a culture or 
a subculture undertake, the way of looking at problems and anomalies that come up, the relative 
importance of intuitive and deliberative cognitive resources brought to bear in the process of 
solving the problems, and a host of similar other features of the inferential and scientific process.
It is, at times, naively asked as to how, for instance, the statement of Newton’s laws might 
depend on cultural factors, since these leave too little room for cultural specificities to operate. 
The response to this cannot, of course, consist of posing an alternative statement of Newton’s 
laws that a different cultural milieu could possibly produce, since cultural resources exert only 
broad structural features of scientific theory making. Copious indications of that are to be found  
in comparative studies of the sciences developing within continental, Islamic, Chinese, Indian, 
and similar other cultural formations during the later middle ages when the modes of practising 
science were not subjugated to one single mode of approach. Each of these cultures produced its 
own scientific framework committed to understanding some aspect or other of the mechanisms 
inherent in nature, and each having its own area of epistemic validity. 
History proceeded along a course where most of the varied frameworks were all sought to be 
subsumed under a single dominating cognitive mode of doing science. It is no use wailing over 
how things could possibly have developed along an alternative course. But it is definitely a 
meaningful proposition to recognize the cross-cultural influences in science, to recognize that 
science is an interpretation of reality that is conditioned by social-cultural modes of thought, and 
to make the best use of this realization in the future development of the sciences.        
The idea of differing cognitive traits across cultures – and within cultures too – has distinct 
dangers of misuse lurking underneath. What is a difference in the overall type or complexion, 
somewhat like a difference in flavour, and is often not amenable to explicit description, is in 
danger of being depicted as a matter of superiority and inferiority among culturally inherited 
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cognitive traits. Such interpretations in terms of superiority and inferiority, and concomitant 
power relations of domination and subjugation invite, as a reaction, the opposite tendency of 
ignoring the cultural differences altogether, this notwithstanding the fact that cognitive 
differences have indeed been made use of in history in developing and extending power 
relations. This is where a deep and broad understanding of the notion of epistemic and non-
epistemic aspects of the scientific process meets with troubled and turbulent waters.
 
THE  RAIONALITY  OF SCIENCE:  VALUES  IN  TROUBLED  TIMES 
Indeed, the scientific process as a whole is riddled with deeply conflicting aspects that seem as 
turbulent as the erupting conflicts in all major spheres of human interaction in today’s world. 
This is because of the fact that the course of the scientific process is often, and indeed generally, 
dominated by power interests. The aim of scientific enquiry in major areas of investigation,  
considered from the instrumental point of view, is not neutral from the perspective of power 
relations. As for the epistemic aim, it is often of a derivative nature, though a constantly present 
one, as we have seen above.
Even when all the non-epistemic aspects setting the course of the scientific process are ignored 
(this is a big counterfactual assumption indeed) the question of rationality of science is far from 
being a settled one. This is an area where, to start with, it appears that philosophical 
considerations of the twentieth century vintage (the first three-fourths of the century, that is,) can
have a major role to play. But even such a limited discourse on the rationality of science dos not 
inspire confidence, since the issue of rationality of science as a whole (assuming that the notion 
of science ‘as a whole’ is at all meaningful) turns out to be somewhat like that of the rationality 
of an individual, where the general feeling is that the question of rationality itself is not a well 
posed one. Indeed, in order to pronounce upon the rationality of the scientific process as a whole,
one needs to know what the distinctive method of science is, and then to evaluate whether that 
method is conducive to achieving the epistemic aim (recall that we have agreed to ignore, like a 
true philosopher, all the non-epistemic aims) of science. And, the prospect is by no means 
encouraging on either of the two counts. Whether science has any distinctive method of its own, 
setting it apart from other spheres of human endeavour (the demarcation question in the 
philosophy of science; see, for background, [Hansson]) is a question that does not appear to have
a clear answer. That the concept of such a distinctive ‘method of science’ is not a sound one, has 
famously been expressed by Paul Feyerabend in his aphorism, ‘Anything goes’ ([Feyerabend], p 
19).
This widely quoted pithy statement of Feyerabend’s is, at times, interpreted out of context:
“It [the book ‘Against Method’] is not a systematic treatise; it is a letter to a friend and addresses his
idiosyncrasies. For example, Imre Lakatos was a rationalist, hence rationalism plays a large role in the
book. He also admired Popper and therefore Popper occurs much more frequently than his 'objective
importance'  would  warrant.  lmre  Lakatos,  somewhat  jokingly,  called  me  an  anarchist  and  I  had  no
objection to putting on the anarchist's mask. Finally, lmre Lakatos loved to embarrass serious opponents
with jokes and irony and so I, too, occasionally wrote in a rather ironical vein. An example is the end of
Chapter 1: 'anything goes' is not a 'principle' I hold - I do not think that 'principles' can be used and
fruitfully discussed outside the concrete research situation they are supposed to affect - but the terrified
exclamation of a rationalist [i.e., Lakatos] who takes a closer look at history. Reading the many thorough,
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serious, longwinded and thoroughly misguided criticisms I received after publication of the first English
edition I often recalled my exchanges with lmre; how we would both have laughed had we been able to
read these effusions together” ([Feyerabend], preface).  
The commonly accepted view of the scientific method is that science progresses in cycles of 
hypothesis (resulting in a theory), deduction, testing against evidence, and confirmation. Among 
these, the ‘theory of confirmation’ (either based on a principle of inductive generalization or of a 
more general probabilistic variety) has been seen to be not a solidly founded one and was 
replaced by a ‘theory of refutation’ by Karl Popper, which too did not prove to be beyond 
criticism. As for the process of hypothesis formation and the subsequent process of testing the 
deductive consequences against evidence, with these two phases of the scientific process 
forming, respectively, the context of discovery and the context of justification, the former was 
seldom addressed in the philosophy of science before the advent of the cognitive-naturalist era 
beginning, roughly, from the nineteen seventies, and the latter process (that of justification 
against evidence) was shown to be theory-laden (see, for instance, [Bogen]), thus making the 
scheme of theory - deductive consequences - justification against evidence devoid of much of the
rigor one would like it to have. In the resulting confusion, the very concept of a formal 
demarcation between science and non-science is all but abandoned though, paradoxically, there 
appears to be unanimity on the judgment about particular systems and practices, by adherents to 
diverse views in the philosophy of science ([Hansson]; i.e., in other words, there have to be some
criteria underlying our judgments in this respect that cannot, perhaps, be stated in formal terms). 
At the same time, the notion of the epistemic aim of science, i.e., of scientific truths of nature, 
has also turned out to be a turbid one since, as we have seen, the concept of ‘truth’ is under a 
great state of stress between its non-epistemic origin and its epistemic responsibilities.  
All in all, then, it seems that the question of rationality of science is, again, a confused one.
But, at the same time, a criticism is often levelled against the cognitive-naturalist approach that 
the naturalist point of view itself is no less confusing since it is concerned with only a descriptive
account of nature and natural mechanisms, including one of cognitive processes, and glosses 
over every concern with what need be or ought to be, thereby distancing itself with efforts at 
improvement of human cognitive limitations and, more broadly, of the human condition in 
general.
What is the position of naturalism on the question of improvement? This is an issue of 
stupendous magnitude, especially in today’s world, where emotions, including destructive ones 
associated with greed, lust, and craving for power, have been let loose, and questions of 
enormous complexity are now flung out to riot-ridden streets, to be settled at dagger-point. Gone,
perhaps, are the days of quiet and nuanced philosophical discourse, since momentous issues hang
in the balance, to be decided under pressure of raw emotions at polling booths. Since this is what 
is, why torment one’s mind with what ought to be? The cognitive-naturalist point of view 
appears to concern itself with describing what is, while remaining unconcerned with questions 
relating to improvement of what is, towards what ought to be.
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It is indeed difficult to deny such accusations and adopt a stance of nonchalance, and it needs a 
serious engagement with real issues troubling the minds of men, where these issues are, in the 
main, not those of the mechanisms of cognition, but problems of searing intensity relating to 
values – to morality and ethics that have found no resolution in class-rooms, laboratories and 
philosophy conferences.
And the question of values ultimately hangs heavy on science itself. Science – and the fetishism 
of it – has been the cause of immense ravages, and that notwithstanding its supposed quest for 
truth, its concern with the secrets of nature. The real test of the cognitive-naturalist approach will
lie in finding an answer to how values and goals are generated in the world of individuals, 
communities, and cultures, and what role they are destined to play in the turbulent mental life 
that people live. This, of course, is vitally linked with how we perceive the world, and how we 
perceive ourselves.
The greatest philosophical traditions in history have time and again returned to this question: 
how we perceive ourselves. And the science of cognition itself is under no mean burden of 
responsibility in harnessing its efforts to this eternal quest of mankind – to that of understanding 
its own predicament in this world. This, of course, will entail a pressing engagement with greatly
confusing questions of the self, of the soul, of volition and free will, of conscious and 
unconscious psychological processes in men, and of the deep existential turmoil inherent in the 
human condition of today’s world.
Inductive inference appears to be just another piece of esoteric play of ideas, indifferent to the 
pressing concerns of our times and to the common sense perception of men. But inductive 
inference is precisely the mode of thought that defines the common sense perception: it is the 
typically explorative mode of cognition that subsumes logical and philosophical thought but does
not let itself be reduced to the latter. It is inductive inference through which we perceive the 
world and, in the process, perceive ourselves. But, whether an understanding of inductive 
inference with its associated unconscious cognitive processes will bring us any nearer to solving 
our own problems is anybody’s guess, now that our world is decomposing and getting torn apart,
not the least by the use of fruits of science itself.  
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CHAPTER 10  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING WORDS 
Faltering ahead with a torch in hand
In this book we have taken a close look at two aspects of human inferential activity (see below), 
of which the making of scientific inferences constitutes a special instance. The two aspects are 
apparently contrary to each other, which makes the inferential process, or, to be more precise, 
our understanding of that process highly non-trivial and problematic. 
It is to be clearly appreciated at the outset that inference making is the activity of the cognitive 
system aimed at making sense of the world and achieving certain ends, where the aspects of 
achieving and making sense have an intricate relation to each other. In these acts of making sense
and achieving of ends, the cognitive system engages in an act of interpreting the world around it.
Now, in order to understand how exactly the cognitive system interprets the world, we engage 
ourselves in understanding and interpreting the activities of the cognitive system itself. Thus, 
there are two levels of interpreting and making sense: one is the cognitive system making sense 
of the world at large, and the other is the system engaging in the reflective act of understanding 
its own inferential processes, especially those relating to the sciences. Of the two, the latter is 
actually a special instance of the former since the cognitive system is itself a part of the world at 
large, though that truism does not help us much except in realizing that both of these are open-
ended processes. 
The open-endedness will get explained as I now recall the two apparently contrary aspects of the 
human inferential activity (including the one of making scientific inferences), which has been the
recurrent theme in this book: inferences are rooted in the cognitive system of the individual and 
of groups of individuals (such as the scientific communities in the case of scientific inferences) 
while, at the same time, these are aimed at grasping relevant aspects of a mind-independent 
reality.
The inferential process of the individual is fundamentally of an inductive nature, where logically 
driven deductive processes find their place only within the ongoing inductive flow. The inductive
process is generally in the nature of a deeply personal one, where beliefs and emotions play an 
essential role though, paradoxically, the end product of the inferential process has to be effective 
with reference to the world out there, a world that does not know of the personal beliefs and 
emotions. For instance, the scientific hypotheses and theories have to correctly correspond to 
features and mechanisms inherent in nature or, in other words, have to be bearers of truth. 
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The personal aspect of knowledge about the world was highlighted by Michael Polanyi who, 
moreover, stressed upon the tacit nature of the greater part of that knowledge and of the process 
of gaining that knowledge. Later generations of cognitive scientists worked upon the idea of tacit
cognition, thereby bringing out a number of basic features of the cognitive activity of the human 
mind, including the irrationality of the cognitive process. 
The ‘irrationality’ becomes apparent when individuals are given psychological ‘tasks’ of various 
types by way of requiring them to address little problems whose solutions are known to the test-
givers (the cognitive psychologists) in terms of sets of rules supposed to be normative ones. It 
then becomes necessary to recognize the distinction between the normative and the descriptive, 
the latter being the way the cognitive and inferential processes actually proceed within the 
human mind. Now, this is a tricky question that requires a deep look at how the cognitive process
operates tacitly, i.e., at an unconscious level. 
The unconscious mind is capable of greatly complex cognitive activities, most of which were 
previously assumed to be exclusively dependent on focused awareness and intention. While 
some revealing indications of the range of activities of the cognitive unconscious are available by
means of psychological studies, there remains a huge unexplored area, which calls for 
speculations and interpretations so that the few pieces of solid information available can be 
interpreted and woven into a coherent framework. Evidently, there may be alternative 
frameworks of interpretation and speculation, some of which will prove to be inadequate in the 
light of subsequent findings, while some others will gain in strength, and this process of 
speculating, pruning, and gaining in strength will continue and, additionally there will be 
occasional major transformations in our conception of how the cognitive process, including the 
processes of inference, works. 
This, incidentally, is also the way that science approaches nature and natural phenomena. 
Mechanisms operating within natural phenomena are revealed to science in successive stages, in 
each of which nature appears in a new perspective as greater and greater depths are probed by 
means of improved instruments, backed up with improved conceptual frameworks. In other 
words, at every stage of interpretation of reality, there exist unexamined substrata and 
unacknowledged natural boundaries, due to which the fit between nature and the theories of 
science shows up small anomalies and faults symptomatic of an innate vulnerability of these 
theories. The latter get replaced by broader and deeper theories at a later stage which, however, 
do not bear a clear and simple relation of reducibility to the earlier generation of theories. The 
transition from one stage to the next is often a complex process where hypotheses, essentially of 
the nature of inspired guesses, are proposed, and highly speculative ideas are subjected to 
criticisms, counter-criticisms, and meticulous appraisal examining their consistency with 
evidence and with vast bodies of concepts of proven worth. In the process, some of the 
speculations and hypotheses get abandoned while some others are selected for further scrutiny 
and examination.  
In the special case of building of theories aimed at describing our cognitive and inferential 
processes, the vulnerability of speculations, hypotheses, and theories is especially pronounced 
because of the fact that most of these processes are in the nature of hidden ones, taking place 
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within the cognitive unconscious. However, one seems to be on fairly solid ground in saying that
all the inferential processes are contextually determined, where there is an external context as 
also an internal one to be reckoned with, both of which are of a deeply complex nature. The 
external context, described by the stimuli and inputs from the external world that sets an 
inferential process in motion is complex in virtue of the fact that out of the infinite number of 
environmental inputs that the cognitive mind can possibly pick up, only a subset (which may be 
a very large one) is actually selected depending on their relevance and salience. However, the 
selection is made complex by the fact that, first, the criteria of relevance and salience depends on
the current state of mind (including the current set of goals, purposes and values) of the 
individual concerned and, secondly, many of the inputs received from the environment, and 
subsequently used for inferential purposes, are of a subliminal nature. Most of the inputs are in 
the form of cues picked up tacitly and subsequently transformed into unconsciously formed 
heuristics.
The internal context of an inferential process is of a similarly complex nature, if not more, since 
it is made up of heuristics and beliefs, mostly of an unconscious nature, additionally involving 
emotions and affects. In other words, there exist vast repertoires of hidden components in both 
the external and internal contexts relevant to the inferential process.
An inference involves a processing of information of a tangled and complex nature where a vast 
hierarchy of rules are made use of, again, mostly at an unconscious level. The rules are of 
various categories, some of which are independent of beliefs and modes of thought of individuals
and groups of individuals while some others are not so. The latter include rules of a person-
specific and those of an inter-subjective nature, mostly answering to the description of heuristics.
The latter are half-baked rules of thumb and hunches, many of those of a transient and fluid 
nature, liable to be discarded unless proven to be of some worth. On the other hand, there is a 
vast web of beliefs, many of which are resistant to revision and are of a relatively remote 
relevance with reference to the inferential act in question. What is of special significance is that a
number of heuristics and beliefs act as resources that propel the cognitive mind across logical 
gaps, where the latter are gaps that cannot be bridged by means of objectively defined rules. In 
this, the cognitive mind is greatly aided by emotions and affects that facilitate the making of 
decisions that acquire relevance in the bridging the logical gaps. It is this process of leaping 
across logical gaps that is specific to inductive inference, which makes it fallible and, at the same
time, personal in nature while being uniquely effective too.
Of especial relevance in the sciences is the process of abduction, i.e., the one of making of 
hypotheses that subsequently germinate into scientific theories. A novel hypothesis that leads to 
the transformation of an entire conceptual space is mysterious process indeed, the true nature of 
which can only be speculated upon. It is likely to involve a greatly enhanced exploration of the 
conceptual space where local instabilities in the sequential progression of information 
processing, caused by the amplifying action of emotions, lead to the development of parallel 
branchings in the exploration process. In this, efficient organizing principles like the detection of 
analogies play a crucial role whereby relatively remote ideas get correlated and eventually 
coalesce together to lead to a conceptual transformation engendering remarkable possibilities.  
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The scientific theories that result from these processes of an abstruse nature have a dual 
significance: these sprout from grounds abounding in beliefs and cultural resources of 
individuals and groups of individuals, and are built upon prior structures of existing concepts and
theories and, at the same time, these are aimed at revealing the inner mechanisms of nature. As a 
result, the theories are bearers of truths about nature that have strange and conflicting aspects to 
these. On the one hand, these are truths largely independent of opinions and points of view of 
individuals and groups of individuals (though this is conditional upon a more or less prolonged 
process of exchanges and communications of ideas) and, in this sense, are objective in nature 
while , on the other, these are aimed at a mind-independent reality. The mechanisms inherent in 
the latter are explored in successive stages of incommensurable nature, through conceptual 
transformations akin to a change in perspective. In this, the truths are in the nature of socially 
conditioned interpretations.
But the fact that the inferential acts in science, including the ones arrived at by the process of 
abduction, are fundamentally in the nature of interpretations, with logical gaps remaining within, 
need not imply a weakness in these. On the contrary, it constitutes a strength of great relevance 
in our inquiry into nature and in our incessant engagements with a largely unknown, uncertain, 
and complex world. There does not exist any sure-shot way of coming to grips with a vast and 
complex reality with our limited and meagre cognitive resources other than the one of guessing 
and groping for our way ahead, sticking our neck out, making use of what has proved to be of 
some worth and discarding what is found to be ineffective while, at the same time, retaining the 
lessons of the failures. 
The cognitive abilities are, to a quite considerable extent, results of a protracted evolutionary 
process that is essentially of a similar nature as the one outlined above – building upon the past 
in a piecemeal way, in response to contingent necessities. Cognition has no ultimate goal 
precisely because it faces nature in an infinite variety of contexts. Inferences, abstractions, and 
theories are not aimed at producing a facsimile description of how nature exists and behaves as a 
whole, but at providing us with a summary understanding of parts and aspects of nature as we 
face these in specific contexts so that we can make effective sense of these. Our theories are like 
maps drawn from a limited exploration into nature, based on which we make hypotheses 
regarding the way ahead. We then commit ourselves to further explorations in keeping with our 
hypotheses and, when rewarded with success, remake the maps, where the new set of maps differ
from the earlier ones in that new aspects are incorporated into these, requiring novel ways of 
reading the maps. Theories, in other words, make possible new encounters with nature. In this, 
science is continuous with and constitutes a heightened form of our mundane, day-to-day 
engagement with reality where we make great use of our ability to guess, and guess correctly, 
albeit with equally great support from our judgement based on sound logic.
The naturalist point of view looks at the actual process by which scientists go about their 
business of interpreting nature, without burdening itself with logical and abstract considerations 
of what the aim of science is, what the scientific method is, and what constitutes scientific 
progress. In this, the naturalist point of view focuses keenly on the cognitive roots of how 
science inquires into nature. It focuses keenly on how inferential processes actually proceed in 
the minds of individuals, how a great variety of cultural resources affect our cognitive 
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endeavour, and how hypotheses are actually formed, giving rise to theories about the world 
around us, without burdening itself too much with questions of norms of rationality; more 
precisely, it tells us that questions relating to norms are misplaced ones.
Still, questions relating to norm are not irrelevant. And, abstract and logical considerations are 
not irrelevant either. In a manner of speaking, considerations in the abstract are as relevant as 
those in the concrete. In the context of human cognition and of the scientific process, the 
naturalist point of view entails the considerations of the latter variety, while the former are the 
ones that were the mainstay in the philosophy of science up to the sixties of the last century. The 
logical approach in the understanding of human cognition, principally geared to realizations of 
cognitive mechanisms in artificial intelligence, captures quite an impressive number of aspects of
the cognitive process, and a logical analysis of the scientific process brings in sharp focus quite 
an impressive number of issues relating to the cognitive roots of scientific exploration and the 
way the latter relates to a mind-independent reality.
Questions of norm in human cognition cannot be shaken off by the simple assertion that these do
not relate to how cognition actually works. Human cognitive and inferential processes are not 
limited within the narrow horizon of effectiveness, because effectiveness is meaningful only with
reference to goals and values. And, questions relating to goals and values are not confined to the 
field of cognition alone, because these are deeply existential ones. Ultimately, these relate to our 
desires and drives, our cravings for power, our yearnings for fulfilment, our deep-rooted instincts
for sharing and understanding, our need to improve upon what we have become, and our endless 
quest for making sense of our own existence in this world of ours – a world that is within us as it 
is around us.
Both the two worlds are fathomless, revealed to us contextually and discontinuously, in bits and 
pieces. Our perception of either of the two builds up, shimmers before our eyes, and then 
dissolves into a new picture, revealing novel aspects in a new context. This makes for a quest 
that remains open-ended even as it constitutes an intoxicating and dizzying journey. We do hold 
the powerful torch of logic in our hands, but the rays emanating from it are too straight to obviate
the necessity of guessing, groping, and faltering ahead along twisting paths in a world that is at 
once labyrinthine and layered.
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